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Introduction
Venture Capital Funds invest in new (generally small) ventures with high risk 
exposure  and  high  growth  potential,  thus  playing  a  fundamental  role  in  fostering 
national  innovation  and  economic  growth  (Gompers  and  Lerner  2001,  Kortum and 
Lerner 2000, Callahan and Mueggue 2002). Academic studies on Venture Capital have 
investigated over time a number of related topics. This research examines the many 
strategies which Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds (hereinafter VCs) may use to 
diversify their investment. I analyse the relationship between portfolio strategies and the 
performance of a VC.  
There is a large and growing literature analysing the return of venture capital 
investments (Jones & Rhodes-Kropf 2003, Ljungqvist & Richardson 2003, Kaserer & 
Diller 2004, Cumming & Walz 2004, Cochrane 2005, Kaplan & Schoar 2005). The 
majority of these articles study the relative performance of VCs compared to public 
markets.  However,  there  is  much  less  understanding  about  the  impact  of  portfolio 
strategies on the performance of VC. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by examining the 
impact of diversification on the rate of positive return of VC funds.
Portfolio diversification is a particularly interesting issue in the Venture Capital 
industry, where “generalist” funds (involved on many different markets) work alongside 
funds concentrating their portfolios on specific industries, geographical areas and stage 
of development (Cumming 2004, EVCA 2005, The Economist 2004). Among the many 
possibilities of action, it has been seen that some large funds tend to circumscribe their 
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activities by accurately choosing industries to include in their portfolios (EVCA, 2005; 
The Economist, 2004), whereas other funds divide their organizational structure into 
separate  units  devoted  to  specific  business  categories  or  industries  within  which  to 
develop  and  exploit  specific  expertise  as  a  competitive  advantage  (Harper  and 
Schneider, 2004). 
Although  finance  and  strategic  management  researchers  have  increasingly 
widened the scope of research on VCs, the latter’s portfolio strategies have been rarely 
investigated  (e.g.  Norton  and Tenenmbaum,  1993).  Though,  even  if  some previous 
studies showed the existence of heterogeneity in the VC market relatively to managerial 
approaches,  preferences  for  particular  stage  of  development  of  the  supported  deal, 
business selection criteria (Robinson 1987, Norton e Tenenbaum 1993, Elango et al. 
1995, Wright and Robbie 1998, Manigart et al. 2002), little attention has been paid on 
how VCs cope with the composition of their portfolios.  Surprisingly, little knowledge 
exists  as  to  how  VCs  develop  their  investments  portfolio,  even  if  the  decisions 
regarding investment scope are key issues for corporate strategy (Hofer and Schendel 
1978). This research advances that VCs performance is influenced by the choices of 
composition of their portfolio, along three possible dimensions: geographic dimension 
(i.e.  the geographic  origin of  the  investee  companies);  the  stage of  development  of 
selected deals; the industry or technological field of the backed ventures. 
This study suggests that VCs performances are contingent on their choices as to 
the  composition  of  their  investment  portfolios.  Also,  the  decision  determining  the 
composition of a fund and thus the level of diversification, plays a crucial role in its 
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development, since it is a long-term strategic decision that is difficult to change. The 
maximum amount a fund is allowed to invest in a single company as well as in certain 
financing stages, industries, or countries is fixed in the partnership agreement with the 
limited partners, i.e., the investors. A deviation from this agreement is only possible if 
all limited partners approve. Hence, since the portfolio decision are difficult to change, 
and have a deep impact on the VCs funds, we address the following question: does 
portfolio-diversification lead to higher performance than portfolio-specialization?
This  research aims at  contributing to  the literature  dealing with the strategic 
decisions  and  performances  of  VCs,  calling  into  play  the  debate  on  whether  a 
diversification  strategy  is  more  or  less  effective  than  specialization.  Exploring  this 
question may also contribute to the literature on corporate strategy in that it expand the 
breath  of  corporations  that  are  included  in  the  analysis  of  how  diversification  and 
specialization strategies affect performance. Understanding these issues contributes to 
the debate on VC strategy and performance, by analyzing the different behaviours and 
determinants of success of VCs, by comparing different stream of theory supporting two 
competing strategies: portfolio diversification versus specialization.
The rest of this Thesis is organized as it follows:
Chapter I introduces the venture capital context and the relevant literature which 
assessed the issue of portfolio strategy and venture capital performance. 
Chapter II will directly address the question of factors affecting venture capital 
performance, the difficulties in finding reliable proxies for evaluate funds’ return and 
the solution offered from previous literature.
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Chapter  III  will  present  the  analytical  framework  suggesting  two  competing 
hypotheses relatively to the relationship between portfolio strategy and performance, 
which are supported by two separate theoretical approaches: Financial Intermediation 
Theory,  support  the idea that  portfolio  diversification is  associated with better  VCs 
performance, while the Resource-based approach applied to the venture capital context 
suggests that portfolio specialization should lead to higher performance.
Chapter IV firstly is dedicated to display the setting of the analyses, the UK 
venture  capital  industry.  The  rest  of  the  chapter  discuss  the  methodological  issues. 
Sample selection, variables and statistical methods will be presented here.
Chapter V reports the analyses and results on the relationship between portfolio 
diversification and performance. The first section of the chapter will show the dynamics 
of  sample  funds  and  the  emerging  trends.  Then  the  results  and  implication  from 
regressions will be presented. Also, robustness check will be reported to strengthen the 
findings.
Chapter VI concludes the thesis and discuss possible avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER I
Relevant literature on Venture Capital portfolio 
strategies and their performance.
In this section I will provide a synthetic review of the relevant literature dealing 
with the portfolio strategies of VCs. First I will briefly describe what venture capital is 
and how venture capitalists operate. Second I will discuss the literature which is most 
related to  the topic  of  this  research,  investigating on VCs’  portfolio  strategies  and 
preference for particular type of investments. Then I will discuss later works that tried 
to shed light on the relation between these decisions and VCs performance. For each of 
these two groups of papers I will point out their findings and conclusions, as well as 
their  limitation and the paths of  future research they have  suggested.  Finally  I  will 
review the main literature on the performance of VCs. As it will be shown, this is a very 
complicated issue, due to the general lack of available data on private transaction and to 
the need to choose a robust proxy of  the measure.
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1.1. The Definition of a Venture Capital Investment.
A  number  of  different  definitions  have  been  given  for  venture  capital 
investments,  depending  on  the  characteristics  of  the  various  parties  involved.  This 
prolificacy of definition can be sometimes misleading: for instance in the United States 
(US) “venture capital investment” refers only to investment in the shares of privately 
held companies at an early stage of a company’s development, whereas in the United 
Kingdom and continental Europe it refers to investment at all stages of a company’s 
development. In this dissertation the UK and European connotation is used.
Venture  capital  investment  consists  in  the  purchase  of  shares  of  (young) 
privately held companies by outsiders for the primary purpose of capital gain (Cressy 
2005). Indeed venture capital is considered as a solution to financing high-risk, high 
reward projects. Figure 1.1. represent the venture capital cycle.
A  Venture  Capital  Fund  (hereinafter  VC)  fund  is  a  collector  of  financial 
resources an a basket of funded companies (MacMillan et al. 1985). The creation of a 
fund  involves  several  entities  (Murray  and  Marriott,  1998),  being  grounded  on  the 
participation of two parties: on the one hand, the funded companies or entrepreneurs 
and,  on  the  other,  a  partnership  between  institutional  entities  (so-called:  Limited 
Partners) providing financial capital,  and a venture capital managing firm (so-called: 
General  Partner)  which  professionally  manages  the  fund  (Bygrave  et.  al,  1989; 
Chiampou and Kallett, 1989). It is very common that a fund is participated by a number 
of limited partners and it is syndicated and run by a number of different general partners 
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(so-called syndication of funds). Hence the funds involves multiple stakes and interests 
which not only are difficult to disentangle but which also affect the partnership itself.
Figure 1.1. The Venture Capital Structures
 
The  Primary  goal  of  a  fund  manager  is  to  provide  returns  to  investors,  by 
enhancing the value of backed companies which entered the fund. In order to realize 
capital gains, the funded companies are exited from the fund and sold to third parties or 
public market. In order to do this, fund managers offer a variety of service to funded 
companies.  Early studies on this topic (Sahlman 1990, Sapienza 1992, Sapienza and 
Korsgaard  1996)  have  underlined  the  role  of  VCs  in  the  management  of  backed 
ventures. A role which goes beyond that assumed by traditional financial intermediaries. 


















                                                                                                                              Chapter I
investigation,  examining  whether  they  act  as  mere  intermediaries  or  as  managing 
companies capable of adding value to backed companies through their own expertise 
and resources (Gompers and Lerner 2002, Hellmann and Puri 2002). It has been shown 
that  VCs  provide  assistance  to  new  ventures  by  monitoring  their  financial  and 
operational performances (e.g. Gompers and Lerner 1999, Kaplan and Stromberg 2001); 
moreover, they are highly involved in recruiting management teams (e.g. Elango et al. 
1995,  Hellmann and Puri  2002,  Bottazzi  et  al.  2004),  and in  finding resources  and 
competences complementary to those of funded ventures (e.g. Brander et al. 2002), both 
in terms of physical and relational capital and human resources (Sorenson and Stuart 
2002);  furthermore,  they  create  incentive  schemes  connected  with  the  economic 
performances of funded companies’ managerial teams (e.g. Reid et al. 1997, Kaplan and 
Stromberg  2003)  and  substantially  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  the  latter’s 
professional standards (e.g Kaplan and Stromberg 2003).  
These are some of the strategies VCs display in order to make profit from the 
companies they hold in their portfolios. Managing the portfolio of companies imply at 
first the ability to create, select and develop a set of assets so that the VC partnership 
can provide a remuneration to the investors for the risk they bear and the resources they 
put at stake.
Hence portfolio management and VCs strategies relatively to portfolio decisions 
is strongly related to their ability of adding value to their funded companies by having 
access to complementary resources, sharing financial risks, getting access to a network 
of managers, investors and investment opportunity (Brander et al., 2002).
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In this sense, special attention has been given to the managerial competences 
developed by VCs, assessing their role and level of participation in the management of 
funded companies (Sapienza 1992, Hellman and Puri 2000, 2002). Such studies have 
essentially subscribed two approaches: on the one hand, attention has been given to the 
creation  of  adequate  structures  for  the  governance  of  relationships  between venture 
capitalists and backed companies; on the other, focus has been placed on a number of 
processes for the management of different activities (Wright and Robbie 1998). 
In the first case, the pioneering work of Sahlman (1990) has paved the way for a 
theoretical  approach essentially  concerned  with  the  screening  and the  evaluation  of 
business plans, and with the preparation of pay-off structures and contractual clauses 
reducing VC firms’ risk exposure.
This  dissertation,  instead,  is  more  in  line  with  the  abovementioned  second 
theoretical approach, which focuses on the strategic approaches displayed by VCs to 
select and support funded companies (e.g. Bygrave and Timmons 1992, Fried and Hirsh 
1994, Tybejee and Bruno 1994).  This theoretical approach comprises different studies 
which have examined the reasons behind the heterogeneity of VCs which affect their 
managerial  styles,  their  preferences  for  specific  development  stages  of  supported 
ventures, and their strategic differences in selecting their operational scope in terms of 
technological sectors and preferred countries in which to invest. 
Although  some  studies  have  examined  VCs’  strategic  choices  as  to  which 
development stage is to be preferred when making investments (see e.g. Norton and 
Tenenbaum 1989, Gupta and Sapienza 1992), little attention has so far been paid to how 
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VCs cope with different dimension along which they can choose between an investment 
diversification or investment specialization strategy. 
1.2. Portfolio strategy of Venture Capitalists: the early studies 
on Diversification versus Specialization.
Dealing with the competition in the venture capital industry, the literature on 
VCs has taken into account the variety of portfolio investments strategies (Elango et al. 
1995, Wright and Robbie 1998). Given the heterogeneity of the field, some studies have 
examined different  kinds of  VCs, identifying multiple  managerial  styles,  investment 
profiles, preferences for given fields and development stages of enterprises or ventures 
requiring  financing  (Robinson  1987,  Florida  e  Kennedy  1989,  Elango  et  al.  1995, 
Wright and Robbie 1998). 
On the basis of such studies, some researchers have dealt  more directly with 
VCs’  choices  in  terms  of  diversification  or  specialization  of  their  portfolio  of 
investments.   Nonetheless,  there  still  remains  a  relatively  small  number  of  studies 
investigating the many differences between VCs portfolio strategies. 
Moving from the recognition of a wide variety of strategies followed by VC 
firms, some seminal papers started to analyse factors that might explain variations in 
preferences  in  industry  diversity,  stage  of  development  and  geographic  scope  of 
portfolio investments. 
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The  finding  of  this  early  studies  suggest  that  VCs  focusing  on  early  stage 
investment tend to have a narrower industry and geographic scope of their portfolio than 
VC  firms  involved  in  later  stage  investments,  in  order  to  accumulate  specialized 
knowledge  and  guarantee  a  greater  involvement  and  assistance  to  the  investee 
companies (Gupta and Sapienza 1992). 
Another important finding is that VCs managing larger funds tend to diversify 
their portfolio much more than smaller firms. Furthermore the need to collect detailed 
information in order to reduce uncertainty induces VCs to concentrate on industries they 
are  most  familiar  with.  In  particular,  the  high  uncertainty  characterizing early-stage 
companies induces VCs to include a small number of companies in their portfolio and 
to specialize in given industries (Norton and Tenenbaum 1993, Elango et al. 1995).
VC firms tend also to specialize in specific development stages, in which their 
acquired expertise can produce greater value (Carter and Van Auken, 1994). 
This  initial  stream  of  literature  on  VCs  choices  relatively  to  portfolio 
composition  faced  for  the  first  time  the  issue  of  heterogeneity  between  VCs.  In 
particular  these  scholars  focused  on  the  heterogeneity  of  VCs,  by  looking  at  their 
strategic  approach  relatively  to  the  management  of  their  portfolio  of  assets,  the 
availability of  resources and the their role in adding value to investment companies.
Gupta and Sapienza’s work (1992) examined the investment strategies of 169 
US based VCs between 1980 and 1989 in order to identify factors that might explain 
variations in preferences regarding the industry diversity and the geographical scope of 
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their investments. More interestingly this study is one the first attempt to explore the 
portfolio strategies on a multiple level basis.  Gupta and Sapienza investigate on how 
the  risk-lowering  pressure  induces  VCs  to  implement  different  strategies  to  their 
investment portfolio composition, relatively to their preferences regarding the stage of 
development of selected deal, the industry spread of investee portfolio companies and 
the geographic breadth of VCs operations.
 Their basic assumption is underpinned on the hypothesis that variations in VCs 
preference regarding portfolio composition of their investment along the industry and 
country dimensions are a function of the preferred stage of development at which to 
make the initial investment.
Their main findings suggest that VCs that specialize in early-stage development 
investments are more keen to lower levels of industry diversification and tend to prefer 
narrower geographic scope, relatively to those who invest in later-stage of development 
ventures.
The importance of this findings is much more in what can be conclude on the 
strategic  behaviour  of  VCs.  Indeed the  fact  that  the  effect  of  stage-of-development 
decisions  have  on  preferences  regarding  industry  and  geographical  scope  of  VCs 
portfolios is of particular interest as it sheds light on what value VCs might add to their 
role as conduits of investors capital to investee companies. The authors assumes that, 
because of the high risk-specific nature of the VC investing activity, the first decision in 
order  to  control  for  the  risk  of  their  activity  has  to  be  taken  along  the  stage  of 
development dimension. Then, given that VC who specialize in early-stage deals show 
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their keenness for narrower industry and geography scope, the authors also suggest that 
their findings reinforce the notion that VCs are more than just providers of financial 
capital. On the opposite, they add value to portfolio companies and thus increase VC 
performance. 
They also propose two possible explanations about the value-added hypothesis. 
VCs may have superior selection capabilities. VCs who focus on early stage ventures 
possess specialized knowledge, which enable them to make more effective decisions 
regarding the selection of ventures to be funded. Hence the value added by VCs is much 
more embedded in their “picking the winner” abilities (Baum and Silverman 2004) then 
in their development skills. The other explanation also involves the ability of VCs to 
improve risk-return characteristics of their backed companies. 
Hence,  VCs who focused on early-stage investment prefer narrower industry 
and geographic scope, for they can thus provide industry-specific knowledge, external 
contacts  and  strategic  and  management  advices  to  the  investee  companies  thereby 
improving their risk-return characteristics.
Adopting Baum and Silverman words, some VCs might be able to show better 
results by acting both as “scouts” of potential profitable companies, in recognition to 
their  ability  to  identify  growing ventures which are  more  likely to  show increasing 
future  value;  and  as  “coaches”,  in  recognition  to  their  ability  to  provide  funded 
companies bundle of assets and resources that encourage and trigger their growth.
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Norton  and  Tenenbaum (1993)  achieve  similar  conclusions.  By  using  data 
collected  by  means  of  postal  questionnaires,  the  authors  evaluated  a  number  of 
suggestions on the many strategies orienting VCs’ choices as to the composition of their 
portfolios in order to assess how risk exposure is managed thereby. 
They argue that essential to VCs’ performance is the control and management of 
portfolio risk. VCs have hence developed multiple instrument for controlling risk, as for 
instance by structuring the financing in different and subsequent stages and by relying 
on very strict and detailed ex-ante covenants (see also Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). 
The authors suggest that a powerful tool VCs have to control for risk exposure, include 
portfolio  diversification.  Spreading  the  risk  by  investing  in  different  markets  and 
countries VCs can minimize investment specific risks. On the other hands, they also 
showed that many VCs seems to rely on specialization into particular investment types, 
so  that  information  sharing,  gaining  access  to  networks  and  deal  flows,  acquiring 
reputation in the investing community can also be used to control for unsystematic risk.
Their  analysis  conducted  on  98  enterprises  suggests  that  the  need  to  collect 
information so as to reduce uncertainty induces VCs to concentrate on industries they 
are most familiar with. In particular, the high uncertainty of the early growth stages of 
deals induces VCs to include a small number of companies in their portfolio and to 
specialize in given industries.  Conversely, VCs engaged in later  development stages 
prefer to spread out their involvement across different industries. 
The fact that investors in early-stage deals seems less diversified across industry 
and country lead the authors to conclude that the assumption of complete diversification 
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is not appropriate in the context of VCs. In this circumstances of high uncertainty, VCs 
are more likely to rely upon their expertise to specialize in certain technical and product 
areas. Due to their information advantage in said technologies and markets, and the high 
fixed costs of gaining expertise in other domains, it does not make economic sense for 
them to seek portfolio diversification.
Other  scholars  were  involved  in  researching  on  the  heterogeneity  of  VCs. 
Elango et al. (1995) study the source of heterogeneity among VCs. 
Through a  questionnaire-based data  gathering method,  they obtain data  from 
about 150 VCs in Nothern America, and point out that VC differ on several dimension, 
which  they  group into  four  different  areas:  venture  stage,  staff  assistance,  size  and 
geographical heterogeneity. 
The authors  asked to a  number  of US based VCs information on these four 
dimension until the year 1989. Relatively to this present dissertation more interesting 
are above all the dimensions regarding the stage of ventures in which VCs invest, and 
the geographical scope of operation. 
Consistently with prior studies, Elango et al. found that earlier stage investors 
are much more interested in focusing on smaller  number of ventures within similar 
product characterized by technological novelty and with high growth potential, while 
later-stage investors look for companies that offer market-proven product, regardless to 
the type of market relatedness between backed companies’ businesses. 
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At the same time, VC that are more concerned with later stage and buy out deals, 
are also more likely to open subsidiaries in other parts of the US in order to search for 
potential investment in other geographical areas rather than focusing on their domestic 
territory,  while  for  instance  VC focusing in  early-stage  high-tech  investment  in  the 
Silicon Valley. 
In other words, Elango et al. reach similar conclusion of previous work, where it 
seems that VCs who specialize in early stage ventures tend to prefer less diversity in 
terms of industry and geographical scope of their investment portfolio.
Also  Carter  and  Van  Auken (1994)  are  interested  in  investigating  on  the 
importance of companies’ stage of development in investors choices. 
In particular, while previous works have examined the relative significance of 
various evaluation criteria for venture capital projects, there has been no attempt prior to 
Carter  and  Van  Auken  study  to  investigate  on  the  relationship  between  evaluation 
criteria and the investment preference of the VC. 
The authors argue that one of such preference involves the stage of development 
of founded companies. They look at the stage of development of backed companies as 
one key criteria VCs employ when selecting the deals they are willing to invest in. They 
used a postal questionnaire approach and collected information on 69 US based VCs 
during the years 1980-1989. 
Their findings reports that VCs prefer to invest in business prior they reach a 
mature phase, and that VCs investing in earlier stage of development declare to be more 
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involved  as  active  manager  in  their  companies,  than  those  preferring  later  stage 
investments. 
As an explanation for this pattern of strategic choices, the authors employ the 
same rationalization scheme of Gupta and Sapienza (1992) and Norton and Tenenbaum 
(1993), supporting the view that specialization strategy is an important strategic means 
that VC can display in order to control for unsystematic risk and uncertainty. In other 
words, since the information on funded companies and market expectations are likely to 
be a function of the company’s stage of development, it is reasonable to expect that 
investors  might  specialize  in  specific  stage  of  development  where  expertise  in 
evaluation may be more valuable.
Carter and Van Auken found evidence suggesting that the stage of development 
of  the  companies  in  which  the  VC  invests  is  of  absolute  relevance  to  investors. 
Moreover  investors  who appear  to  prefer  investments  in  their  early  stages  are  less 
interested in the management of risk and of the endeavour than later stage investors, and 
more willing to exercise control over the project by employing an active management 
approach, for instance by spending more time in the selection process and by replacing 
management as the need arise. 
Finally and very important for the purpose of this dissertation, Carter and Van 
Auken’s paper is one of the first attempt to look at the impact that strategic choices of 
VCs have on their ability to perform. Their work suggest that preferences about the 
stage of development of investee companies are also related to the investor’s strategy to 
realize value from its investments. 
19
                                                                                                                              Chapter I
Since the ultimate goal  for  the investor  is  to  find a  profitable  exit  from the 
venture, VCs can be very concerned about the probability of success of this effort. This 
probability is linked to the future prospect of liquidity of the investment. 
In other words, the probability for a VC to experience a favourable exit has a 
direct relationship with the probability to cash-out the investment. On the other hand, 
since a positive exit can be made only via third sale of the backed company to another 
investor and/or another organization, or by taking the founded company into the public 
market via initial public offering (IPO), the probability to liquidate the investment is 
also affected by the stage of development of the investment. Using responses from their 
sample questionnaire, the authors thus shows that later stage investors pretend to be 
much concerned about liquidity then their early stage investor peers. Also early stage 
investors seem to favour the IPO as a means of exiting the project, than later stage VCs. 
Two basic assumption are suggested here: the first one is that the probability of 
positive exit through third sale are higher than the probability of positive exit from IPO 
(Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). The second one is that the probability to obtain bigger 
excess return from investee companies is higher if the companies are taken to the public 
market than if the they are sold to another (private) counterpart (Gompers and Lerner 
2001). 
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1.3. Conclusion and limits of early research.
These papers are the first attempt to tackle the issue regarding the way VCs cope 
with their portfolio strategies, in order to deepen the understanding of the heterogeneous 
strategic behaviour of VCs relatively to the managing of their companies in relation 
with the decisions on the composition of their portfolio. These scholars have linked the 
topic of investment strategy of VCs and the problem of portfolio management.
Interestingly, one can track several common themes which characterise the early 
research.   First  of  all,  from all  of  these  studies  it  emerges  a  tangible  utility  which 
explain the need and the purpose of investigating this issue, that is: VCs have to employ 
and display portfolio strategies in order to face and manage the risk-return issue of their 
investments.
Moreover,  it  is  generally  reckoned  that  there  are  two  possible  theoretical 
approaches among which a VC can choose in order to mange the risk-return issue: by 
focusing the portfolio of investment along some strategic dimension, either spreading 
the number of investments along these dimensions. In almost all of these studies the 
strategic variables along which a VC can gauge their portfolio strategies and success are 
the degree of  specialization/diversification relatively to  the stage  of  development  of 
their portfolio, the industry and geographic scope of their basket of investments. 
Relatively to the specialization versus diversification approaches, the first one 
apply to the benefit of specialization, that is the possibility of information sharing and 
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replication, the development of expertise and key resources and capabilities that can be 
redeployed on a number of subsequent or contemporary investments.
The second approach rely  on  the  benefits  of  portfolio  diversification,  which 
apply  on  financial  theory  and  address  the  issue  of  risk-return  of  a  portfolio  of 
investment arguing that by diversifying the asset of a portfolio, the unsystematic risk 
can be reduced with, benefiting the performance.
The pattern of portfolio decisions for VCs are modelled by these authors with a 
common strategic starting point, or priority strategic dimension, which is the choices 
regarding the preference for the stage of development of target companies, as if the core 
feature which distinguishes the VC business from other type of economic activity is 
concealed within the particular choice of the stage of development. It seems like this 
early stream of research considers that the choice of regarding the  stage of development 
in which a VC operate is taken for granted by VCs. I suggest that this is because of the 
undeniable difference which the stage of development of a venture entails. For instance, 
an investment in the seed stage typically involve a start-up with no track of previous 
activity, generally developing concept-products or offering or producing new products 
and services in new markets, and unable to predict future steadily flows of sales neither 
of profits (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984). 
On the  other  hands,  an  investment  in  the  buyout  stage  typically  concerns  a 
developed company as deal target, with a track record of sales and a history of profits, 
which needs to finance its growth and development plans. One can easily think about 
differences in risk and needs that such different stages of development required from a 
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VC to be  managed.  The  important  point  is  the  following:  as  it  appears  from these 
mentioned  seminal  studies,  because  of  the  intrinsic  difference  in  risk  and  abilities 
needed to operate in diverse stage of development deals, once a VC decide how to 
position itself  along this dimension,  the particular chosen stage demands subsequent 
patterns of choices regarding the degree of specialization of diversification along the 
industry and geographic dimensions.
Finally, these seminal contributions achieve common findings. It is commonly 
acknowledged the view that early stage investors tend have more focused investment 
portfolios along the industry and the geographical dimensions, than the later stage ones.
These  seminal  contributions  opened  an  important  and  interesting  avenue  of 
research  regarding  the  understanding  of  VCs  strategic  behaviour  and  the  different 
approaches they display relatively to portfolio management. 
One of the limits  of these first  studies is  that  their  findings rely  upon small 
sample, drawn from only US, in the early years of Venture Capital. Gupta and Sapienza 
perform  their  analyses  on  a  sample  of  169  US-based  VCs,  while  Norton  and 
Tenenbaum’s sample counts for 98 respondent US-based VCs; Elango et al. perform 
their study based on 149 responses; Carter and Van Auken rely on 69 VCs. This suggest 
caution  on  generalization  of  their  findings:  for  instance  the  papers  look  at  the 
phenomenon only in US. Yet it worth to say that during the ’80s, the Venture Capital 
industry was much more active in US than in the rest of the world. But more recent 
research show that the bulk of VC raise is to be set in the ‘90s, where not only the US 
23
                                                                                                                              Chapter I
players have enormously grown in terms of numbers and volume of activities, but some 
scholars talk about a real boost in the Venture Capital industry (Gomper and Lerner 
2001, Bottazzi et al. 2004) thanks to the huge development of these industry in Europe 
and in the Far-Eastern markets. 
Hence, we might have a limited perception on what is the behaviour of VCs 
from these later works, since many years have passed from this early contributions, the 
Venture Capital market developing worldwide and shaping its features.
Moreover, given the severe limitations on the public availability of data on VCs, 
these studies used survey-based data. In any survey there is a trade-off between the 
eliciting  of  responses  and  collecting  sufficient  information  (Carter  and  Van  Auken 
1994).  These  studies  focused  on  the  investment  preferences  rather  than  the  actual 
patterns of VCs (Gupta and Sapienza 1992). While we can expect a high correlation 
between  investment  preferences  and  actual  strategies  there  is  an  empirical  need  to 
support  this  expectation.  Some of  the authors point  out  that  from their  responses it 
emerged different preferences relatively to the industry and geographical scope of their 
investment,  from  companies  which  showed  similar  preferences  regarding  stage  of 
development  (Elango et  al.  1995).  Some VCs focus  on  specific  industries,  whereas 
others do not, and this seem to be a significant factor although not tested (Bygrave and 
Timmons  1992).  This  is  a  call  for  the  need  to  investigate  on  the  actual  portfolio 
strategies of VCs, not only on their past preferences, and to model the interaction of the 
possible  variable  along  which  a  VC can  choose  its  diversification  or  specialization 
approach relatively to its portfolio strategies.
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Finally, Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) claim for the need of additional work to 
be done in order to better understand the theory and process of VCs on risk control. For 
instance, none of these works have taken into account the impact of different portfolio 
strategies on VCs’ performance. This is an issue of primary importance, if the ratio 
which is used to explain the need for VCs to manage their portfolio of investments is 
the need to  cope with the issue of risk-return.  The focus of these studies had been 
mainly on the antecedents of VCs’ investment preferences and it would be important to 
take a look at the impact of this choices on the ability of VCs to perform (Gupta and 
Sapienza  1992,  Elango et  al.  1995).  The  comparison  of  performance  between  VCs 
specializing and/or diversifying along different dimension could also be very interesting 
to shed light on the heterogeneous behaviour of VCs (Carter and Van Auken 1994).
1.4. Recent studies on the VCs portfolio strategies.
Venture capital has in recent years become a substantial and growing area of 
academic research. This florescence has emerged from the pioneering works mentioned 
above together with the build-up and final bursting of the stock market bubble of the 
1990s, regarded by many as fuelled by venture capital (See Gompers and Lerner, 2001).
Recent  research  showed  that  while  some  VCs  specialize  only  in  certain 
technologies  and  stage  of  development  and  geographical  markets,  keeping  their 
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investment strategy very focused, others tend to display a diversification strategy along 
the above mentioned dimensions (Cumming 2004). 
Latest  reports  on VC industry point out that  many players are  defining their 
operative area by accurately selecting industrial  fields  (EVCA 2005, The Economist 
2004),  while  some  others  ramify  their  organizational  structure  in  industry  and/or 
country-specific units in order to develop a context-specific knowledge as a competitive 
advantage (Harper and Schneider 2004). 
Most recent academic papers try to shed light on VCs heterogeneity, suggesting 
that specialized organizations might be more successful then diversified VCs (Bottazzi 
et  al  2004),  while  other  produce  first  evidence  that  a  diversification  approach  can 
improve  fund  performance  (Knill  2005).  Research  community  claims  the  need  to 
deepen the understanding of the linkages between VCs’ performance and their degree of 
specialization. 
These few studies emphasize also the importance of other factors which might 
affect portfolio investment strategies, such as the country of origin, the source of funds 
and the  degree  of  experience  of  the  VC.  In  a  study of  the  Finnish  venture  capital 
industry, De Clercq et al. (2001) point out that VCs develop their investment strategies 
over time, through subsequent decisions regarding the type of companies they invest in. 
More experienced VCs were slightly more specialized in terms of industry then less 
experienced VCs (although the difference was not significant at conventional levels), 
whereas the former were found to be more geographically diversified.
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Bottazzi  et  al.  (2004),  analysing  the  European  VC  Industry  found  that 
knowledge and human capital specialization at the level of the VC firm is a fundamental 
driver  to  understand  VCs’  strategies:  specialized  VCs  are  more  active  and  more 
involved with their portfolio companies. Gompers et al. (2004) studying the reactions of 
US VCs to shifts in public market signals, found that the most successful were the VCs 
exhibiting a higher level of industry-specific focus of their investments portfolio. 
These works stress on the importance of knowledge and resources accrued by 
VCs and on the constraints of diversified firms in redeploying their resources among 
investments pertaining to different business areas. Thus a greater industry focus should 
reduce the inefficiencies associated with spreading the VC’s resources across portfolio 
companies (Fulghieri and Sevilir 2005).
The study of  De Clercq et  al. (2001)  is  the first  attempt to  identify realized 
strategies of venture capital firms when undertaking portfolio investments. Their units 
of analysis are not the declared preferences of Finnish VCs. More directly they focus on 
portfolio of investments of these VC. They gathered data for the period 1994 through 
1997  on  1160  investment  from  28  Finnish  VCs  representing  virtually  the  entire 
population  of  the  Finnish  venture  capital  industry. The purpose  of  this  study is  to 
examine  the  realized  strategies  of  Finnish  VCFs  as  determined  by  their  portfolio 
investments. The study builds on prior research on diversification, specialization, and 
knowledge acquisition, as it pertains to venture capital investments. 
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They analysed the underlying patterns in  the venture capitalist’s  selection of 
portfolio companies. More specifically, they focused on the characteristics of portfolio 
companies, in terms of their industry, company stage of development and geographical 
location, as strategic variables that guide the VCs’ decision process. 
They built on Gupta and Sapienza, Nroton and Tenenbaum quoted research, in 
that it should be expected that VCs’ strategic decisions are based on maximizing risk-
returns  combination  of  their  investment  portfolios.  Moreover,  they  argue  that  these 
decisions may follow a specific pattern as VCs gain experience over time. VCs then use 
their experience to control investment risk while maintaining high returns. They start 
proposing that VC can control for risk by taking two possible approaches: (1) reducing 
risk through specialization, with a VC developing knowledge by focusing on a specific 
industry, company stage of development, and geographic location; or (2) spreading risk 
through  diversification  across  industries,  company  stages  of  development  and 
geographic locations.  They modelled three independent indexes measuring the VC’s 
relative degree of  diversification along the dimension of industry scope,  geographic 
location and stage of development of their investments.
They  looked  at  bivariate  correlation  coefficients  of  the  three  indexes  above 
mentioned and other control variables, including measures of the experience of the VC, 
performing  then  a  one-way  ANOVA  and  t-test  which  informed  about  how  the 
investment  patterns  changed  from  year  to  year,  and  whether  a  general  investment 
pattern existed over the 4-year period.
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They found that over time, VCs tend to specialize the industry scope of their 
portfolio. Further, VCs consistently diversified geographically throughout the 4 year 
period of the study, and they diversified their portfolio in terms of stage of development 
by investing in increasingly later stage companies through the first years of the study, 
before entering a period of equilibrium in which this degree of stage of development 
diversification  held  relatively  constant.  Finally,  the  importance  of  accumulated 
experience was illustrated by the finding that less experienced venture capital  firms 
showed a time lag in these investment patterns compared to more experienced firms.
An important contribution of their study concerns their approach to the analysis 
of portfolio strategies of VCs. Their study focuses on how VCs develop their portfolios 
through subsequent decisions regarding the types of companies they invest in. Instead of 
looking  at  VCs’  preference  regarding  possible  dimensions  of  diversification  or 
specialization, they modelled these dimensions employing independent diversification 
indexes for  the industry scope, the geographical breadth and the stage of development 
spread of the companies VC hold in their portfolios.
Another  important  contribution  of  this  study  concerned  the  relationships 
identified between different types of risk and specific portfolio investment patterns, and 
suggesting that further understanding of the VCs’ decision making process may arise 
when considering whether different factors become important during different stages of 
evaluation. In particular, they propose that private investors are willing to accept higher-
than-market  risk  in  order  to  receive  higher-than-market  returns.  Therefore,  a  VC’s 
performance is a function of how well it manages this risk. Specifically, its performance 
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reflects the quality of its investment decisions and the effectiveness of its management 
advice  and  services  subsequent  to  the  investment  decisions  (Zacharakis  and  Meyer 
1995). 
Bottazzi  et  al. (2004)  investigate  on  the  role  that  VCs  play  in  financial 
intermediation. They found that specialization is key to VC activities in the sense that 
choosing a  specialization approach,  VCs can be  more active  in  the  management  of 
funded companies. 
This is one of the first comprehensive studies looking at the Venture Capital in 
Europe,  underpinning  the  analysis  on a  hand-collected  dataset  of  European venture 
capital investments. The data covers the period 1998-2001, and consists of a sample of 
venture capital deals in all the members of the European Union (in the period under 
study), plus Norway and Switzerland. Their primary data source is a comprehensive 
survey of all the venture capital firms in these countries, plus various other sources of 
commercial  available  data,  resulting  in  a  final  sample  of  over  120  VCs,  over  500 
partners, and over 1,600 portfolio companies. A first important feature of this paper is 
that  is  Europe-focused  studies,  and  that  the  data  collection  is  one  of  the  first 
significantly larger than other previous hand-collected datasets on venture capital.
Bottazzi et al. main conceptual frame is based on the belief that specialization 
can help us better understand the nature of financial intermediation, since it is the key 
variable  that  drives  the  degree  of  involvement  of  VCs  in  managing  of  backed 
companies.  Hence,  they  collocate  their  paper  in  the  debate  whether  VCs  can  be 
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conceived as mere financial intermediaries, providing no more than financial capital and 
few other pure financial services to the founded companies, or VCs can be considered 
as  corporate  manager,  actively  managing  the  companies  they  fund,  through  the 
provision of other type of capital (resources, human capital, knowledge and expertise, 
networks and social capital).
They look at whether more focussed and specialized VCs become more involved 
with the companies they finance.  More specifically,  they look at two dimensions of 
specialization.  First,  they  consider  specialization  at  the  level  of  the  organization. 
Second,  they posit  that  financial  intermediation is  performed by people and look at 
specialization at the level of human capital. Then they also look at the interaction of 
these two levels of specialization, and ask whether the decision to be active resides at 
the  level  of  the  organization  or  whether  it  is  individuals  within  the  financial 
intermediaries who drive this choice.
Relatively to the organizational level, they found that an active investment style 
is strongly related to a financial intermediary’s specialization. Independent VCs (those 
VCs who are mainly dealing with VC kind of operations) are significantly more likely 
to  get  involved  with  their  companies,  than  subsidiaries  VCs  (those  as  for  example 
financial entities who occasionally are involved at some level in venture capital deals). 
Further  more,  and consistently  with  prior  research,  VCs that  specialize  their 
investment activities to doing only early stage deals and those which concentrate on 
relatively  few  deals  in  absolute  numbers,  tend  to  be  much  more  involved  in  the 
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management of funded companies than VCs who pursue later stage investments or that 
are involved within a larger number of deals. 
Beyond specialization at the organizational level, they also found that human 
capital is associated with a more active investment style. In particular, VCs with prior 
business experience are significantly more involved with the companies they finance. 
Another  important  contribution  of  this  paper  comes  from  looking  at  the 
interaction between these  two dimensions  of  specialization,  and finding  that  human 
capital augments, rather than replacing, organizational characteristics. In other words it 
seem more likely that variations in human capital across VCs has more explanatory 
power than variation among partners within the same deal.
Fulghieri and Sevilir (2005) take a portfolio approach to analyse VCs investment 
strategies, and investigates the optimal size and scope of a VC's portfolio. They studied 
how the  composition,  in  terms  of  size  and  focus,  of  the  VC's  portfolio  affects  the 
incentives of  the VC and of  the entrepreneurs  in  his  portfolio,  as  well  as  portfolio 
performance.
They address  the questions  relatively to  the determinants the size of  a  VC's 
portfolio; they investigate on the costs and benefits of having a small versus a large 
portfolio. They also examined the strategic aspects of managing a portfolio of start-ups 
rather than a single start-up.
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Their  basic  concern  is  to  model  how  VCs  take  the  decision  of  having  a 
diversified portfolio of companies or a focused one, assuming that size and focus of 
portfolio of investment is an important variable affecting VCs’ performance.
Also Fulghieri and Sevilir’s starting hypothesis is that VCs add value to investee 
companies by acquiring knowledge, human capital and skills that are very often specific 
to  their  portfolio  companies.  These  investments  lead  to  specialization  in  the  VC 
industry, where different VCs invest in different sets of skills. For example, some VCs 
specialize only in certain technologies and industries and keep their investment strategy 
focused, whereas others diversify into different industries.
The authors build a model which explains the composition of VC’s portfolio, 
relatively to its optimal size and focus of investments. They argue that the degree of 
portfolio focus affect the trade-off between having a large or a small portfolio. A high 
level of relatedness between portfolio companies allows the VC to reallocate resources 
more efficiently from one start-up to another. 
The VC benefits from a high level of focus in two different ways. First, when 
one  of  the  start-ups  fails,  the  VC transfers  his  resources  and  human capital  to  the 
successful  start-up.  The  higher  the  level  of  focus,  the  higher  the  efficiency  of  the 
reallocation  of  resources.  This  implies  that  a  greater  level  of  focus  reduces  the 
inefficiency associated with spreading the VC's initial investment across several start-
ups, increasing the benefits of the resource allocation effect.  This issue was already 
suggested by Norton and Tenenbaum, who suggested that in this circumstances of high 
uncertainty, the high fixed costs of gaining expertise in other domains, it does not make 
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economic sense for them to seek portfolio diversification. In other words, Fulghieri and 
Sevilir  built  a  mathematical  model  which  hypothetically  replicates  this  relationship 
between scarceness of resources, uncertainty and the probability for VCs to focus their 
portfolio.  Fulghieri  and  Sevilir’s  paper  also  suggests  that  larger  and  more  focused 
portfolios are optimal in the case of risky start-ups investing in related technologies with 
high uncertainty and failure rates. 
Another benefit of focusing the portfolio of investments is that it allows the VC 
to perform better.  The authors’ opinion is that  this  happens because,  looking at  the 
relationships between VC and entrepreneurs as a bargain in which both of the two side 
aim at having the highest number of options to perform a favourable exit in the future, a 
high degree of focus increases the value of the VC's outside option while he bargains 
with the entrepreneurs. 
The  authors  conclude  that  a  greater  level  of  focus  reduces  the  ex-post 
inefficiency associated with spreading the VC's resources across several start-ups, and 
increases  the  benefits  of  ex-post  resource  reallocation.  This  implies  that  focused 
portfolios are more desirable (all else equal) in the case of risky start-ups that invest in 
technologies with high uncertainty and failure rates. 
Gompers et al. (2005) document that VCs with the most industry specific human 
capital  and  experience  react  most  to  an  increase  in  investment  opportunities  in  the 
sectors of their specialization. The evidence is explained by the view that it is more 
difficult for diversified and less specialized VCs to re-deploy their human capital from 
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the sectors  of  their  investment  to  the sector  experiencing an increase in  investment 
opportunities.  Their  analysis  covered  all  US  venture  capital  investments  during  the 
period 1975-1998, thanks to the availability of Venture Economics commercial datasets, 
resulting in a final sample of 42559 observations.
They build on the idea that more experienced VCs achieve better performance 
than less experienced peers (Sorensen 2004). They modelled VCs’ experience in three 
different  ways. They  called  “General  Experience”  of  a  VC  its  total  number  of 
investments prior to the time of the investment in question. This measure represent the 
VC’s experience accrued in the venture capital business.
The  second  type  of  VC’s  experience  relates  to  the  "Industry  Experience,” 
constructed  similarly  to  the  “General  Experience”  measure,  but  including  only 
investments in the same industry as the investment in question. In other words they built 
class or industry categories of investments and measure the industry specialization of a 
VC in these classes. The third type of experience measure, “Specialization”, measure 
the fraction of all previous investments that the VC made in a particular industry. In 
other words they built the specialization measure as the ratio of “Industry” to “General” 
experience.
Their  findings  suggest  that  the  three  kind  of  VC’s  experience  are  important 
channels  through  which  the  VC  influences  its  reactions  to  shifts  in  public  market 
signals. Indeed VCs tend to increase their investments in years and industries in which 
IPO activity  increases.  Also  The results  also  indicate  that  industry  experience  have 
higher level of investment then less industry experienced peers. Moreover General and 
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Industry experience is positively associated with greater investment sensitivity to IPO 
activity. 
Relatively  to  the  industry-specialization  kind  of  experience,  Gompers  et  al. 
showed evidence that more specialized VCs tend to increase their industry investments 
more than less specialized firms when IPO activity increases, consistently with their 
findings on industry experience.
Finally Gompers et al. looked at the performance of the companies in which the 
VCs  invest,  measuring  their  performance  by  determining  whether  the  investment 
resulted in a profitable exit for the VC. This is most likely the case if the company went 
public, registered for an IPO, or was made object of a third sale (i.e. the company was 
acquired or merged). The authors argue that investments they categorized as successes 
in that way, are likely to have generated higher returns that the investments that have 
not yet exited or have been characterized as bankrupt or defunct. Preliminary results 
seem to indicate that investments made by venture capital firms with more general and 
industry experience are more successful. The patterns with specialization are non-linear, 
but the least specialized organizations appear to be the poorest performers. 
Then they repeated their analysis introducing new control variables such as the 
stage of development of funded companies and the capital inflow in the market during 
the year of the investment. This time, results showed that VCs do somewhat worse on 
the  investments  they  take  when  there  is  a  lot  of  IPO activity.  However,  the  more 
experienced venture capitalists exhibit less degradation in their performance than do the 
less experienced venture capitalists.
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This is an important paper in the stream of research involved in the investigation 
of  the impacts  of  VCs’  specialization or  diversification  portfolio  strategies  on their 
performance. Their general findings support the view that VCs are concerned with the 
decisions  relatively  to  specialize  or  diversify  their  investment  portfolios.  Moreover, 
experience and especially industry-specific experience is shown to be a key driver in the 
process of investment strategy. They also found hints that investments for specialized 
VCs tend  to  be  more  successful  in  terms  of  probability  of  positive  exits  from the 
founded ventures, although the authors themselves call for further need to deepen this 
last  issue,  since  the  linkages  between  performance  and  specialization  versus 
diversification choices remain ambiguous
Finally, Knill (2005) investigated on the trade-off between two different types of 
strategies a VC is looking to implement in order to achieve portfolio optimisation. She 
distinguished between the “pure play” strategy, characterizing the willingness of a VC 
to get actively involved in the management of backed companies, and the “generalist” 
strategy carried on by the VC while pursuing a diversification approach in order to 
minimize the overall risk of their portfolio.
Her  strong  basic  assumption  is  that  every  VC  plays  at  the  same  time  two 
different roles: the role as general manager of each of the companies the VC invests in, 
and a role as fund manager concerned about the overall risk-return profile of the fund it 
manages.  Knill  argue  that  these  two  different  roles  entails  opposite  investment 
philosophy which have the potential to lead the VC to a dilemma. In other words, in 
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their role as company managers VCs should seek for specialization in the particular 
business concerning the company they run or support. On the other hand in their role as 
fund managers, they should look for the overall portfolio considerations and think about 
the level of diversification potential investors practice, in order to take control and to 
reduce portfolio risk.
This paper specifically built on Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) in that this paper 
also examines how VCs reduce risk through stage diversification, information sharing, 
networking and/or specialization. The underling assumption is that a VC determines 
whether  an investment  is  worthy based on the likelihood of its  profitability  and on 
prospect of medium/long term portfolio risk.
This paper also differ from Norton and Tenenbaum approach in several aspects. 
First of all, Knill examines more than 38000 observations relatively to US based VCs, 
collected from a commercial  dataset  on the period 1998-2003, and thus providing a 
larger sample than Norton and Tenenbaum’s one from which deriving conclusions.
Also Knill look more directly at the relation between VCs’ portfolio strategies 
and their performance, although instead of a direct measure of fund profitability she 
uses an indirect measure of growth relatively to the amount of asset under management 
of the General Partner1. She also look at the performance of backed companies, because 
she is also interested in knowing which of the said different approaches (the “generalist” 
versus the “pure play” roles) is the best from the company point of view. She used the 
1 Knill argue that, due to lack of available data it is virtually impossible to collect direct measure of 
performance. She then decided to rely on a proxy of performance measured, which is usually strongly 
positively correlated with more direct level of performance. I will discuss the problem good measure of 
performance in later sections of this dissertation.
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probability of getting through an IPO or being sold via merger or acquisition as a proxy 
to measure the performance of backed companies profitability. 
Interestingly, as I will discuss in detail in next sections of this dissertation, these 
types of performance measures are usually employed by researchers to measure the 
performance at the fund level.
Similarly  to  De Clercq et  al  (2001),  Knill  built  three dimension of  portfolio 
diversification  relatively  to  the  industry,  geographical  and  stage  of  development 
diversity of backed company, based on modified Herfindahal indexes2. She then studied 
the effect of these indexes on the performance variables.
Looking at the impact of VCs’ levels of diversification along the industry, the 
geographic and the stage of  development  dispersion of portfolio  companies to their 
performance,  her  findings  showed  that  the  impact  of  VC  diversification  are  quite 
different  for  the  performance  of  VCs  themselves  and  the  performance  of  backed 
companies. In other words her data shown that a diversified approach seems to be more 
beneficial  at  the  VC  level  then  at  the  backed  company  level  questioning  the 
misalignments of incentives in the VC-backed company relationship.
Interestingly  the  results  showed  that  the  geographic  diversification  seems  to 
have the a positive impact on measure of performance at the fund level, while industry 
and  stage  of  development  diversification  strategies  seems  to  have  only  a  smaller 
marginal impact.
2 I will discuss the diversification measures more in depth in the section dedicated to the measurement of 
variables.
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1.5. Conclusion and limits of recent studies
Based on the findings of earlier literature, these recent papers push forward the 
understanding of VCs’ portfolio strategies and their relationship with performance.
 These later studies appear some ten years after the earlier ones, benefiting for 
quite a long time for the venture capital market to develop and expand from United 
States to United Kingdom first, and then Continental Europe and Far East.
First of all, indeed, these later studies can count on more reliable samples from 
which they can derive conclusion,  thanks to  the growing volume of venture capital 
operation and the great importance of the venture capital in fostering economic growth 
and innovation (see Hellman and Puri 2001), as it is witnessed by the proliferation of 
commercial  database set-up by organization conceived with the purpose of  tracking 
VCs operations over time.
Second, a number of new and unresolved issues are addressed relatively to the 
relationships between VC basic concern about the risk-return profile of their portfolio 
and the strategies they display in order to cope with it. These latest works start to be 
interested  not  only  in  the  preference  of  VCs  for  particular  stage  of  development, 
technological  sectors  or  geographical  markets,  but  in  the  actual  strategies  VC 
implement along these dimensions. Also, multiple level of strategic assets should be 
considered in relation to the various possibility for a VC to leverage on while setting up 
their  specialization  or  diversification  approach:  human  capital,  organizational  level, 
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networks an alliances, industry-specific knowledge are some of the possibilities along 
which a VC fund can diversify its portfolio of investments. 
Furthermore, these works start to investigate on the impact that these strategies 
have  on  performance.  Since  the  VC  partnership  involves  several  entities  each  one 
carrying its own stakes and interests, it is important when talking about performance to 
specify who the performance are related to3. 
Central  to  this  group  of  research  is  also  the  idea  that  the  accumulation  of 
different  kind  of  experience  is  a  key  concept  that  deserve  further  theoretical 
development and empirical investigation at different levels, in order to explain the roles 
VCs plays in modern economy and in fostering the development of new companies. For 
instance,  as  Fulghieri  and  Sevilir  (2005)  pointed  out  specialized  VCs  will  manage 
portfolios with a small number of companies, while less specialized VCs manage larger 
portfolios. Also Bottazzi et al. (2004) suggested that specialized VCs, since they hold 
portfolios with a small number of companies, are able to take a more active role in the 
direct  management  of  their  portfolio  companies,  leveraging  on  the  development  of 
greater  human-capital-specific  resources  and  with  a  more  active  investment  style 
relatively to their portfolio companies. From this point of view, VCs should seek for the 
specialization  of  their  portfolio,  since  specialization  should  specialized  VCs  refrain 
from investing in start-ups that are not related to their core business (De Clercq et al. 
2001). Conversely, as Gompers et al. (2005) pointed out, investment activity by VCs 
with more general expertise is more sensitive to the overall business cycle conditions of 
3 This is a very important issue since the VC partnership represent a different number of separate entities. 
I will dedicate a specific section to discuss this fundamental issue
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the economy since it is more difficult  for diversified VCs to re-deploy their  human 
capital and other resources from the areas of their investment to the area experiencing 
an increase in investment opportunities.
On the other hands there is also contradictory evidence that diversification can 
also benefit can also create value to investors and VCs, as far as a diversified portfolio 
allows for the reduction of risk without reducing performance. So far there has been no 
attempt to directly measure the impact of diversification strategy versus a specialization 
approach on performance. This issue call into question also which level of performance 
one is considering. As Knill (2005) pointed out, it could be a misalignment between the 
incentives  for  the  investors  to  diversify  the  fund portfolio  and  the  incentive  of  the 
backed company to be supported by a VC which has well developed skills in the same 
particular field and markets of the backed company.
The  existing  literature  reveals  some  limitations  that  deserve  further 
investigation. There is limited research on the determinants of VC success in relation 
with portfolio strategy. This issue is deeply linked to the lack of understanding on the 
precise mechanisms behind the relative performance of specialized or diversified VCs
As a final consideration, these latest studies appeared some ten years after the 
earlier  ones,  which  suggest  that  the  portfolio  strategies  of  VCs  are  far  from being 
completely understood and further research is to be exhaustive. Apart from such papers, 
VCs portfolio strategies and the question whether implement a diversification versus 
specialisation approach in  order  to  achieve  better  performance,  has  so  far  been  the 
object of a few studies. Surprisingly, little knowledge still exists as to how VCs develop 
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their investments portfolio, even if the decisions regarding the scope of firms’ activities 
are key issues for corporate strategy (Hofer and Schendel 1978). To my knowledge, 
there  are  virtually  no  empirical  studies  on  the  impact  of  diversification  (or 
specialization) investment strategies on VC fund performance, the issue we will discuss 
in the next section. 
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CHAPTER II
The performance of Venture Capital.
In  what  terms  should  venture  capital  performance  and  related  success  be 
measured?  The  answer  is  that  it  depends  on  the  observer.  From a  political  macro 
economic  perspective,  contributions  such  as  employment  growth,  number  of  new 
companies  or  technological  breakthroughs,  are  of  significant  importance.  Several 
academic VC studies claim for example that entrepreneurial activity fosters innovation, 
patenting  and  growth  performances  (e.g.  Kortum  and  Lerner  1998,  Engel  2002, 
Hellman and Puri 2002, Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004). From an 
entrepreneurial perspective VC firms’ performances might be measured in terms of their 
ability to add value, in addition to capital infusions. Earlier research show e.g. that VC 
firms  play  an  important  role  in  professionalizing  the  firms  in  which  they  invest; 
connecting them with potential clients and suppliers; and attracting additional funding 
(e.g. Sapienza, 1992; Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave and Tylor, 1993; Barney, Busenitz, 
Fiet and Moesel, 1996).
A number of studies has examined the performance of venture capital, some of 
them concentrating on the performances of funded enterprises (see e.g. Robinson, 1998; 
Hege et al. 2003) whilst others focusing directly on VCs’ performances (see e.g. Brophy 
and Gunter, 1988; Bygrave, 1989; Chiampou and Kallett, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1985; 
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Cochrare,  2001).  From  an  investor  perspective  the  most  important  measurement, 
however, is financial returns from venture capital fund investments. A longer-term lack 
of competitive returns will force investors to avoid VC investments, or only invest in 
funds with proven track records. A vital VC market with satisfactory financial returns is 
thus the guarantee for its future survival.
For the purposes of this research, I will focus on the impact that diversification 
has  on  VCs’  performances,  i.e.  the  performance  at  the  fund  level.  What  is  more 
important,  therefore,  is  to  define  a  performance index to  be used in  assessing VCs 
performances.
Reliable  performance indexes are  hard to  be  found (MacMillan et  al.,  1989; 
Cochrare, 2001; Hege et al., 2003) essentially because of the “private” nature of VC 
firms, these not being subject to the transparency and divulgation standards which listed 
companies have to comply with. It thus appears particularly difficult to collect data on 
the economic and financial performances of VCs.
More importantly, the performance of venture capital should be understood in 
the context of a set of investments forming a portfolio and to which the concepts of risk 
and return can be applied. Firm-specific risk of a portfolio can in general be virtually 
eliminated if the size of a portfolio is sufficiently large and diversified. The VC would 
then choose a risk-return combination that best suited the investors whose money are 
invested. The only risk such investors would be subject to would be the un-diversifiable 
risk, associated with the market as a whole (Cochrane 2001). But as we have seen from 
previous literature VCs do not necessarily build their portfolios in order to diversify all 
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the company-specific risk, being concentrated in particular markets, industries or stage 
of  development.  VCs  portfolio  are  substantially  illiquid  to  boot  making  valuation, 
particularly difficult and adding a dimension to risk4. Furthermore even if commercial 
dataset  tracking  several  measure  of  performance,  are  now  available  for  research 
purposes most of them provide this data only on aggregated form, that is relatively to 
the return to particular segment of class of VCs as a whole. Thus researchers have so far 
built a number of proxy to resolve this impasse.
Traditionally, attention has been paid to the return rates yielded by VC funds on 
the invested capital (Brophy and Gunter, 1988; Bygrave, 1989; Chiampou and Kallett, 
1989). Studies based on this approach, however, have faced both biases and lack of data 
on the internal rates of return (IRR) of said funds. The lack of univocal and objective 
data has been essentially resolved in two ways, i.e. by directly requiring VCs (through 
postal  questionnaires)  to  provide  performance  data  (e.g.  MacMillan  et  al.,  1989; 
Manigart et al., 2002) or by using secondary indexes (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Hege 
et al., 2003), e.g. by looking at VCs’ exit strategies: since the ultimate goal is to get out 
of their investments and have a return on their invested capital, many studies have used 
VCs’ exit strategies (e.g. IPOs or sale of the companies to other entities through merger 
or acquisition) as a performance index.
The recent foundation of monitoring organizations and instruments (i.e. EVCA, 
NVCA, TVE) which periodically gather and elaborate (through standard procedures) 
information in the field on an international level, has widened the methods available to 
4 Firm-specific risk (assumed to be eliminated by the investor in the CAPM model) will in practice play a role in 
pricing of such portfolios and so the CAPM cannot strictly be applied to price them. See Cochrane (2004).
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evaluate  VCs  performances  by  using  historical  data  on  investments’  (incoming and 
outgoing) cash-flows during the latter’s “life-time” (Murray and Marriot, 1998; Karaser 
and Diller, 2004). Yet assessments through IRR indexes are not free from distortions 
(Cochrane, 2001), this measures are bias for the remuneration of fund managers which 
are generally based on an yearly fee for their management of funds, plus a percentage 
fee  for  contributing  to  the  latter’s  increase  in  value  (Murray  and  Marriot,  1998). 
Agreements on fund managers’ remunerations may be differently renegotiated for each 
fund they work on, and may be affected both by the timing of decisions relating to the 
disinvestments of the fund and the return of capital, and by the terms of payment of 
investors,  through  e.g.  shares  or  liquid  assets  (Chiampou  and  Kallett,  1989).  Such 
circumstances  affect   the  way  the  IRR  indexes  are  calculated;  not  surprisingly, 
international associations representing the VC field are involved in trying to unify and 
standardize guidelines and criteria for the assessment of VCs returns (EVCA, 2005). 
2.1.  Factors affecting VC performance
There is a large and growing literature analysing the return of venture capital 
investments, showing the impact of several factor on the profitability of venture catpial 
investments (Jones & Rhodes-Kropf 2003, Ljungqvist & Richardson 2003, Kaserer & 
Diller 2004, Cumming & Walz 2004, Cochrane 2005, Kaplan & Schoar 2005). In this 
paragraph I present the most relevant factors affecting VC performance.
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Empirical data show that high returns to VC are directly associated with the size 
of the fund, and with the expertise of the fund managers. Laine and Torstila (2004) 
found that  large funds have significantly higher exit rates. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
found that for US funds the relation between size of fund and performance is concave, 
that is the larger the fund the better it perform, until the size reach a certain threshold 
after which the size has a negative influence on VC performance. Cumming (2005) 
explain  this  phenomenon  as  evidence  of  the  trade-off  between  VC  assistance  to 
entrepreneurial firms in the VC’s portfolio and the size of the portfolio. Consistent with 
recent developments in the banking literature (Hughes et al. 2001), fund size in venture 
capital is affected by risk taking, capital structure, and a number of other factors related 
to  agency  costs,  costs  of  investing  and  monitoring,  and  the  potential  for  value 
maximization, so that after a certain threshold increasing fund size is not cost efficient. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the size of the found not only have impacts 
on performance in terms of scale effects, but also in terms of reputational capital. Those 
fund  manager  that  are  able  to  attract  greater  amount  of  capital  from investors  are 
considered  to  be  the  most  skilled  managers  (Barktus  and  Hassan  2003),  showing 
formidable track of  records of  positive returns in  the past;  being better  prepared to 
evaluate  the  potential  of  profitable  ventures  (Baum and  Silverman  2004)  and  thus 
having better chances to gain positive returns. Accordingly, larger funds presumably 
have greater  expertise  and reputation and thus have better  performances  (Laine and 
Torstila 2004).
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Another important positive effect on VC performance it has shown to be the 
expertise of the VC. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) found that  first-time funds (i.e. funds 
that are raised for the first time) tend to raise bigger amounts of capital when the private 
equity industry performs well, which they find interesting in the light of that first time 
funds perform markedly worse than follow-on funds. Hocberg et al. (2005) also found 
that funds raised subsequently to previous founds tend to perform significantly better 
than sole or first-time found5.
The experience of the fund manager is also positively related to performance of 
VC. Rosenstein et al. (1993), Sapienza et al. (1996) and Manigart et al. (2002) all found 
that experienced VC managers are perceived to add more value than inexperienced VC 
managers  to  their  portfolio  companies.  Gompers  et  al.  (2004)  show  that  the  VC 
managers with the strongest  hands-on industry experiences increase their  number of 
investments the most when industry investment activity accelerates. Gottschalg et al. 
(2004) found that more experienced and skilled private equity managers have higher 
survival  rates  and  offer  higher  returns.  Diller  and  Kaserer  (2005)  showed  that  VC 
returns  are  positively associated with VC managers’ skills.  It  has  often been noted, 
however,  that  VC  managers  are  intuitive  decision  makers,  and  that  this  intuition 
develops  after  making  numerous  venture  investment  decisions  (e.g.  Zacharakis  and 
Shepherd  2001).  This  support  the idea that,  by the  time VC managers  accrue their 
5 In the venture capital industry is common for a fund with good returns at the end of its life to replicate 
itself by raising a new fund with the same characteristics – and very often calling the new fund with the 
same name of previous one, followed by the subsequent number. Venture Expert defines sole funds as the 
funds that were raised for specific declared purposed and that will not have the possibility of a subsequent 
fund; follow-on funds are those raised for pursuing the same type of investment of previous one; First-
time funds are those raised without a positive experience of funds behind them.
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expertise in a larger number of investment, they became able to enhance fund returns 
(Kaplan and Schoar 2005)
A further variable which affects VCs’ performances is the allocation and level of 
capital inflows in the venture capital market. Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that 
portfolio firm valuation in a financing round is higher the more money poured into the 
venture capital market over the year before the deal closed. An overheated market was 
according to the authors’ one of the reasons for the very low returns generated by VCs 
during  the  period  of  1985-19906.  They  argue  that  there  is  a  limited  number  of 
favourable  investments  in  the  private  equity  industry  giving  way  to  the  so  called 
“money chasing deals” phenomenon, which has been supported by several researchers 
(e.g. Ljungqvist and Richardson 2003, Hochberg et al. 2005, Diller and Kaserer 2005). 
Diller and Kaserer (2005) find this especially true for early stage VCs, as they are more 
affected by illiquidity and segmentation than buyout funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
conclude that market entries are cyclical, whereby funds that are raised in boom times 
are less likely to raise follow-on funds, implying that these funds are likely to perform 
poorly.  They show that an increase in the allocation of money towards a particular fund 
has a  significant  negative  impact  on the performance of  this  fund.  Hochberg  et  al. 
(2005) also found that funds subsequently perform significantly worse the more money 
flowed into the VC industry in the year they were raised. Another effect of a overheated 
venture capital market is that VCs are unable to invest up to their capacity, according to 
Mason and Harrison (2004). This arises for two main reasons; (1) there is a high level of 
6 And then, most likely, also for the period after the Internet bubble, which has had a major negative 
impact on the returns of VCs.
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venture capital aversion amongst entrepreneurs, attributed to their failure to understand 
the role of VC firms as well as reluctance to surrender ownership and control, and, (2) 
many of the businesses which do seek venture capital are not investment ready. 
VCs  frequently  engage  in  collaborative  relationships  with  other  peers. 
Syndication is common in the venture capital industry. Syndicates are typically formed 
by a lead investor who contacts other potential VCs and records their commitments to 
invest. Syndication has turned out to have a positive impact on performance, since it 
serves  multiple  aims:  (1)  Risk  diversification  and  Information  sharing:  through 
syndication  each  VC  can  invest  in  more  projects  and  thereby  better  diversify  the 
portfolio and reduce firm-specific risks (e.g. Gompers and Lerner 1999, De Clercq and 
Dimov 2003, Hege et al. 2003). Furhtermore VCs tend to have investment expertise that 
is both sector-specific and location-specific where syndication helps diffuse information 
across sector boundaries and expands the spatial radius of exchange (e.g. Sorenson and 
Stuart 2001). (2)  Identify profitable investments and accruing deal flow: in evaluating 
ventures’  potentials  the involvement  of  another  VC provides a  second opinion (e.g. 
Lerner 1994). By checking each other’s willingness to invest in potentially promising 
deals,  VCs can pool correlated signals and thereby may select  better  investments in 
situations  of  often  extreme  uncertainty  about  the  viability  and  return  potential  of 
investment proposals (Sah and Stiglitz 1986). VCs invite others peers to co-invest in 
their promising deals in the expectation that such invitations will be reciprocated in the 
future (e.g. Lerner and Schoar, 2004). (3)  Portfolio value add: Syndication networks 
may also help VCs add value to their portfolio companies, where syndication networks 
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facilitate the sharing of information, contacts, and resources among VCs (e.g. Hellman 
and Puri, 2002; Lindsey, 2003)7.  
As a final remark, it has been shown for institutional and environmental factors8 
only  indirect  effects  on  VCs  performance.  However  it  has  been  highlighted  the 
importance  of  such  factors  as  the  presence  of  developed  stock  markets,  supporting 
institutions and the existence of efficient legal and tax structure in order to create and 
keep the venture capital industry alive. Megginson (2002) support the need to increase 
the sources and occasion of collaboration between Universities and research institution 
in order to create a supportive culture fostering the links between innovative ventures 
and VCs. The most important factors for VC fund managers appear to be to reduce 
geographical and industrial obstacles through syndication, avoid raising funds in boom 
times. For policy makers the most significant measures are to nurture a deep and liquid 
local stock market, establish efficient legal and tax structures, increase incentives for 
investing by private investors, and reduce labour market rigidities. In particular the UK, 
although still lagging behind the US NASDAQ stock exchange, seems through AIM to 
be  in  the  process  of  developing  a  competitive  and  efficient  stock  market  for  high 
technology companies. The UK also appears to have a large informal Venture Capital 
7 Other  motives  for  syndication  have  been  advanced.  For  instance,  by  syndicating  deals  with  more 
experienced VCs helps in gaining reputation and certification, enabling further capital to be raised. (e.g. 
Hsu,  2004).  Furthermore  the  some  authors  found  support  for  the  “Window  dressing”  hypothesis 
(Lakonichok  et  al.  1991)  as  a  motive  for  syndication:  VCs  may  syndicate  investments  even  if  the 
financial returns to such investments are relatively low in order to show potential investors an exit record 
(Lerner 1994, De Clercq and Dimov 2003).
8 For  influence  of  government  programs  see  i.e.  Megginson  (2002);  for  regulatory  changes  see  i.e. 
Cumming and Walz (2004); for tax and legal structures within different labour market see i.e. La Porta et 
al. (1998) and Jeng and Wells (2000); for the role of stock markets see i.e. Gompers and Lerner (2000) 
and Black and Gilson (1998).
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market  and  is  considered  to  have  one  of  the  most  favourable  legal  and  fiscal 
environments in Europe (Black and Gilson 1998). 
2.2. Studies of returns 
Although the majority of reports from the VC industry seems to suggest that the 
returns to venture capital exceed well-known benchmarks (like the NASDAQ and the 
FTSE All Share indices), little was known about the returns to venture capital until the 
first years of 21st Century. In the earlier studies returns were often not measured in cash 
flow terms  (as  would  be  economically  appropriate)  and  were  not  measured  net  of 
management fees (thus creating an upward bias in the figures). 
The academic literature seemed to assume that since venture capital is ‘special’ 
it should attract higher than average returns from the stock market. However, in the first 
academic  contribution  to  measuring  the  returns  to  venture  capital  Moskovitz  and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) impugned this assumption. Using two large representative US 
datasets for private equity covering the periods 1989 to 1998 (without unincorporated 
businesses)  and  1952  to  1999  (including  proprietorships  and  partnerships),  their 
findings are remarkable. Firstly, they find that the scale of venture capital in the US is 
huge and competes with public equity in importance. The total value of venture capital 
in the period 1989-1998 was in fact about the same as that of public equity (equity of 
quoted  companies).  Secondly,  they  found  that  investment  in  venture  capital  was 
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extremely concentrated with about 75% of all PE owned by households for which it 
constitutes at least half of their net worth. Moreover, such households invest more than 
70%  of  their  holdings  in  a  single  private  company  in  which  they  have  ‘an  active 
management  interest’,  that  is  they are  employed in  it  or  run it.  Finally,  despite  the 
obvious risk of such a typical portfolios the returns offered by venture capital is on 
average no higher than the market return, the return to a highly diversified index of 
quoted (and mainly highly liquid) securities. The authors argued that economic logic, 
based on the well-attested concept of risk aversion would dictate a risk premium to 
venture capital investment (so-called the “Private Equity Premium Puzzle”).
Cochrane(2004)  adopts  a  very  different,  econometrics-based,  approach  to 
examining the returns to venture capital which focuses on solving the sample selection 
problems that had determined previous efforts in the area. Despite this difference in 
approach,  his  results  are  broadly  in  line  with  Moskovitz  and  Vissing-Jorgensen. 
Cochrane argues that there are mainly three reasons why the risk and return of venture 
capital  should  differ  from  that  of  traded  stocks,  holding  their  betas (measures  of 
systematic or market-wide risk) or other characteristics (e.g size and industry) constant. 
These are (1) Liquidity: a higher return may be required by investors to compensate for 
the  lack  of  trade-ability  of  private  equity  (i.e.  opposite  to  public  equity);  (2) 
Diversification: private equity has typically been a high proportion of an investors net 
wealth implying that they do not hold fully diversified portfolios and hence have high 
firm-specific risk associated with them; (3) Costs of monitoring and governance: fund 
managers often provide services of monitoring and control over investments made on 
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behalf of their clients (i.e. the investors) and this additional cost must be accounted for 
in the returns these investments yield. Cochrane finds, however, that VC returns, even 
when the lower risk of the VCs portfolio  approach is ignored, are little different from 
those of similar traded stocks and moreover are highly volatile. Returns are estimated to 
be about 15% per annum with a volatility of about six times this figure. This finding is 
confirmed in a recent study of VC returns to companies going to IPO in the UK (Cressy 
and Lembergs, 2006).
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) investigate the performance of and capital inflows 
to VC partnerships in the United States. Using cash flow data for the period 1988-1999 
they address the following questions: (a) What are the returns to early and later stage 
VC funding? (b) Do these returns exceed market benchmarks? (c) Are some VCs better 
than others? (d) Do returns to PE persist over time? They found that the returns to early 
stage funding were higher in the 90s boom but otherwise more variable and lower than 
those to late  stage funding.  However,  the average figures concealed a great deal  of 
heterogeneity amongst VCs with top quartile funds posting a premium of 10-20% over 
bottom quartile  funds.  The  level  of  returns  is  largely  independent  of  the  weighting 
scheme employed. Weighting funds  equally, Kaplan and Schoar found the returns are 
slightly below the relevant benchmark (here the S&P500 index) and offer an IRR of 
17% per annum. However, weighting funds relatively to the  committed capital,  they 
found returns are slightly above the benchmark and offer an IRR of 18% per annum. 
Dispersion of performance amongst VCs is however strong in both cases. One of their 
most interesting findings relates to question concerning the heterogeneity of VCs and 
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whether  and  why  there  are  VCs  performing  better  than  others.  They  found  a 
considerable persistence in fund returns through time, making past performance to a 
significant degree a guide to future performance.  This also support the evidence that 
those who manage a fund that performs well are more likely to be able to raise future 
funds as a result.
There are also issues of selection bias (non-randomly omitted observations) 
with these studies (Hege et al. 2003). In finance, the typical measure of performance is 
the return on a quoted security, consists of both a dividend yield (dividends expressed as 
a proportion of the current value of the stock) and a capital gains, which are the most 
relevant part of VCs returns on venture capital.  However it is not possible to observe 
the value of a venture capital investment much of the time (Cochrane 2004) but in three 
occasions: if the backed company receives a further round of investment from a VC;  if 
its  shares  become  part  of  an  IPO; if  the  company  is  sold  to  another  organization 
through merger or acquisition. If on the other hand, the company does not receive more 
money in the current period but remains on the VCs portfolios, or becomes bankrupt 
and disappears, no such value is typically observed. This presents the econometrician 
with  a  potential  sample-selection problem  since  the  sample  of  observed  values  is 
generally unrepresentative of the population of values. 
As  Cochrane  (2004)  pointed  out,  potential  biases  do  not  stop  at  selection 
however. For example, consider the relationship between one source of observation of 
value, the IPO, and the true value of the firm in any period. It turns out that empirically 
the chances of an IPO increase with a firm’s value (Cochrane, 2004). This means that if 
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we include in  our  estimate of  returns only those investments with high (and hence 
observable values) we end up with a potentially gross overestimate of the returns to 
venture capital – gross because IPOs are a small proportion of the total number of VC 
investments and make up a disproportionately large fraction of total value. If one were 
to  ignore  the  fact  that  the  true  distribution  of  VC  returns  is  highly  skewed 
(approximately lognormal according to Cochrane, 2004) and were to take  arithmetic 
mean returns  rather  than  geometric mean returns  as  our  measure,  this  would  again 
overstate  the  returns  to  venture  capital.  Both  these  errors  have  unfortunately  been 
perpetrated in the academic and practitioner literature in this area9. Cochrane suggest to 
deal with this problems by estimating a joint distribution of company returns and IPO 
status (defined as reaching IPO or not).10 The estimated joint distribution will then give 
him the returns to venture capital as a whole, including the return to  those investments 
that never  reach  IPO.  Previous  studies  simply  estimated  the  returns  to  IPO  (and 
sometimes trade sale) treating these as the returns to venture capital as a whole, thereby 
providing a very rosy picture of industry profitability.
Other  recent  studies  broadly  confirm Cochrane’s  findings  even  if  they  do  not 
control as accurately as he for selection biases. Thus Hege et al. (2003) found that in 
their sample of European and American companies the average log(1+IRR) in 1997 is 
18% per annum rising to 29% in 1999 and falling to -12% in the year 2000. Cressy and 
Lembergs (2006) on a sample of UK based VCs from the Private Equity Intelligence 
9 Early empirical studies of the returns to venture capital include Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenson(2000), 
Reyes(1997), Gompers and Lerner(1997), Smith and Smith(2004).
10 More generally, sale status, since a company may be sold either through a trade sale or an IPO. 
However, we shall refer to IPO status rather than sale status here.
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and Venture Economics databases find an average fund IRR of some 15%. The latter, 
like  Cochrane,  find  that  the  distribution  of  returns  is  Lognormal,  but  because  their 
sample is of IPO companies only (companies much less likely to fail), it has a much 
smaller standard deviation.
2.3. Analysis of  success rates
Another way to examine the performance of venture capital investments is to 
look at the determinants of the chance that one of them will end in a sale (trade sale or 
IPO)  rather  than  bankruptcy  etc.  Several  studies  have  used  this  empirical  approach 
which has the obvious advantage that it does not presuppose a market model to value 
companies – the choice of which offers no consensus.  As Jaaskelainen et al (2003) 
suggested,  although  the  performance  of  a  venture  capital  fund  can  be  defined 
straightforwardly as the return on investments, the observation of the performance of 
VCs  is  hard  for  an  outsider  due  to  secretive  behaviour  of  the  venture  capitalists 
concerning  their  profits.  However,  as  the  largest  valuations  and  returns  to  venture 
capitalists are most often realized in IPO and trade sales (Bygrave and Timmons 1992), 
it is possible to use the number of IPOs and third sales (controlling for the number of 
investments) as a proxy for the VCs performance. 
For example, Hege et al (2003) examined the determinants of success in a large 
sample  of  European  venture  capital  investments.  They  combine  a  database 
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(VentureXpert) with a questionnaire approach to VCs and use both discrete measures of 
success  (high,  medium  and  low  represented  by  IPO,  Trade  Sale  and  Bankruptcy 
respectively) and continuous measures (reported valuation data). Three main findings 
emerge from their study. Firstly, VCs in the United States are more likely than those in 
Europe to use control rights in their contracts and to enforce them when the need arises. 
For example, United States VCs make greater use of convertible securities which in the 
event  of  bankruptcy  is  associated  with  a  shorter  time  to  liquidation11.  Control  also 
appears  in  the  statistic  that  American  VCs  are  three  times  as  likely  to  replace  an 
underperforming manager as their European counterparts and this reduces the time to 
liquidation  in  the  event  of  bankruptcy12.  Secondly,  a  higher  proportion  of  total 
investment in America is invested in first rounds; Europeans seem to have a preference 
for later rounds (buyouts etc). However, Hege et al. results show that these investments 
are  also  more  likely  to  fail.  Controlling  for  post-investment  monitoring  (another 
significant  function of  the VC) along with other  factors,  the  negative informational 
deficiencies associated with first round investments may reduce their chances of success 
below those of later  stage investments.  Another important control introduced by the 
authors which should impact on VCs performance is the syndication of investments 
(Brander et al 2003). Comparing US and  European VCs, the American syndicates are 
on average significantly larger than those in Europe.  This is apparently not because 
larger syndicates are associated with greater success, since the authors’ findings show 
that greater syndicate size has no impact or even a negative impact on IPO success. This 
11 In the United States according to Hege et al (2003), of VCs’ investments make use of convertible 
securities at the median 68%.
12 An American VC is three times more likely to replace an owner-manager than a European VC.
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results  contradict  the  literature  on  VC  syndication,  which  sees  the  rational  of 
syndication in the advantages of resources complementarities and risk diversification 
which should be reflected in superior performance (Lockett and Wright 1999, Manigart 
et al. 2002).
Remer (2005) has a possible explanation for the seemingly paradoxical outcome 
on syndication. Examining the outcomes of specifically biotech investments in three 
countries, the US, the UK and Germany in a sample of about 1700 biotech ventures 
funded between 1970 and 2002 he finds, that controlling for industry, economy-wide 
and  financial  factors  the  probability  of  syndication  is  negatively  related  to  the 
experience  of  the  VC.  However,  he  also  finds  this  is  in  turn  positively  related  to 
performance,  measured  here  by  the  probability  of  an  IPO.  The  experience-IPO 
relationship is also stronger the better matched is that experience to the project under 
consideration13.
Some other  studies  employ more  comprehensive  count-data  on  performance, 
considering the exit or success rates experienced by VCs. IPOs are often considered as 
the  preferred  exit  vehicle  of  the  most  venture  capital  firms  since,  although  only  a 
fraction of venture capital  investments reach the IPO, most of the total  value to the 
investors is created in these exits (Bygrave and Timmons 1992, Gompers and Lerner 
1999). However it has been shown in the US market and in UK as well, that IPO is a 
13 This suggests that a motivation for syndication is partly to gain experience: less experienced VCs 
therefore tend to syndicate, and such VCs are more likely to be associated with failure than success 
presumably because the Lead VC has compensatingly large experience on which the Follower VCs can 
draw. In the longer run, the followers will presumably reciprocate the ‘generosity’ shown them by the 
leader. (Lockett and Wright, 1999).
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feasible alternative for only few small businesses14. VCs may rely on the IPO markets to 
a widely different extent depending on their strategy. Advantages of a non-IPO exit 
could be related to greater privacy or lesser external pressure on operating performance. 
Often a trade sales provide more immediate liquidity than IPOs: a trade sale of a 100% 
stake liberates capital immediately, while only a part of the company is sold in an IPO 
(Schwienbacher 2002). 
Hence  the  drawback  with  using  only  the  number  of  IPOs  from  new  company 
investments is that performance measure would be biased upwards, since it counts only 
for the value of very positive exits. One can circumvent this issue by calculating a total 
number of positive exits, i.e. including also the trade sales (Laine and Torstila 2004). 
Measures of exit rates are interesting not only as a proxy of investment success; they 
also have value to practitioners as they evaluate whether their investment memoranda 
are realistic. Studying a sample of 138 US-based VCs between the period 1990-2000 
consisting in 4500 portfolio companies, Laine and Torstila (2004) suggest that the exit 
rate may be affected by such factors as the size and the portfolio composition of the 
fund, including industry preferences and the focus on early or later stage investments, 
these  latter  measured  with  dummy  variables.  Their  findings  are  consistently  with 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005): large VCs have significantly higher rates of exit success, 
perhaps due to a better reputation as quality certifiers, consistently with the findings of 
Sahlman (1990) relatively to those VCs which may have a larger investment universe 
14 For instance Schwienbacher (2002) reports the following exit frequencies from a survey of 67 U.S. 
funds: IPO (+ sale of quoted equity) 29.9%, trade sale / acquisition 30.3%, management buyout 2.0%, 
secondary sale / refinancing 5.0%, and finally liquidation (write-off), 32.8%.
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than smaller  one. Sole funds, i.e.  funds that receive no follow-up have significantly 
lower exit rates. This is probably due to reverse survivorship bias: VCs who perform 
badly never are not likely to have the chance to raise another fund. Finally, the stage 
and industry focus of the fund seem to matter less than thought, although expansion 
stage funds had larger exit rates in this sample.
There  appears  to  be  a  need  for  further  research  into  VCs  performance  as 
measured  by  exit  rates,  where  future  uncertainty  no  longer  clouds  the  results.  the 
question is: can we use exit rates as a reliable proxy for VC investment success? Some 
steps in this direction have already been made. Hocberg et al. (2005) replicated Kaplan 
and Schoar’s (2005) VC fund-level performance model, which relates performance to 
log fund size and log fund sequence number (each included in levels and squares) and a 
set of vintage year dummies, using exit rates instead of direct fund return as measures of 
performance. Like Kaplan and Schoar, they found only weak evidence that more mature 
funds perform better, and strong evidence that larger funds perform significantly better. 
Furthermore the relation between fund performance and fund size is  increasing and 
concave, consistent with diminishing returns to scale. The authors finally repeated their 
analysis for a subset of their sample VCs for which they were able to find individual 
fund  return,  and  show  that  IRR  measures  and  measure  based  on  the  fraction  of 
companies that exit are very high correlated. 
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2.4.  Conclusions:  what  measure  of  performance  should  be 
used?
Given the generally accepted importance of the VC industry as such and the 
large amount of literature about venture capital, it may seem surprising that there are 
only a few papers analysing the returns of VC. However, an analysis of the profitability 
of investments in private equity is no easy task since information within the private 
equity  industry  is  by  definition  "private",  compared  to  e.g.  public  markets,  and 
transparency requirements are limited. The common use of fund valuation data provided 
by two commercial vendors Venture Economics and Venture One, has been criticised 
by e.g. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) for having three principal shortcomings: (i) 
the data is available only in aggregate rather than in fund-by-fund format; (ii) returns 
data is largely provided by VC firms on a voluntary basis and thus potentially subject to 
selection  biases;  and,  (iii)  the  data  is  based  on  unrealised  as  well  as  realised 
investments, which introduces noise and potentially biases due to subjective accounting 
treatment. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) show that the IRR of the average fund 
does not turn positive until the eighth year of the fund’s life (the so called “J-curve 
effect”), which means that it is only at the very end of a fund’s life that excess returns 
are realised. In addition, external valuations of portfolio companies only exist in the 
events of IPO’s, trade sales based on tradable securities or cash, additional financing 
rounds  including  third  parties  or  if  the  company  files  for  bankruptcy.  Therefore, 
according  to  Ljungqvist  and  Richardson  (ibid),  the  calculations  of  interim  IRRs 
63
                                                                                                                             Chapter II
computed before a fund reaches maturity are not very informative. Cumming and Walz 
(2004) show that there are systematic biases in the reporting of interim IRRs which is 
explained in terms of cross-country differences in accounting standards, legality and 
proxies  for  information  asymmetry  between  VC  managers  and  their  institutional 
investors. In addition, Woodward and Hall (2004) argue that reported returns from VC 
firms are too low in a rising market but too high in a falling market. Cumming and Walz 
(2004) show that experienced VC firms tend to report significantly lower valuation than 
their younger, especially early stage and high technology focused, counterparts. A final 
example  of  challenges  when  evaluating  and  comparing  IRRs,  is  the  unclear  and 
inconsistent use of net and gross returns, i.e. whether the reported results include or 
exclude fees to the VC firms.
Comparing  results  from  different  analyses  on  VC  performance  is  thus 
complicated.  Having  said  that,  now  it  still  remain  to  decide  which  measure  of 
performance is the more appropriate for this study. A number of studies has examined 
this  specific  issue,  some  of  them  focusing  on  the  performances  of  VC-backed 
companies whilst others focusing directly on VCs’ performances (see e.g. Brophy and 
Gunter,  1988; Bygrave, 1989; Chiampou and Kallett,  1989; MacMillan et al.,  1985; 
Cochrare, 2001). In our case, we wish to concentrate on the impact that diversification 
has on VCs’ performances, thus choosing a performance measure at the fund level. 
We have seen that the secular returns to venture capital seem to be rather low 
given the very high risks associated with it. We have also noted that returns to venture 
capital overestimate the true returns since they are (a) individual rather than portfolio 
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returns  and (b)  they ignore the costs  of VC salaries and carried interest  (Cochrane, 
2004). It is conceivable that the correct estimates of these returns will find them to be 
below those of the relevant risk-adjusted benchmarks. 
Ideally, one would measure fund performance directly, using the return a fund 
achieved  over  its  ten-year  life.  However,  returns  for  individual  funds  are  not 
systematically available to researchers as VC funds generally disclose their performance 
only  to  their  investors  and  Venture  Economics  only  makes  fund  returns  publicly 
available in aggregate form. Some researchers have recently had access to disaggregated 
performance data from Venture Economics, but only in anonymous format (see Kaplan 
and Schoar  2005,  Jones  and  Rhodes-Kropf  2003).  Absent  a  facility  for  identifying 
individual  funds  and  thus  matching  their  returns  to  their  portfolio  strategy 
characteristics and other cross-sectional variables, these anonymous data would not help 
in examining the effect of VCs portfolio strategies on performance.
This latter concern raises the following question: can we then use exit rates as a 
proxy for  investment  success? Exits  will  differ  widely  in  their  terms and the  price 
obtained. We should certainly be careful in making inferences based on, say, the IPO 
exit rate only. Although IPOs have often been a high profit exit method, there may be 
characteristics of the portfolio companies or market situations in which a particular fund 
would find other exit methods more optimal.
The  total  rate  of  successful  exits,  however,  while  not  a  perfect  proxy  for 
performance,  presents  fewer  problems.  We can  in  most  cases  safely  assume that  a 
venture capitalist will prefer almost any kind of exit to liquidation. The exit rate can 
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mostly be more clearly observed from the outside than the actual cash flows of the fund. 
In  contrast,  the calculation of  performance through internal  rates of  return (IRR) is 
tricky in terms of both data availability and measurement problems. As an example of 
the latter,  in IPO exits,  venture capitalists  typically keep a large stake for a certain 
period after the IPO and exit piece by piece (see Cumming and Macintosh, 2003, for 
partial exits). The difficult part for an outside observer would be to track all the actual 
cash flows the venture capitalist receives from selling portions of its ownership after the 
IPO.
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CHAPTER III
Research Framework and Hypothesis
This research examines the many strategies which VCs may use to cope with 
their  investment  portfolio.  The  focus  is  on  the  analysis  of  relationships  between 
portfolio  strategies  and  the  performance  of  a  VC.   There  is  a  large  and  growing 
literature  analysing  the  return  of  VCs’  investments  (Jones  and Rhodes-Kropf  2003, 
Ljungqvist and Richardson 2003, Kaserer and Diller 2004, Cumming and Walz 2004, 
Cochrane  2005,  Kaplan  and  Schoar  2005).  The  majority  of  these  papers  study  the 
relative performance of VCs compared to public markets. However, there is much less 
understanding about the impact of portfolio strategies on the performance of VCs. In 
particular this  research’s aim is  that  of  filling this  gap by examining the impact  of 
portfolio diversification versus specialization strategies on the rate of positive return of 
VC funds.
Portfolio diversification versus specialization is a particularly interesting issue in 
venture capital, where “generalist” funds (involved on many different markets) work 
alongside funds focusing their  portfolios on specific stage of growth,  industries and 
geographical areas (EVCA, 2005). 
Although  finance  and  strategic  management  researchers  have  increasingly 
widened the scope of research on VCs, the latter’s portfolio strategies have been rarely 
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investigated (e.g. Norton and Tenenmbaum 1993). In the light of increased importance 
of  the  Private  Equity  and  Venture  Capital  markets  within  Western  economies, 
researchers have been recently paying more attention to this issue (Hellmann and Puri 
2002). 
Since  this  study  examines  the  relationship  between  specialization  versus 
diversification strategies and the performance of VCs, it applies to the management and 
finance  theory  which  empirically  supported  the  linkages  between  the  industrial 
composition of a portfolio of investments and its performance. Though, even if some 
previous studies showed the existence of heterogeneity in the VC market relatively to 
managerial approaches, preferences for particular stage of development of the supported 
deal, business selection criteria (Robinson 1987, Norton e Tenenbaum 1993, Elango et 
al. 1995, Wright and Robbie 1998, Manigart et al. 2002), little attention has been paid 
on how VCs cope with composition of their portfolios. On the contrary, recent research 
showed that while some VCs specialize only in certain industries, stage of development 
and  countries,  keeping  their  investment  strategy  very  focused,  others  diversify  into 
different markets (Cumming 2004). Recent reports on the European VC industry point 
out  that  many players are  defining their  operative area by accurately selecting their 
investment  scope  along  different  dimensions  –  i.e.  industry,  geographic  origin  of 
investee companies and stage of development of deals – (EVCA 2005, The Economist 
2004), while some others ramify their organizational structure in specific fields in order 
to  develop  a  context-specific  knowledge  as  a  competitive  advantage  (Harper  and 
Schneider 2004). 
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Surprisingly, little knowledge exists as to how VCs develop their investments 
portfolio, even if the decisions regarding investment scope are key issues for corporate 
strategy (Hofer and Schendel 1978). By examining the activities of UK Private Equity 
and Venture Capital funds issued from 1981 until 2000, this research advances that VCs 
performance is influenced by the choices of composition of their portfolio, along three 
possible dimensions: geographic dimension (i.e. the geographic origin of the investee 
companies); the stage of development of selected deals; the industry or technological 
field of the investee company. 
It  is  important  to  examine  factors  influencing  these  decisions  and  the 
consequences on VCs performance.  Our study suggests  that  VCs’ performances  are 
contingent on their choices as to the composition of their investment portfolios. Also, 
the decision determining the composition of a VC’s portfolio of investments and thus 
the level of diversification, plays a crucial role in the creation of a fund. First these are 
long term strategic decisions that are difficult to change. Second the maximum amount 
a VC fund is allowed to invest  in a single company as well as in certain financing 
stages, industries, or countries is fixed in the partnership agreement with the limited 
partners,  i.e.,  the  investors.  A deviation  from this  agreement  is  only  possible  if  all 
limited partners approve.
Hence,  since  the  portfolio  decision  are  difficult  to  change  and  have  a  deep 
impact on the development of the fund it-self, we address the following question: does 
portfolio-diversification lead to higher performance than portfolio-specialization?
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This  research aims at  contributing to  the literature  dealing with the strategic 
decisions and performances of VCs. The suggested research question also calls into play 
the  debate  on  whether  a  diversification  strategy  is  more  or  less  effective  than 
specialization of portfolio investments. The literature on strategic management dealing 
with  diversification  has  recently  convened that  when a  VC firm has  a  portfolio  of 
correlated companies, its performances are better - due to the strategic fit between the 
logic  dominating  its  core  business,  its  distinctive  competences  and  the  enterprises 
included  in  its  portfolio  –  than  those  produced  by  a  firm  implementing  a  “pure” 
diversification  strategy  centred  around  the  portfolio  effects  connected  with 
diversification in different industries, markets and stage of development (Robins and 
Wiersema 1995, 2003, Palich et al. 2000). VCs invest in highly risky ventures with the 
hope of obtaining a profit in return. While, on the one hand, the traditional financial 
approach suggests that diversification eliminates non-systematic risks (Scharpe 1964, 
Brealey  and  Myers  1996),  on  the  other,  the  competence-based  approach  seems  to 
support  greater  specialization  of  VCs  portfolio  as  a  means  of  reducing  uncertainty 
(Bygrave 1987, Lubatkin and Rogers 1989, Manigart et al. 2002). 
Although the existence of a huge literature from both management and financial 
fields, the answer to the question whether diversified or focused firms perform better 
still remain ambiguous (Robins and Wiersema 2003). Exploring this question in the UK 
market is important for several reasons. Venture Capital has become an important part 
of the economic and financial system in Europe, having grown enormously in the last 
decade (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2004).  UK have been representing 50% of all  Private 
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Equity and Venture Capital operations hold in Europe since the late Nineties and even 
far more during the previous years, thus representing the ideal setting where conducting 
analyses and examines the said phenomenon.
Exploring this question may contribute to the literature on corporate strategy in 
that  it  expand  the  breath  of  corporations  that  are  included  in  the  analysis  of  how 
diversification  and  specialization  strategies  affect  performance.  Understanding  these 
issues  contributes  to  the  debate  on  VC strategy  and performance,  by  analysing  the 
different behaviours and determinants of success of VCs, by comparing different stream 
of  theory  supporting  two  contrasting  point  of  view:  portfolio  diversification  versus 
specialization.
After supporting the need and relevance of doing research on this topic, I will 
discuss two different theoretical frameworks, one supporting portfolio diversification 
while the other leading to strengthen portfolio specialization. The first approach apply 
to the financial intermediation and portfolio theory, while the second one rely on the 
assumption of the resource/knowledge based view. I will show that many studies who 
refer, more or less explicitly, to one of these two theoretical arch-frames, tend to suggest 
that portfolio diversification either specialization is the better strategy for a VC coping 
with risk-return of its portfolio. This will help me introducing the thesis I will advance 
in the hypothesis sub-section.
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3.1. The importance of portfolio strategies to Venture Capital
VCs invest in new ventures with high risk exposure and high growth potential. 
Academic studies on VC have over time investigated a number of related topics. In 
particular, special attention has been given to the managerial competences of VC firms, 
assessing their role and participation in the management of funded enterprises (Sapienza 
1992,  Hellman and Puri  2000,  2002).  Such studies  have  essentially  subscribed  two 
empirical approaches (Wright and Robbie 1998): on the one hand, attention has been 
given to the creation of adequate structures for the governance of relationships between 
venture capitalists and funded enterprises;  on the other,  focus has been placed on a 
number of processes for the management of different activities. In the first case, more 
attention have been given to the means and practical instruments available to VCs in 
order  to  control  for  the  business  run  by  funded  companies,  through  screening  and 
evaluating business plans, and with the preparation of pay-off structures and contractual 
clauses. The final goal for VCs is obviously the control and reduction of risk exposure 
when deciding to invest in a new portfolio company.
The  abovementioned  second  empirical  approach  focuses  on  the  managerial 
processes used by VCs to support funded companies, and on the running of their own 
activities (e.g. Bygrave and Timmons 1992, Fried and Hirsh 1994, Tybejee and Bruno 
1994).  Said  approach comprises  different  studies  which  have  examined the  reasons 
behind the heterogeneity of VCs which affect their managerial styles, their preferences 
for specific development stages of ventures, and their strategic differences in selecting 
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the  latter.  Given  the  heterogeneity  of  venture  capital,  some  studies  have  examined 
different  kinds  of  VCs,  identifying  multiple  managerial  styles,  investment  profiles, 
preferences for given fields and development stages of enterprises or ventures requiring 
financing (Robinson, 1987; Florida e Kennedy 1989, Elango et al. 1995, Wright and 
Robbie 1998). On the basis of such studies, some researchers have dealt more directly 
with VCs’ choices between diversifying and concentrating their investment portfolio. 
Although  many  studies  have  examined  VC  firms’  strategic  choices  as  to  which 
development stage is to be preferred when making investments (see e.g. Norton and 
Tenenbaum, 1989, Gupta and Sapienza, 1992, Manigart et al. 2002), little attention has 
so far been paid to such VCs’ diversified investments. 
In  the  previous  literature-review  section  I  tried  to  show  how  the  issue  of 
portfolio diversification or specialization is important, since it casts light on the way 
VCs cope with the strategic decisions about the management of portfolio companies 
having a direct impact on VCS performance. By using data collected by means of postal 
questionnaires, Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) have evaluated a number of suggestions 
on the many strategies orienting VCs’ choices as to the composition of their portfolios 
in order to assess how risk exposure is managed thereby. Their analysis suggests that 
the need to collect information so as to reduce uncertainty induces VCs to concentrate 
on industries they are most familiar with. In particular, the high uncertainty of the early 
growth stages of deals induces VCs to include a small number of companies in their 
portfolio  and  to  specialize  in  given  industries.  Conversely,  VCs  engaged  in  later 
development stages prefer to spread out their involvement across different industries 
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and/or different countries. Gupta and Sapienza’s work (1992) have a similar idea and 
find very similar evidences.  In particular, their  work suggests that VCs investing in 
early stage companies are generally more involved in managing funded enterprises than 
VCs investing in later stage enterprises. Some VCs even specialize in specific corporate 
development stages, in which their acquired expertise produces greater value (Carter 
and Van Auken 1994). Moreover, it appears that large VCs with large funds diversify 
their portfolio much more than small firms (Gupta and Sapienza 1992). Recent works 
try  to  shed  light  on  VCs’  heterogeneity,  suggesting  that  industry-specialized 
organizations should be more successful then diversified VCs, and claiming the need to 
deepen the understanding of the linkages between VCs’ performance and their degree of 
diversification. Bottazzi et al. (2004), analysing the European VC Industry found that 
knowledge and human capital specialization at the level of the firm is a fundamental 
driver  to  understand  VCs’  strategies:  specialized  VCs  are  more  active  and  more 
involved with their portfolio companies. Gompers et al. (2005) studying the reactions of 
US VCs to shifts in public market signals, found that the most successful were the VCs 
exhibiting a higher level of industry-specific focus of their investments portfolio. These 
works stress on the importance of knowledge and resources accrued by VCs and on the 
constraints  of  diversified  firms  in  redeploying  their  resources  among  investments 
pertaining to different business areas. Thus a greater industry focus should reduce the 
inefficiencies associated with spreading the VC’s resources across portfolio companies 
(Fulghieri and Sevilir 2005).  On the other hand, Knill (2005) found that industry and 
stage-of-development levels of diversification are positively related to VCs’ growth, in 
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the US market. The author found that, by playing a “pure diversification strategy”, VCs 
can minimize portfolio risk, thus accruing the amount of capital under management.
Literature on VCs has so far taken into account the wide variety of investments 
in  venture  capitalists’  portfolios  (Elango  et  al.  1995,  Wright  and  Robbie  1998). 
Nonetheless, there still remains a relatively small number of studies investigating on the 
impact these decisions have on VCs performance. 
Many  studies  look  at  what  VCs  do  and  how they  are  different  from more 
traditional investors (Morris 2001). Previous literature approached the VCs portfolio 
strategy issues as a means to manage risk/returns (Gupta and Sapienza 1992, Norton 
and Tenenbaum 1993,  De Clerq et  al.  2001),  emphasizing two opponent  strategies: 
diversification or specialization of their investments portfolio. Most of these studies, 
explicitly or implicitly, refer to relevant theoretical concepts that have been used outside 
the venture capital context. Those concepts provide some insights into answering my 
guiding  question.  At  the  same  time  though  there  are  few  empirical  studies  that 
simultaneously touch upon this question and use these theoretical concepts. In particular 
one can retrieve two main stream of theoretical approach which apply to the debate on 
diversification  versus  specialization  of  VCs  portfolio.  The  first  one  pertain  to  the 
financial intermediation theory and financial portfolio theory, which look at VCs as, on 
the one hand, provider of financial capital to investee companies, on the other hand as 
resource “allocators” for their investors (Chan 1983); the second one is deeply rooted in 
the  concepts  of  the  resource/knowledge-based  perspective,  which  emphasizes  the 
relevance  of  VC-specific  capabilities  and  knowledge  in  certain  business  fields 
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(industries,  countries  and/or  stage  of  development)  relatively  to  their  investment 
approach.
Also this issue calls into question the role of VC as financial intermediaries or 
active managers relatively to their portfolio companies. The academic debate on the 
greater  effectiveness  of  diversification  versus  specialization  on  VCs performance  is 
intertwined with the debate on the role of VC firms, i.e. whether they are mere financial 
intermediaries or, rather, managing companies  highly involved in the management of 
backed firms. According to the former perspective, a well-diversified portfolio may thus 
reduce the overall risk without reducing its results (Markovitz 1970). If, instead, VCs 
are  perceived  as  being  actively  involved  in  the  management  of  backed  companies, 
providing both financial capital and human capital, relational resources, know-how and 
professional skills, a portfolio focused on the business domains where VCs are most 
likely  to  increase  the  value  of  their  portfolio  companies  should  lead  to  greater 
performance.
3.2. The Financial Intermediation Perspective
Starting with Spence (1974), there is a sizeable theoretical literature regarding 
VCs  as  intermediaries  for  equity  investors  seeking  profitable  business  in  which  to 
allocate  their  resources,  and  for  potential  growing  companies  who  need  capital  to 
implement their development projects. In this regard, VCs have been studied from and 
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agent/principal perspective  (e.g.  Jansen  and  Meckling  1976,  Busenitz  et  al.  1997) 
and/or applying the concept of the signalling theory15, which look at VCs investments 
who correlate the development of VCs to their ability to stay in the market as repeat 
players  (Booth  and  Smith  1986)  by  signalling  good  investments  and  accrue  their 
reputation as providers of venture opportunities and/or capital ready to invest. 
Following this  perspective,  VCs function as intermediaries between investors 
and entrepreneurs, drawing funds from the former to invest in the latter.  Why don’t 
entrepreneurs simply do directly to the investors? Because VCs have an important role 
in  managing  the  investments  that  investors  lack  and  their  relationship  to  the 
entrepreneur helps to resolve information asymmetries that would otherwise exist (Chan 
1983). Building upon this literature some authors developed a theoretical model that 
shows the general  value of VCs as intermediaries - in a market with imperfect and 
costly information – for resource allocation and welfare of investors. According to this 
model,  when  all  investors  are  uninformed,  entrepreneurs  are  induced  to  undertake 
inferior projects,  offering low returns,  and investors consequently will  not enter the 
market. However, the presence of some zero-cost, perfectly informed investors, as VCs 
are  assumed  to  be,  induces  entrepreneurs  to  select  projects  with  higher  investor 
returns.16
15 In  addition  to  these  two  theoretical  theorys,  a  few  studies  also  refer  to  other  concepts,  such  as 
‘Procedural Justice Theory’ (e.g Busenitz et al. 1997, 2004, Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996, Sapienza et al. 
2000).  However,  I  will  not  review  those  concepts  in  detail  since  they  have  not  been  widely 
used/mentioned and/or don’t seem to provide much additional insights with view to our guiding question.
16 Here, Chan (1983) argues that VCs can be considered zero-cost agents, since the clients pay their costs. 
Furthermore, as information about firms is reusable for different clients, there are economies of scale in 
the intermediary’s operations, even if the intermediaries’ information cost is assumed to be the same for 
investors and intermediaries.
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An important  valuable  role  played  by  VCs as  intermediaries,  is  particularly 
evident  for  ventures  going  public.  Megginson  and  Weiss  (1991),  for  instance, 
highlighted the role VCs have in certifying the quality of entrepreneurial ventures at 
IPO to outside investors in the markets, since many VCs bring companies to market on 
an  ongoing  basis,  and  therefore  should  have  a  very  strong  incentive  to  establish  a 
trustworthy reputation in order to retain access to the IPO market on favourable terms. 
Furthermore, the value of VCs’ reputational capital is likely to exceed the maximum 
possible benefit from certifying falsely – because successful fund managers who are 
able to establish profitable ‘follow on’ funds, are also able to achieve an enhanced deal 
flow  from  entrepreneurs,  and  are  more  likely  to  retain/attract  high-quality  staff. 
Similarly,  Sahlman (1990)  pointed  out  that  successful  VCs bring  instant  credibility 
associated with  their  capital;  their  contacts  in  the  financial  community  can make it 
easier to raise capital from other sources including IPO. Therefore, all else being equal, 
investors  may  be  willing  to  pay  more  for  companies  brought  to  market  by  VCs 
perceived to be better able to oversee and guide new enterprises, resulting in a less 
under-priced issue (Barry et al. 1990).
Moreover, VCs’ role as intermediaries might not only be relevant with view to 
the  financial  markets.  Instead,  VCs  act  as  good  agents  reducing  uncertainty  and 
information asymmetry by facilitating ventures’ access to non-financial resources such 
as personnel, suppliers and customers, network position (Manigart and Sapienza 1999, 
Stuart et al. 1999). Because VCs are active in a range of activities and functions that 
span  industrial  segments,  they  can  act  as  information  intermediaries,  providing 
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privileged  information  access  and  reducing  search  costs  for  start-ups  seeking 
appropriate  cooperation  partners  and  for  investors  seeking  good  investment 
opportunities. Indeed since investor may face with great uncertainty about the quality of 
young companies, they rely on the prominence of the affiliates of those companies to 
make judgements about their quality (Hsu 2004).
Whilst  developed in  the  context  of  the mature  firm,  the logic  of  the agency 
theory also appealed to researchers examining the VC-entrepreneur relationship - where 
the VC is usually assigned the role of the principal, and the entrepreneur the role of the 
agent.17 In  fact,  this  theory  arguably  is  the  most  commonly  employed  concept  in 
research on venture capital.18 
Most agency models are based on a  set  of common assumptions (Eisenhardt 
1989, Petersen 1989) relatively to the relationship between the VC (principal) and the 
backed-company (agent): 1) VCs face situations of uncertainty with respect to the task 
to be undertaken by the agent, 2) VCs have different risk preferences over the returns 
they will receive from the contract, 3) principal and agents pursue different goals, or 4) 
maximise different utility functions, 5) VCs are boundedly rational, and 6) VCs and 
backed-companies  have  different  information  sets  in  that  the  principal  cannot  fully 
observe the outcome and quality of the agent’s action.
17 In addition, there is also sometimes said to be another principal-agent relation, where the VCs serve as 
agents to their investors (e.g. Amit et al. 1990, Bergemann and Hege 1998, Brettel et al. 2001).
18 Authors that have either explicitly or implicitly referred to this concept in the venture capital context 
are, for instance: Admati and Pfleiderer 1994, Amit et al. 1998, Arthurs and Busenitz 2003, Barney et al., 
1989, Barney et al. 1994, Barry et al. 1990, Bruton et al. 2000, Busenitz et al. 2004, Fiet et al. 1997, 
Gompers, 1995, Gompers and Lerner 1999, Gorman and Sahlman 1989, Hellmann 1998, Kaplan and 
Strömberg 2001, 2002, 2003, Lerner 1994 1995, Ruhnka and Young, 1991, Sahlman, 1990, Sapienza et 
al. 1996, 2000, Sapienza and Gupta 1994.
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 Agency models show that that information asymmetry gives rise to two main 
problems:  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard.  Adverse  selection  might  be  due  to 
‘hidden information’. The principal might be able to observe the activities of the agent, 
but the agent might have private information (e.g. about his own capabilities or certain 
details of his project) that is not available to the principal. This, in turn, might lead to a 
misinterpretation by the principal regarding the agent’s ability, and, as a result,  to a 
suboptimal contract, at least from the principal’s perspective. Moral hazard, by contrast, 
might be due to ‘hidden action’. Specifically, it refers to unobservable behaviour by the 
agent,  such  as  low  effort  or  shirking,  which  impacts  negatively  on  the  principal’s 
welfare. Since the principal often cannot observe the agent’s activities, it is difficult for 
him to differentiate a negative outcome of an activity due to factors under the control of 
the agent (e.g. inadequate effort) or due to factors outside the agent’s control. Thus, the 
agent can ‘explain’ unsatisfactory outcomes by exogenous factors and act – without 
sanctions – against the interests of the investor. Clearly, both types of problems are 
likely to lead to conflicts that have a negative impact on the performance of a fund.
Indeed, the suitability of the financial intermediation theory in the context of 
venture  capital  seems  obvious.  Firstly,  there  is  no  doubt  that  uncertainty  is  a 
characteristic  of  all  VC investments.  Secondly,  both VCs and entrepreneurs  can  be 
assumed  to  be  rational  individuals  who  might  have  different  risk  preferences  and 
different utility functions and try to satisfy different self-interests. (For instance, most 
VCs will be primarily interested in the maximization of their internal rate of return of 
their investments; but whilst most entrepreneurs will also be interested in the monetary 
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outcome of their projects, they might have additional intentions such as ‘on the job 
consumption’,  ‘independence’,  and/or  ‘developing  a  track  record’).  Thirdly,  in  VC-
backed ventures conflicts of interest are likely to emerge over specific issues such as 
valuation, exit timing, and the allocation of resources and efforts (Sapienza et al. 2000). 
Fourthly,  information  asymmetries  are  likely  to  exist  between  the  VC  and  the 
entrepreneur  because  of  the  difficulty  and  costs  of  day  to  day  monitoring  and  the 
technical nature of the activities conducted by the entrepreneur (Amit et al. 1998). The 
entrepreneur is likely to know more about his project and its likely success, or failure; 
and he is also likely to know more about his own ability and motives than the investor 
(Bygrave 1988, Gompers and Lerner 1999)19. At the same time, as mentioned before, 
principal-agent theory strives to identify not only causes of potential conflict between 
principal (VC) and agent (entrepreneur) but also suitable means to prevent or deal with 
their negative consequences. Kaplan and Stroemberg (2001) point out that theory has 
identified  three  primary  ways  for  the  VCs  to  mitigate  possible  agency  risks:  pre-
investment  screening,  financial  contracting,  and  post-investment  monitoring  and 
advising. 
19 The VC literature has discussed some of the reasons for possible manipulations of information by 
entrepreneurs. For instance, the entrepreneur might be afraid that negative information makes the VC 
decide  against  (further)  investments  in  the  venture.  Similarly,  the  entrepreneur  might  be  afraid  that 
negative  information  makes  the  VC  replace  the  management  team  completely  or  reduce  its  rights 
(Macmillan et al. 1988, Fried and Hisrich 1995). In both cases there is an incentive for the entrepreneur to 
keep back negative information and to present himself to the VC in the best possible way (Wright and 
Robbie 1998). This in turn, might lead to the problem of adverse selection of ‘low-quality’ projects, 
because it is hard for investors to distinguish between good-quality and poor-quality projects (Amit et al. 
1999). Similarly, the problem of moral hazard (due to hidden action) might result in the entrepreneurial 
setting because the investor is not able to observe whether the entrepreneur is working hard and making 
sensible decisions, or whether he is planning to ‘take the money and run’ (Amit et al. 1990, Brettel et al. 
2001).
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Building upon the principal-agent theory, there is large academic literature on 
financial  contracting  that  looks  at  the  possibilities  of  avoiding  conflicts  between 
principals and agents in the first place,  or at  mitigating their negative consequences 
should they occur. The focus of this literature is on contractual arrangements aimed at 
aligning the principal’s and the agent’s interests, and to incentive the agent20, as well as 
on the possibility to limit the VC risk exposure by accurately building a portfolio of 
investment  companies that  shield the VC from company-specific  risk.  This  strategy 
explicitly   apply  to  Markovitz  portfolio  theory  (Markovitz  1970).  Modern  portfolio 
theory states that rational investors will use diversification to optimize their portfolios. 
Basic  concepts  of  the  theory  are  Markowitz  diversification  and capital  asset 
pricing  model,  which  represents  portfolios  of  assets  a  weighted  combination  of 
investments and assets’ returns as random variables. The return of a portfolio is thus the 
weighted combination of the assets' returns and portfolio risk is the standard deviation 
of the portfolio returns.  The model assumes that investors are risk averse. This means 
that given two assets that offer the same expected return, investors will prefer the less 
risky one. Thus, an investor will take on increased risk only if compensated by higher 
expected returns. Conversely, an investor who wants higher returns must accept more 
risk.  The  exact  trade-off  will  differ  by  investor  based  on  individual  risk  aversion 
characteristics. The implication is that a rational investor will not invest in a portfolio if 
a second portfolio exists with a more favourable risk-return profile - i.e. if for that level 
of risk an alternative portfolio exists which has better expected returns. An investor can 
20 This might involve, for instance, the appropriate allocation of cash-flow-rights (so-called cash-flow 
models), voting- and board-rights (so-called control-models), and/or liquidation-rights (so-called debt-
models) (Hart 2001, Kaplan and Stroemberg 2001, 2003).
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reduce portfolio risk simply by holding instruments which are not (perfectly) correlated. 
In other words, investors can reduce their exposure to individual asset risk by holding a 
diversified portfolio of assets. Diversification will allow for the same portfolio return 
with  reduced  risk.  For  diversification  to  work  the  component  assets  must  not  be 
(perfectly) correlated. Asset-specific risk - the risk associated with individual assets - 
within a portfolio can be reduced through diversification. Systematic risk, or market 
risk, refers to the risk common to all assets. Systematic risk cannot be diversified away 
(within one market). Within the market portfolio, asset specific risk will be diversified 
away to the extent possible. 
Academic studies on diversification are not only finance-related, but come also 
from other disciplinary areas.  Industrial  Organization economists have examined the 
performances of diversified or specialized businesses since the 1960s (Arnould 1969, 
Gort  1963,  Markham  1973,  Lang  and  Stulz  1994).  Scholars  focusing  on  the 
development of management capabilities have looked at the potential applicability of 
managerial expertise to a variety of different businesses (Andrews 1969, Drucker 1955, 
Koontz 1961). Since the late Seventies it has sparked a lively (yet unsolved) debate on 
the effectiveness of diversification in completely different ventures (Levy and Sarnat 
1970, Higgins and Schalls 1975) as opposed to more focus on interconnected ventures 
(Bettis 1981, Rumelt 1982, Markides and Williamson 1996, Goold and Luchs 1993).
In short, whilst acknowledging the positive impact of diversification on performances, 
attention is shifted to its potential  extension. In other words, to what extent can the 
incorporation of different activities improve a firm’s performances?
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Advocates of “pure” diversification insist on the financial advantages resulting 
from the so-called “portfolio effects”, thanks to the reduction of risk exposure through 
the combination of ventures whose financial flows are not correlated (Madj and Myers 
1987, Berger and Ofek 1995). 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  specific  risk  of  an  investment  may  be  reduced  by 
increasing  the  industrial  diversification  of  the  portfolio  (Kim et  al.,  1989).  Finance 
researchers have underlined further advantages, such as the link between risk reduction 
and increased debt capacity whose interests, being fiscally deductible,  entail  notable 
resource savings (Amit and Livnat 1988). According to such a theory, diversification 
allows for resource and competence surpluses to be used in different territorial, market 
o technological scope; diversification is thus much more than a mere opportunity to 
reduce risk exposure by allocating completely fungible resources (Barney 1997). 
3.3. Conclusion on the financial intermediation perspective
In sum, the literature that takes a financial intermediation perspective on the VCs 
focuses  on  the  VCs’  role  in  alleviating  the  problems  resulting  from  information 
asymmetries  between  the  ventures  and  third  party  providers  of  financial  (and  non-
financial) resources. As such, this theory provides explanations not only for why VC 
exist as an independent type of investor but also for how VC backing might be related 
to venture performance. 
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Financial  intermediation theory focuses both on the information asymmetries 
between VCs, investors and entrepreneurial ventures, and on agency problems resulting 
from likely information asymmetries (i.e. the VC's lack of knowledge compared to the 
entrepreneur) and opportunistic behaviour by the entrepreneur, which have the potential 
to  result  in  severe  problems  for  the  venture and  suggests  means  to  alleviate  these 
problems, such as contractual arrangements and portfolio diversification.
However, in this context a major  assumption is that VCs are able to overcome 
information  asymmetries  and  uncertainty  –  and,  by  this,  ensure  the  quality  of  the 
ventures they back and ‘certify’. But the intermediary/signalling literature hardly looks 
in detail at how VCs actually deal with those issues. 
There is a growing body of literature that suggests that the principal-agent theory 
neglects  important  aspects  of  the  VC-entrepreneur  relationship.  For  instance,  it  is 
argued  that  it  is  a  one-dimensional  view  of  the  relation  between  the  VC  and  the 
entrepreneur.  Sahlman (1990)  for example,  notes that,  although VCs seem to retain 
much of the power in the relationship with entrepreneurial ventures, there are in fact 
checks and balances in the system: VCs who abuse their  power will  find it  hard to 
attract the best entrepreneurs, who have the option of approaching other VCs or sources 
other than venture capital. Forbes and Milliken (1999), furthermore, point out that an 
agency theory – although identifying problem areas and suggesting possible means to 
deal with those problems - does not take into account how decision-making processes 
themselves can affect the perception and resolution of problems.21 
21 As  a  consequence,  an  increasing  number  of  scholars  recommend alternative/additional  theoretical 
theories and models. For instance, a recent stream of literature suggests that there might be a ‘double-
sided moral hazard’ problem (e.g. Casamatta 2000, Dessi 2000, Inderest and Mueller 2001, Repullo and 
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On the other hand, the agency theory and the related contracting theories fall 
short of explaining two, arguably even more important, issues in the venture capital 
context.  Firstly, agency theory focuses mainly on the VCs’ role as financiers, and  on 
contractual  arrangements  to  mitigate  VCs’  downside  potential  when  investing  in 
entrepreneurial ventures. But it has little to say about other key contributions of VCs to 
their investee ventures: the provision of non-financial, value-added resources. Hellmann 
and Puri (2002), for instance, argue that – although the traditional financial theory tends 
to focus on the information-based roles of financial intermediaries, dealing with the 
alleviation of moral hazard or adverse selection, and emphasizing the monitoring role of 
VCs, who gather information about the firms they finance - the role of VCs extends 
beyond that of traditional financial intermediaries like banks; they play a broader role in 
the professionalization of the companies they finance. 
Also, the portfolio diversification theory clashes with some particular features of 
venture capital. Financial portfolio theory states that systematic risk is equated with the 
risk (standard deviation) of the market portfolio. Since an asset will be purchased only if 
it improves the risk-return characteristics of the market portfolio, the risk of a security 
will be the risk it adds to the market portfolio. In this context, the volatility of the asset, 
and its correlation with the market portfolio, is historically observed and is therefore a 
Suarez 1998, Schmidt  1999).  Some scholars  also argue that  a  ‘prisoner's  dilemma’ model is  a  more 
appropriate  conceptual  lens  for  understanding  the  VC–entrepreneur  relationship  than  agency  theory, 
which emphasizes their potentially competing interests and monitoring costs (e.g. Cable and Shane 1997). 
Others furthermore point out that while the agency theory might provide a good fundament for explaining 
structural and compositional elements of control, it has limited ability to explain how the parties behave 
in their  ongoing and reciprocal  relationship - where aspects of  cooperation might be at  least  equally 
important than aspects of competitive. As a consequence, some scholars recommend concepts such as 
‘Procedural  Justice  Theory’  to  ground research  on  venture  capital  (e.g.  Busenitz  et  al.  1997,  2004, 
Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996, Sapienza et al. 2000).
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given. Unfortunately, the venture capital market is far from being an efficient market, 
and the several approaches to asset pricing that attempt to price assets by modelling 
assets' returns cannot be applied, for at least 3 reasons: (1) venture capital is private in 
nature, characterised by information asymmetries and lack of information which make it 
not  possible to rely on market returns with the specific  aim of  pricing; (2)  venture 
capital is illiquid so that assets (i.e. the backed ventures) can be sold to only a limited 
number of potential buyers, and often at a great discount to their purchase price. (3) 
venture capital has very volatile floatations, and hence one can observe valuation and 
returns only when and if an asset  is sold,  which is not as common as it  comes for 
securities. As a matter of facts, portfolio theory rely on the possibility for (maximum) 
prices  paid  for  any  particular  asset,  and  hence  the  return  it  will  generate,  to  be 
determined based on its relationship with the market portfolio. But for the said reasons 
it is fairly impossible to determine the actual returns of a market-portfolio in the venture 
capital market22.
These particular feature of venture capital market may limit the possible benefits 
a VC may gain by implementing a strategy of pure diversification of its portfolio. In 
particular  the  high-risk  associated  with  the  nature  of  the  VC  activity  itself  (i.e. 
supporting  potential  future  growing  companies)  may  push  the  VC  to  rely  to  other 
strategic approaches instead of a pure portfolio diversification, as I will illustrate in the 
Hypotheses section.
22 Relatively to the discussion on the applicability of financial theory and portfolio diversification in the 
contest  of  Venture  Capital  I  owe  a  special  debt  of  gratitude  to  Professor  Robert  C.  Cressy,  whose 
speeches, lessons and private conversations on said topic gave me insight and inspiration.
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The deficiencies of agency theory are addressed,  to some extent, in the final 
strand  of  theoretical  oriented  literature  we  shall  discuss,  namely  the  resource-based 
theory, which follows in the next section. 
3.4. Resource-based theory
The  intermediation  perspective  treats  VCs  as  a  homogenous  group,  without 
acknowledging likely differences between them (Hsu 2003). As such, it cannot explain 
the apparent differences in the performance of VCs. When a group of competing firms 
choose similar (contractual) approaches to agency problems, these approaches cannot be 
sources of competitive advantage for any one firm (Barney and Hesterly 1996).
The resource-based theory views the firm as a unique bundle of heterogeneous 
resources  (Barney  1991,  Penrose  1957,  Wernerfelt  1984),  and  builds  on  two  basic 
assumptions about a firm’s resources: 1) that they can vary significantly across firms, 
and 2) that such differences can be sustained due to resource immobility. Thus, no two 
companies are alike; and a firm will have a competitive advantage if it possesses unique 
bundles of resources that are valuable, scarce, hard to imitate, hard to replace, and that 
enable  the  firm  to  perform  better  activities  more  efficiently  or  effectively  than 
competitors (e.g. Amit and Shoemaker 1993, Barney 1986, Conner 1991, Dierickx and 
Cool 1989, Penrose 1968, Peteraf 1993, Spender 1993).23 
23 As Teece (1997) notes, the resource-based theory has much in common with the work on organizational 
ecology  and  commitment,  as  it  sees  firms  as  heterogeneous  because  of  their  different  resource 
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In this theory it is common to distinguish between two main groups of resources: 
tangible  resources (e.g.  financial  resources,  physical  assets,  infrastructure)  and 
intangible  resources  (e.g.  knowledge,  reputation,  human  resources,  culture  ad 
networks). It is also common to distinguish two main types of knowledge: explicit and 
tacit (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Polanyi 1962, Von Hippel 1986). Explicit knowledge 
can  be  observed,  communicated,  transferred  and  imitated  relatively  cheaply  and 
quickly. Similar to ‘information’ explicit knowledge is often considered a public good 
that is not relevant to individual wealth creation. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is 
observable but is difficult to communicate and transfer, and can be imitated, if at all 
only  in  a  costly  and  prolonged  process,  and  is  thus  considered  by  many  as  most 
important resource of a firm (Barney 1991, Spender 1996). 
In  this  context,  the  related  concept  of  a  firm’s  (core)  competencies or 
capabilities must be mentioned. This concept assumes that resources are not normally 
productive on their own (Hamel  and Prahalad 1992). Instead, most tasks require that 
several resources collaborate closely together to form competences that differentiate it 
from its competitors. Thus, the interest is not in resources or capabilities per se but in 
those capabilities that provide a competitive advantage relatively to other firms; and, as 
Grant (1998) pointed out, it is the management’s core task to match a firm’s unique 
resources or capabilities to the opportunities that arise in the external environment. 
endowments  and  because  those  resources  are  ‘sticky’.  This  is  distinctive  from  previous  dominant 
approaches as advocated, for instance, by Michael Porter, who emphasized the importance of industry 
characteristics to explain performance differences of firms, arguing that any competitive edge achieved 
by firms in an industry will be short lived due to the high mobility of their rent-producing resources that 
can be bought and sold in factor markets. 
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However the resource-based theory has been mentioned explicitly only by a few 
scholars  respect  to  research  on  venture  capital.  Bygrave  (1987)  emphasized  the 
importance  of  VC’s  knowledge  as  its  distinctive  capability,  including  innovations, 
technology, and people in specific industry segments. Even more explicitly, Locket and 
Wright (1999) argue that although the VC has been traditionally viewed as a financial 
intermediary it may also be thought of as a “collection of productive resources”.
The applicability  of  the resource/knowledge-based perspective to  the venture 
capital  context  can  be  understood  with  view  to  the  ventures  particularly  so  when 
referring to another resource-centred concept, the resource-dependence theory. 
This concept emphasizes the constraints on the organization’s strategic choice 
especially in situations of resource scarcity and environmental turbulence (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978).  According to this theory many firms do not control all the resources 
they need.  This might  be,  for  instance,  because  environmental  uncertainty makes  it 
impossible  to  own all  relevant  resources  (Thompson 1967).  Also,  a  firm’s  strategy 
might be particularly resource demanding such as is the case with fast growth, high-
innovation  that  aim for  an  IPO.  For  those  companies  acquisition  of  resources  and 
reduction of resource dependence becomes a vital activity.24 
To  explain  this  the  resource-dependence  theory  suggests  inter-organizational 
association  strategies  are  key.  Among  those  strategies  the  adequate  choice  and 
composition of the board of directors is said to be particularly efficient for small firms, 
which cannot devote huge amounts of time and money to inter-organizational relations 
24 In this context, a peculiarity of resource dependence theory, as opposed to neo-institutional theory, is its 
reliance on the effectiveness of managerial action and on inter-/organizational practices, which is seldom 
recognized as having an impact by neo-institutional scholars.
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strategies (Aldrich 1979, Daily and Dalton 1992, 1993, Huse 1995, Pearce and Zahra 
1992, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
The  applicability  of  the  resource-dependence  theory  in  the  venture  capital 
context is straightforward. Aldrich (2001), for instance, emphasizes the importance of 
‘social capital’ that allows firms to obtain resources that are otherwise unobtainable to 
them, such as knowledge,  capital,  clients, and access to suppliers,  networks; and he 
notes that VCs can be seen as one important part of the social capital for entrepreneurial 
ventures.  Fried et al. (1998) highlight that the board of directors of VC-backed ventures 
-  as  suggested  by  the  resource-dependence  theory  –  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
acquisition of resources because. VC-backed firms are usually young and small, so that 
board members, if sufficiently knowledgeable about the firm’s business, could make a 
substantive contribution. Also the fact that both inside directors (founder-managers) and 
outside  directors  (VCs)  have  significant  ownership  in  the  firm  could  provide  an 
incentive for the two parties to work closely together to ensure the success of their 
venture. 
Similarly,  Jääskeläinen et  al.  (2003) note that there are two perspectives that 
look at why VCs get involved in their portfolio ventures: monitoring needs and value-
added assistance/support. Monitoring needs result from agency risk, which gives rise to 
the VCs’ governance with a need to monitor the activities of the ventures to ensure that 
the conduct of the management is aligned with the interests of the VC. However, while 
the governance of ventures concentrates on the value of reduced risks and prevention of 
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undesired outcomes, the assistance/support perspective considers the VCs’ involvement 
as a valuable resource for the focal ventures. 
In the same vein Busenitz et al. (2004) note that VC information may be more 
valuable  to  start-up  companies  than  to  more  later  stage  ones,  because  VCs  bring 
previous  relevant  expertise  and  experiences  with  them  from  earlier  investments. 
Theoretically, therefore, input from VCs – for instance on strategic issues - should lead 
to decisions that are better than those that a start-ups could have generated otherwise. 
Furthermore,  VCs  may  even  serve  as  intermediaries  on  behalf  of  essential  factor 
providers. Those VC-provided contacts have the potential to provide start-ups with a 
more informed view of their business options. Thus, to the extent that VCs provide 
information to start-ups on strategic issues, one might expect that it would be related 
positively to improvements in venture performance (Busenitz et al., 2004). 
3.5. Conclusion on Resource-based view
 
The  resource/knowledge-based  theory  has  been  referred  to  by  a  number  of 
empirical  studies,  which  indicate  that  VCs  differ  in  their  ability  to  identify  and/or 
develop successful companies. 
Indeed, the applicability of this concept in the area of venture capital in general 
and with a view to answering our own guiding research question is obvious. To begin 
with it is plausible to argue that VCs – as all other companies - need certain resources to 
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develop (core) competences, which help them to differentiate themselves not only from 
the more traditional investors but also from their peers.  For this purpose, tangible - 
financial - resources might be considered as one part of the bundle. After all, the VC’s 
main activities  are  attracting  financial  resources  from investors  (or  generating  them 
internally) and investing those funds into promising projects to generate profits. But 
taken  alone,  financial  resources  are  clearly  insufficient  for  VC  success  since  such 
resources need to be managed effectively. They are often scarce (depending on the stage 
of the cycle and the nature of the venture) but usually not ‘unique’.25 Instead, they are 
transferable between firms at low costs, and as such ‘imitable’. As equity resources they 
have (unlike debt) no time dimension and hence can be considered ‘durable’. Of course 
they are always at risk when invested in a business with a view to earning profits. Thus, 
financial resources are not sufficient to provide a competitive advantage to a VC.26
Relating this  view to what  it  has  been shown in the previous  section,  while 
discussing venture capital literature on portfolio decisions, the resource-based theory 
seems to support the empirical findings on the specialization of VCs’ portfolio in those 
particular industries, stage of development and geographic markets, where VCs have 
mostly accrued their capabilities and bundle of unique resources, leveraging on them in 
order  to  built  their  own  competitive  advantage.  Their  particular  knowledge  and 
25 In other words, these resources are not specialised to a particular company or VC.
26 In  this  context,  it  should  also  be  noted  that  if  financial  resources  were  the  main  determinant  of 
investors’ success, there should be little reason for large investors to involve any third parties such as 
VCs, and to pay fees and to share potential profits whilst – in most cases – even bearing the full risk. 
Instead,  large  investors  should  safeguard  against  risk  associated  with  investing  in  high-risk/-return 
ventures via contractual arrangements and/or diversification; and their success might be mainly due to 
economies of scale. But the fact that large investors are willing to do so, and the sheer fact that VCs exists 
as intermediaries in the financial markets suggests that, in many cases, there will be more to the investor’s 
success than just money. 
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capabilities allow VCs to differentiate themselves from more traditional investors but 
also successful VCs from their less successful peers. This might happen, for instance, 
because specialized knowledge and capabilities make them more capable of dealing 
adequately with the risks, uncertainties, and information asymmetries associated with 
investment opportunities. 
Furthermore, the mentioned studies who stress on the active management role of 
VCs, implementing those “hands-on” practices such as such as monitoring, corporate 
governance, as well as a number of information-based advice and support services also 
say that the these practices are time- and resource-consuming (Bottazzi et al.  2004), 
hence limiting the number and range of portfolio companies on which these activities 
are  applicable.  The  assistance  provided  by  venture  capitalists  to  their  portfolio 
companies is largely based on the experience and information of the venture capitalists 
(Barney et al. 1996, Bygrave and Timmons 1992).
 Stretching over this idea under the resource/knowledge based lens, this might 
entails  that,  in  order  to  build  a  sustainable  competitive  advantage  the  VCs  has  to 
develop  unique  capabilities  that  can  be  re-deployed  to  most  of  their  portfolio 
companies. Since time and resources are constrained, and uncertainty particularly high 
in  venture  capital,  VCs  may specialize  in  particular  areas  of  business  (in  terms  of 
preferred industries, countries and/or stage of development of selected deals). In other 
words, VCs may decide to manage the uncertainties relatively to portfolio companies, 
by accruing their  capabilities  in specific  domains where selected companies pertain, 
opting  for  a  focused  portfolio,  as  a  means  to  control  for  risk-return.  Specialized 
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resources are thus exploited to maximize the value of funded companies through the 
creation of synergies between businesses (Brander et al. 2002).
Advocates of specialization in corporate strategy literature believe that multi-
business  firms  benefit  from resource  and  competence  sharing,  only  as  far  as  such 
benefits derive from the creation of synergies between correlated ventures (Grant 1988, 
1991, Kanter 1989, Trautwein 1990, Goold and Luchs 1993), by means of which the 
performance of a given portfolio is better than the sum of each single venture (Panzer 
and Willig 1981, Prahalad e Hamel 1989, 1990). Attention is thus paid not only to the 
portfolio of activities that can be managed contemporaneously, but also to the portfolio 
of competences developed by the firm. The more each competence can be redeployed to 
portfolio  companies,  the  more  it  is  convenient  to  keep  said  ventures  in  the  VC’s 
portfolio and to invest in the development and sharing of competences crucial thereto 
(Campbell 1992, Stalk et al. 1992, Barney 1997). 
In  other  words,  the  portfolio  strategy  is  shaped  by  the  way  the  VC 
conceptualises its business and takes key decisions regarding the allocation of resources 
and attention in similar technologies, product development stages, markets contests etc. 
(Goold and Luchs 1993).  Studies from corporate management largely agree that the 
performances of a firm managing a portfolio of activities hinge on its capacity to “fit” 
each single business with its dominant logic (Goold and Campbell 1991).
It  should  however  be  mentioned that  from a  resource-based  perspective,  the 
characterization of a valuable resource tends to be ex post (Foss et al. 1993); and the 
resource-based literature has far less to say about the emergence of these distinctive 
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capabilities (Levinthal and Myatt 1994). In other words, such resources tend to be taken 
as given and their emergence is not explained. Furthermore, as Teece (1997) points out, 
the  resource-based  theory  recognizes  but  does  not  explain  the  nature  of  isolating 
mechanisms that enable rents and competitive advantage to be sustained.27 
In  sum,  from  a  resource  (-dependence)  perspective  it  seems  reasonable  to 
assume  that  (at  least  some)  VCs  could  have  develop  certain  competences  that 
distinguish them not only from more traditional investors but also from each other by 
allowing  them  identify  and  realistically  assess  the  most  promising  investment 
opportunities,  to  deal  more appropriately  with the risks  and uncertainties associated 
with investments in high risk-return ventures, and to provide missing/complementary 
resources  to  them.  This  might  not  only  become  manifest  in  different  investment 
approaches by VC with different knowledge, but it might also translate into different 
performances of VCs and/or their investments. 
Thus, one might further argue that under the resource/knowledge-based view, 
specialization  is  an  alternative  strategy,  if  not  complementary,  to  the  previously 
discussed  diversification  approach  to  portfolio  composition  (i.e.  the  financial 
intermediation/signalling  and  the  principal-agent  theories)  in  that  having  superior 
resources  or  competencies  should  help  a  VC to  better  fulfil  his  role  as  a  financial 
intermediary and to deal with possible information asymmetries more appropriately.
27 Also more recent developments of the resource-based theory do only partially address this issue. For 
instance,  the  concept  of  dynamic  capabilities  extends  the  resource-based  view  by  incorporating 
evolutionary theory;  and it  emphasizes  the need of  many organizations  to  adapt to rapidly changing 
environments.  However,  for this purpose,  the concept focuses primarily on the exploitation and (re-) 
deployment of  existing internal and external firm specific competences, but not on the development of 
(new) knowledge or competencies (Teece et al. 1997, Teece 1998).
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3.6. Hypotheses
Previous literature approached the VCs portfolio strategy issues as a means to 
manage  risk/returns  emphasizing  two  opponent  strategies:  diversification  or 
specialization of their investments portfolio. Now I will turn to examine which of the 
two said approaches  lead to  better  VCs performance.  This  question has  never  been 
directly addressed before, and its implication are very important since they call  into 
question the very nature of the VCs. Indeed we have so far seen the said two strategic 
approach  received  support  from  different  stream  of  literature,  one  relying  on  the 
concepts of financial intermediation and agency theory, the other looking at VCs under 
the lens of a resource/knowledge based perspective. 
The assessment of such assumptions shall significantly contribute to the debate 
on the role of VC firms as mere financial intermediaries providing capital to funded 
firms or as major players in the development of such companies, providing resources, 
managerial competences, relational capital and actively guiding their growth. In doing 
such an assessment I will look at three different strategic dimensions along which VCs 
can decide whether to diversify or specialize their portfolio of companies. These key 
variables are the  geographic span of portfolio companies, their  industry field and the 
stage-of-development they are involved with when the VC decide to invest in. For each 
dimension I will  provide conflicting hypotheses regarding the theoretical  advantages 
97
                                                                                                                            Chapter III
associated  with  the  implementation  of  a  diversification  strategy  versus  those  of  a 
specialization strategy.
The strategy that VCs use to manage the investment risk/return relationship is 
approached here as a multidimensional construct. Three key variables that have been 
identified to affect this risk/return relationship are industry scope of portfolio company 
investments, stage-of-growth scope of portfolio company investments, and geographic 
scope of portfolio company investments. I thus assume that VCs are able to diversify or 
specialize  their  portfolio  mainly  across  these  three  dimensions  or  characteristics  of 
investee companies. 
For  each  strategic  dimension,  a  rationale  will  be  given  for  using  either  a 
specialization or a diversification strategy, depending on the type of risk that is most 
pertinent to be controlled. Holding that the different types of risk are intertwined, it is 
difficult to propose which polarizing force of risk will prevail.  Therefore, I will then 
advance two rivalling hypotheses.
Funds are able to decide on their degree of portfolio diversification by selecting 
the geographic markets where they will go to invest. This strategy will determine the 
location of their investments and thus the physical proximity of the investments within a 
VC’s portfolio. 
By  broadening  the  spectrum  of  countries  where  they  can  fish  for  investee 
companies, VCs can enlarge their basket of opportunities. A larger geographic horizon 
will  increase  the  chances  and  capabilities  to  identify  higher-return  investments. 
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Moreover, by spreading their portfolio in different geographic areas, they can minimize 
country-specific risk and mitigate the impact on their portfolio performance of factors 
negatively affecting the economic outcomes of a specific geographic region.
On the other hands, the possibility to invest in different countries involves time- 
and resource-consuming activities  of  screening  and analysing  the  different  markets, 
effectively supporting and running backed companies in heterogeneous domains each 
with its different constraints and problems. It requires knowledge of different markets, 
while by focusing on few similar regions, a fund can benefit from accruing the country-
specific knowledge from may point of view (legal issues, economic trends, screening 
and selecting deals).  A limited geographic  scope of  portfolio  investments  facilitates 
control over the management of these companies. Indeed geographic proximity enable 
VCs to maintain significant contact with the management of investee companies, and 
provide  homogeneity  over  several  strategic  aspects  such  as  rule,  regulations, 
Institutional  actors,  other  investors,  geographic  key   factors.  As a  result,  VCs  who 
specialize  their  portfolio  of  investment  in  few  geographic  regions  can  build  on 
experience to control for better evaluate environmental resources and constraints, for 
both agency risk and business risk and, thus maximize their risk/reward returns.
The  second  dimension  along  which  VCs  can  pursue  different  degree  of 
diversification is the range of industries in which to invest. 
Applying to financial portfolio theory (Markovitz 1970, Sharpe 1964), VCs may prefer 
to diversify across industries in order to reduce their risk exposure in a specific industry 
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or technology. A greater variety of industries in which to invest increases investment 
opportunities. 
The increased range of opportunities will provide the capability for the VCF to 
more selectively identify higher-return investments. Agency and business risks could be 
strongly  reduced  by  decreasing  industry-specific  risk  through  the  spreading  of 
investments across several industries. 
On the other hand, investors who specialize in a tight number of technological 
fields  can  control  for  business  risk  by  providing  more  competent  strategic  and 
operational support to deals they funded (Barney et al. 1989). Specialization may help 
VCs to protect from information asymmetry (Eisenhardt 1989), by enhancing control 
over the management of these companies by the VC. For example, it is more difficult 
for portfolio companies to hide issues of management incompetence or other crucial 
information  regarding  company  performance  due  to  the  VC’s  more  in-depth 
understanding of the industry.
Also VCs can develop a more specialized understanding of the complexities of 
these industries, and control for business risk by accruing specific-knowledge which can 
be horizontally applied across portfolio companies, as well as by enhancing skills to 
better  evaluate  environmental  resources  and  constraints  affecting  their  portfolio  of 
investments. 
A third dimension along which VCs can diversify or specialize their portfolio of 
investments is the stage of development of selected deals. This strategy will determine 
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the degree of portfolio company diversity based on stage-of-growth within a VC’s total 
portfolio of company investments. 
It has been shown that different growth-stages of investee companies require a 
number of different supporting skills and capabilities to be implemented by the investor 
(Carter and Van Auken 1994; Chang 2004). Heterogeneity among portfolio company 
growth stages will require the development of more general management skills at the 
expense of particular stage-specific abilities (De Clercq et al. 2001). As a result, the 
management team of VCs will be less able to take a more active role in decision making 
processes  at  the  portfolio  company  level  (Bottazzi  et  al  2004).  A  diversified 
development stage scope of portfolio company investments decreases VC control over 
the management of these companies (Kaplan and Stromberg 2004). However, a greater 
variety of growth stages in which to invest will offer increased investment opportunities 
for the VF, offering more chances to selectively identify higher-return investments since 
the  fund  will  be  less  restricted  by  the  stage-of-development  variable.  Furthermore 
agency  and  business  risk  associated  with  specific  stage  of  development  will  be 
minimized through the spreading of investments across several growth stages. 
On  the  opposite  side,  a  focused  stage-of-development  portfolio  strategy 
facilitates control over the management of these companies by the VC (Zacharakis and 
Shepherd 2001). By limiting the number of portfolio company stages of development 
upon which to invest, fund managers can develop a more specialized knowledge of the 
complexities inherent in these particular stages, and therefore, control for both agency 
and  business  risk.  The  homogeneity  among  the  investee  companies,   allow  for  an 
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effective sharing of specialized knowledge across portfolio companies, which enables 
the VC to become more directly involved in the key decision making processes of their 
portfolio companies as well as better evaluate environmental resources and constraints 
associated with a specific stage-of-development.
So far I  tried to set  into opposition two theoretical  frameworks which try to 
explain  the  advantages  in  term  of  superior  performance  by  following  the  portfolio 
diversification strategy or the portfolio specialization approach.
According to the former perspective, since VCs mainly provide financial capital 
to ventures with a high growth potential, a well-diversified portfolio may reduce the 
overall risk without reducing its results. If, instead, VCs are perceived as being actively 
involved  in  the  management  of  backed  firms,  providing  both  financial  and  human 
capital, relational resources, know-how and professional skills, the creation specialized 
portfolio could greatly enhance portfolio performance by the research and exploitation 
of synergies between similar businesses (Brander et al. 2002).
Following the works insisting on a “resource-based” rational, it is reasonable to 
expect that:
H1,a:  VC  firms  pursuing  diversification as  an  investment  strategy  show  higher  
performance than VC firms following a  specialization strategy.
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Following a financial portfolio logic, it is thus reasonable to expect that:
H1,b:  VC  firms  pursuing  specialization  as  an  investment  strategy  show  higher  
performance than VC firms following a  diversification strategy.
Despite a recently growing academic interest on this topic, there is still no clear 
understanding on the relationship between performance and the portfolio strategy of 
VCs. If some latest work tend to suggest that specialization and diversification should 
affect performance, there is a lot of room to deepen this avenue of research (De Clercq 
et al 2001, Bottazzi et al. 2004, Gompers et al. 2005, Knill 2005).
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CHAPTER IV
Setting and methods of analysis
This  Chapter  is  dedicated  to  the  description  of  the  setting  and  of  the 
methodological  approach  I  used  in  order  to  analyse  the  impact  of  portfolio 
diversification on the performance of VCs. 
I decided to empirically address my research question in the United Kingdom 
(UK) since it is the most developed venture capital market in Europe and second only 
to United States worldwide, providing an ideal setting where to gather information and 
perform analyses. Hence the first part of this section is dedicated to a brief introduction 
to the UK venture capital industry with the aim of describing the analysis setting.
Then I will turn to the description of the variables derived from the literature 
described  in  previous  chapters,  their  operalization  and  the  statistical  approach  to 
perform the analysis.
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4.1. The raise and growth of Venture Capital in the UK.
Venture capital did not become established in the UK until the 1980s28. Indeed, 
prior to 1979 there were just a handful of venture capital firms - of which the most 
significant was ICFC, the predecessor of 3i plc (Clark 1987, Coopey and Clark 1995)29. 
However,  from the early  1980s an enormous expansion occurred in  the number  of 
venture capital firms. 
The private equity industry in the UK has grown rapidly from the mid 1980s 
and is second only in importance globally to the USA. This rapid expansion in the UK 
can be attributed to several factors, particularly the growth of the US venture capital 
industry in the mid 1970s which provided a role model and information for the UK 
counterpart (Bank of England 1982), the global economic boom during the 1980s and 
the general encouragement through this period of new enterprises and small businesses 
by the UK Conservative government.
Key influences were government policy and changes in financial markets. The 
Conservative  Government  under  Mrs.  Thatcher  stimulated  a  more  entrepreneurial 
economy, resulting in a higher quality and number of managers and businesses to be 
28 The early stirrings of a UK venture capital industry began in the UK in the 1930s (Lorenz, 1989), but it 
was only in the early 1980s that it really began to develop and expand. At the foundation of the British 
Venture Capital Association in 1983, there were only 36 members. Six years later in 1989, the industry 
had grown to a peak of 124 venture capital firms (BVCA, 2000).
29 Most  notably,  in  1945,  the  Bank  of  England,  together  with  the  major  national  clearing  banks, 
established the  Industrial  and Commercial  Finance  Corporation (ICFC) (Coopey and Clarke,  1995). 
ICFC eventually evolved into 3i, which became the main equity provider in most of the regions of the 
UK, moving into venture capital from the late 1970s. In 1994, however, 3i went public and, driven by the 
need to make returns for its shareholders, it closed several of its UK regional offices and in 1998—99 it 
announced that it was adopting minimum deal sizes of 1 GBP million for technology deals and 3 GBP 
million  for  general  investments.  This  regional  rationalization  and  upward  shift  in  deal  size  have 
reinforced the perception among many actors  that  there  is  an equity  capital  gap for  small  high-risk 
companies (Robbie and Murray 1992).
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backed.  The  Business  Start-Up  Scheme,  later  extended  and  renamed  the  Business 
Expansion Scheme, which provided tax incentives for private investors who invested in 
unquoted companies, led to the establishment of collective schemes to manage these 
investments.  This  gave  a  significant  boost  to  the  development  of  a  venture  capital 
experience. The introduction of the Unlisted Securities Market in 1981 made it easier 
for smaller firms to achieve a flotation and in the process provided venture capitalists 
with a potential exit route for their shareholdings. Another important influence was the 
economic turbulence of the 1980s, which created opportunities for management buy-
outs  (MBOs)  and  management  buy-ins  (MBIs),  influenced  in  part  by  the  US 
experience, which showed how investing in high tech companies was very profitable 
for  the  investor,  which  actively  sought  investment  opportunities  and  played  an 
important role in expanding the market in which it operated (Coopey and Clark 1995, 
BVCA 1998). 
The total amount of funds invested grew rapidly from the early 1980s, peaking 
at 1.4 GBP billion in 1989. This was followed by a period of decline and stagnation 
between 1989 and 1993 when various financial institutional investors withdrew from 
the industry. Between 1993 and 2000 there was a rapid growth in the amount invested: 
the amount invested in 2000 was nearly 6.4 GBP billion, more than five times higher 
than the annual amounts invested in the early 1990s (Figure 4.1.). However, despite the 
increasing amounts invested by venture capital firms, the number of investments has 
remained stable throughout the 1990s at just over 1000 (1182 in 2000), and is lower 
than the 1988 total (Figure 4.2.), which reflects increasing deal sizes. 
Robbie and Murray (1992) described the UK venture capital industry  in the 
1990s as having entered a stage of maturity, signified by declining profitability and 
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growth,  concentration  of  market  share,  and  increase  in  market  information  and 
buyer/supplier power.
Figure 4.1.: Funds Invested in the UK
Figure 4.2.: Number of companies backed in the UK
Source: Adapted from Mason and Harrison (2002)
UK venture capital activity experienced a significant downturn in 2001, in line 
with global trends. Although the number of companies financed increased by 10% on 
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the previous year, the amount invested declined to 4.8 GBP billion, significantly down 
on the record levels in 1999 and 2000, but still higher than for 1998 and previous years 
(BVCA 2002a).
These trends reflect the cyclical nature of venture capital investment that arises 
from fluctuations  in  the willingness of investors to  provide money to VCs that are 
driven by their return expectations. Successful exits in the early 1990s, which provided 
evidence of attractive returns, encouraged many investors to return and has attracted 
new investors.  There  has  been a  particularly  significant  flow of  money from large 
North American investors seeking diversification from their domestic market (Financial 
Times 1999). These investors accounted for 41% of the funds raised by UK VCs in the 
period 1997-2000 (BVCA 2001a). This current downturn in venture capital investing in 
2001  is  the  outcome  of  the  over-funding  in  the  late  1990s,  the  bursting  of  the 
technology bubble and specifically the collapse of various venture capital-backed dot-
com businesses, the combined effect of which has been to drive down returns, and the 
end of the bull market which has prevented investors from achieving profitable exits 
from their investments.
This growth in venture capital investment activity during the 1990s has been 
accompanied by a significant change in the nature of venture capital investing. Since 
the late 1980s, the UK venture capital industry has become progressively more geared 
to investing in MBOs and MBIs (Table 1). This reflects several factors (Wright et al. 
1998), notably the preference of institutional investors to invest in MBO funds rather 
than early stage funds, the superior returns achieved by MBO funds, and the shortage of 
classic venture capital skills. MBOs and MBIs represented 56% of the amount invested 
in  2000,  compared  with  only  21%  in  1984.  However,  this  represents  a  decline 
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compared with the late 1990s, when MBOs/MBIs were attracting over 70% of venture 
capital investments. 
Table 4.1. Venture capital investment in UK by stage and type of exit
Table 1: Venture capital investments by stage and Type of Exit 
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Source: BVCA (2000) 
The increase in MBO/MBI investments has been at the expense of investments 
in seed capital, start-up and early stage ventures: although the actual amount invested in 
early  stage  ventures  has  increased  substantially  since  the  early  1990s  and  doubled 
between 1999 and 2000, it accounts for a smaller proportion of investment activity than 
in the 1980s. It is therefore the increasing significance of MBO/MBI investments that 
has been responsible for the rising average size of investment.
Although the gap has narrowed considerably in recent years, the UK private 
equity  market  is  regarded  as  more  mature  compared  to  its  continental  European 
counterparts (Tannon and Johnson, 2005). The UK accounts for some 40% of the whole 
of the European market and as a percentage of GDP, the UK is the most significant 
private equity investor in Europe at a level of 1.10%. Out of this, however, only 0.21% 
goes  into  venture  capital  financing  while  the  rest  is  invested  in  the  buyout  sector 
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(EVCA, 2005b). The US is the predominant VC nation30; in 2003 74% of all venture 
capital investments among the G7 nations was made in the US, and VC financing as a 
percentage of GDP was at least twice as high in the US as in the UK (Bygrave and 
Hunt, 2004). The invested amount per company is also higher in the US than in any 
other  country.  In  2003,  US  VCs  invested  on  average  $8.1  million  per  company, 
compared to $1.19 million per company in the UK. 
During 2004 the total amount of raised funds in Europe reached €27.5 billion 
where the UK contributed to 37% of these funds, i.e. €10.1 billion. Pension funds are 
the largest contributors to UK funds, representing 23 to 26% of raised capital during 
2002-2004. Second largest contributors are fund of funds with 15 to 20%, followed by 
banks, contributing 15 to 16%. The UK private equity industry is highly international; 
around  50% of  the  private  equity  investments  done  by  UK investors  during  2002 
through 2004 were allocated to  investments outside the UK (EVCA, 2003;  EVCA, 
2004b; EVCA, 2005b). 
The UK venture  capital  and  private  equity  investors  tend to  invest  more in 
established businesses rather than in new technology ventures,  as  evidenced by the 
dominating  buyout  sector.  Over  70%  of  all  private  equity  goes  into  this  segment 
(Martin, Berndt, Klagge, Sunley and Herten, 2003; EVCA, 2005b). Furthermore, early 
stage investments have decreased substantially in the UK, where VC allocations to seed 
and start-up phases during the last  few years account  for only around 5% (EVCA, 
2005b). And even though the volume of investments in high-technology companies in 
the UK increased tenfold between the early 1990’s and 2001 (Martin et al. 2003), the 
30 Institutional venture capital originated in the USA in the early post-war period, although rapid growth 
only occurred from the early 1980s following reductions in the rate of capital gains tax and new rules 
which explicitly allowed pension funds to invest in venture capital funds (Bygrave and Timmons 1992, 
Gompers 1994).
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technology VC investments as a percentage of GDP was only 0.08% in 2004 (BVCA, 
2005b). In comparison, the US technology VC investments as a percentage of GDP in 
2004  reached  almost  0.15%  (BVCA,  2005b).  BVCA  argues  that  the  large  gap  in 
technology VC investments between the UK and the US is due to both cultural and 
structural differences. The US has been particularly successful in taking advantage of 
the positive effects resulting from clustering and university spinouts, and has found it 
easier to accept the risks involved in investing in technology companies. BVCA also 
suggests that the absence of a functioning pan-European stock exchange for early stage 
ventures hinders the development of early stage VC in Europe. About 22 to 38% of the 
investments in the UK were syndicated, i.e. when a group of VCs jointly invest in a 
portfolio  company,  during  the  2002 to  2004 period.  Out  of  these,  the  international 
syndications represents around 6 to 10% (EVCA, 2003; EVCA, 2004b; EVCA, 2005b). 
Regarding the realisation of private equity investments, industrial trade sales has 
been the most common exit route for the UK VC firms during the last two to three 
years period, representing 20 to 27% of all exits. Since 2003 secondary sales, when one 
financial investor sells it stake in a company to another financial investor, have become 
the second most common exit alternative, today representing almost 15% of all exits. 
The percentage of IPOs has decreased from over 20% in 2002 down to 14% of 
the exits in 2004. At the same time, the number of write-offs has also decreased; from 
23% in 2001 to a level of 8% in 2004 (EVCA, 2003; EVCA, 2004b; EVCA, 2005b). In 
the UK, limited partnerships is the most common legal form of structuring VC funds 
(Mayer et al. 2003). According to EVCA (2004a) the UK has, at least currently, one of 
the most favourable legal and fiscal environments in Europe for the development of the 
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venture capital industry. One exception, however, is the unfortunate tax situation for 
university spin-out companies (EVCA, 2005b).
Finally,  by taking a cautious look at  the financial  returns for venture capital 
investments in the UK, the BVCA reports that early stage and technology VC funds 
performed considerably worse than all the FTSE indices (BVCA 2004, BVCA 2005a). 
Early stage funds achieved just around -10.3% IRR in 2004 over five years, while the 
figure for technology funds was -9.6% IRR over the same period. This gave that the 
overall long-term net return to investors in early stage funds at the end of 2004 stood at 
-2.9% and technology investment at 0.9%. 
4.2. Sample, Variable measurement and statistical approach.
In this section I will give details on the data and methods I used to perform the 
analysis. First I will describe the sample of this research providing details on how the 
sample was built and on the dataset from which I derived sample data. Then I will 
discuss how I operationalized the dependent variable – i.e. VCs performance, the main 
explanatory variables (indexes of diversification on the industry, country and stage of 
development dimensions); and the control variables, mainly discussed in Chapter II, 
while  presenting  the  studies  looking  at  the  impacts  of  several  factors  on  VCs 
performance. Last I will describe the statistical approach I used to assess the impact of 
VCs diversification on their performance.
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4.2.1. The Sample
I decided to study the relationship between the scope of a VC’s portfolio and its 
performance by focusing on VC funds established in the United Kingdom over the 
period 1981-2000. I decided to refer to the UK VC industry since it is the largest and 
most developed in Europe, accounting for nearly 40% of total annual venture capital 
and private equity investment, and is second only to the USA in world importance 
(BVCA, 2005).  I used the database Venture Expert, provided by Thomson Financial, 
as the primary source of data on VC funds and their investee companies. 
Venture Expert provides information on funds, the firms managing these funds 
and the portfolio companies in which the funds invest. It records the identities of the 
participating venture capital firms and funds as well as the portfolio company receiving 
the investment. It also tracks the date of the investment and usually records the amount 
of  the  investment.  The  database  also  reports  outcomes  of  the  portfolio  companies 
receiving funding, including whether they went public, were acquired, went bankrupt, 
were shut down, or are still active investments. Using this information it is possible to 
construct measures of the performance of funds. Unfortunately Venture Expert does not 
provide IRR-based information at the level of the single fund. 
I first identified all VC funds that were created in the UK over the period 1981-
2000  according  to  Venture  Economics.  I  dropped  data  on  funds  whose  date  of 
inceptions is prior the year 1981. Indeed VentureXpert database start the coverage of 
UK Private Equity and Venture Capital deals by the early Seventies, but information on 
early deals is scattered and blanking  possibly leading to data biases and distortions31. 
31 The data coverage of the UK VC industry by Venture Expert starts from the early Seventies, but information on 
earlier  deals  is  scattered and incomplete,  leading to  possible biases.  Gompers and Lerner  (1999) show that the 
Venture Expert coverage is very reliable and consistent starting from 1980 to present, covering up to 90% of Venture 
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The initial sample consisted of all  UK funds that were created starting from 
1981 and including all the funds created in subsequent years until those created in year 
2000,  but  gathering  information  on  fund  characteristics,  backed  companies  and 
performance until December the 31st of 2006. I followed previous studies (Kaplan and 
Schoar 2005, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 2003, Hochberg et al. 2005) and considered all 
funds raised up including 2000, in order to have at least six-year of observations for the 
youngest funds, using year 2006 as the latest year to measure fund performance. Indeed 
funds are structured as closed-end, 10 years limited partnerships (Hocberg et al. 2005, 
Kaplan  and Schoar  2005).  They are  not  usually  traded,  nor  do  they  disclose  fund 
valuations (Ljungqvist et  al.  2005).  Generally, the first  half of the fund lifecycle is 
dedicated to the selection and financing of portfolio companies, whereas the second 
half is generally devoted to the search of a positive exit (through IPOs or trade sales) 
for the investee companies, in order to generate positive inflows. Due to this investment 
cycle, relatively recent funds have not yet operated for long enough to measure their 
lifetime performance. But since the fund has a predetermined limited life (10 years) I 
can easily track the exit of the backed companies over the whole period until year 2006.
According to Venture Expert 689 funds were raised and 5329 companies were 
backed over the period 1981-2000.
From this sample I eliminate “Undisclosed funds” which contain no information 
at all. Also I dropped from my data set funds with incomplete data on the amount raised 
or the composition of investee companies, and funds which were Evergreen funds or 
Funds of Funds, following the approach of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Hocberg et al 
Capital and Private Equity deals in more mature markets such as the U.S. or the UK. For this reason, we decided to 
start our data collection in 1981 since information on VC funds created in the UK before 1980 is present in Venture 
Expert on a very limited base.
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(2005). Indeed Evergreen funds and Funds of Funds follow investment patterns and 
structures that are far from the Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry.
My final sample thus consists of 649 Funds that were raised between 1981 and 
2000,  and  4751  backed  companies.  For  each  fund,  I  constructed  its  portfolio  of 
investment, so that each counted variable is referred to the single found. This is a cross 
sectional sample, constructed in order to allow for each variable one observation for the 
whole period 1981-2000. For each fund portfolio I included all the companies it has 
invested in. For each fund I continued to collect data on portfolio of investment and on 
performance of portfolio deals until the 31st of December 2006.
For each fund, I collected the following information based on Venture Expert 
data: VC fund name, vintage year, managing VC firm, total amount raised, number of 
portfolio  companies.  For  each  investee  companies,  I  collected  the  following 
information: stage of development, country,  main industry (according to the Venture 
Expert  Industry  Classification),  corresponding  VC  fund,  year  of  the  first  stage  of 
investment and of the following stages, status. Based on these data I built the variable 
of analysis, which I detail in the following paragraph.
4.2.2.  The  operationalization  of  the  dependent  variable:  VC 
performance
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In Chapter II it has been pointed out that the ideal performance measure for VCs 
would  be  the  financial  returns  from  VC  investments.  However,  analysing  the 
profitability  of  VCs’  investments  is  a  hard  task  since  information  is  by  definition 
"private",  and  transparency  requirements  are  limited.  The  common  use  of  fund 
valuation data provided by two commercial vendors Venture Economics and Venture 
One,  has  been  criticised  by  some  studies  (e.g.  Ljungqvist  and  Richardson  2003, 
Cochrane 2005) for having three principal shortcomings: (i) the data is available only in 
aggregate rather than in fund-by-fund format; (ii) financial returns are largely provided 
by VC firms on a voluntary basis and thus potentially subject to selection biases; and, 
(iii) the data is based on unrealised as well as realised investments, which introduces 
noise and potentially biases due to subjective accounting treatment. A final example of 
challenges when evaluating and comparing IRRs, is the unclear and inconsistent use of 
net and gross returns, i.e. whether the reported results include or exclude fees to the VC 
firms (Cumming and Walz 2004). Comparing results from different analyses on VC 
performance is thus very complicated.
In  Chapter  II  we  have  also  seen  that  literature  offered  a  reliable  proxy  for 
measuring funds returns is represented by the successful companies exit rates, since the 
capital  gain  VCs  earn  is  made  out  of  the  subset  of  portfolio  companies  which 
experience  a  positive  exit  through  IPO  or  a  third  sale  (Laine  and  Torstila  2004, 
Hochberg et al. 2005)32.  Following this approach I computed fund performance as the 
share of companies in the portfolio having reached a successful exit (IPO or trade sale) 
at the date of the 31st of December 2006. Indeed, by limiting the computation only of 
companies  brought to the public markets one can introduce possible up-ward biases, 
32 Hochberg et al. (2005) also found a positive and strong correlation between exits rates and IRR 
measure of performance. All else equal, the more successful exits has a found, the larger will be its IRR.
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since the performance measures include only the ‘most promising’ ventures, but also 
enhances  a  VC  firm’s  reputation  within  the  investment  community.  Furthermore 
statistics from EVCA (2003) show that the number of IPO in the UK is relatively low, 
which also introduces possible distortions if one include only IPO-based measures. 
Venture Expert reports the current status of each backed company, showing if 
the company went public (IPO), was acquired (M&A), went bankrupt (DEFUNCT) or 
is still in VC’s portfolio (ACTIVE MANAGEMENT). Hence, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the performance measure will be a count of the successful company-exits a 




nceVCPerforma ∑ ∑+= & ;
Where:
-  Σ M&A is the number of portfolio companies that exited the fund through a 
third sale (i.e. via merger with another company or acquired by another organization);
- Σ IPO is the number of portfolio companies that exited the fund via Initial 
Public Offering, being brought to public markets;
- N is the total number of companies in which the fund had invested.
For each fund I computed the number of IPO and M&A it has experienced since 
its inception until 31st December 2006. Thus I have 1 observation for each fund. In 
performing the analysis, I take into account in two ways the possible truncation bias 
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generated by the fact  that more recent funds in the dataset  can benefit of a shorter 
period to reach a successful exit for their investments. First, I include in the regression 
models  dummies  for  each  fund  vintage  year,  in  order  to  control  for  time  effects. 
Second, similarly to Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and to Hochberg et al., 2005) in the 
robustness check section, I repeat the estimates by including in the sample only those 
funds with a vintage year prior to 1996, so that they all should have reached at least a 
ten-year lifetime at the 31st of December 2006.
4.2.3. The measurement of diversification strategy .
In  this  paragraph  I  present  how  I  operationalized  the  diversification 
measure along the different dimension of fund scope identified in the literature (Carter 
and  Van  Auken,  1994;  De  Clerq  et  al.,  2001;  Gupta  and  Sapienza,  1992): 
diversification  by  industry,  by  country  and  by  stage-of-development,  of  portfolio 
investments.
Firstly I recurred to the classification of Venture Expert in order to assign each 
company  in  the  portfolio  in  a  given  industry,  country  of  origin  and  stage-of-
development. Then I needed to calculate an index of diversification relatively to the 
said three dimensions for each of the funds’ portfolios.
Measures  developed  for  the  analysis  of  portfolio  diversification  (and/or 
specialization)  abound  in  the  literature,  stemming  from  several  research  areas  on 
strategy,  economics,  and finance33.  Two general  approaches  to  operationalizing this 
33 For a review of the literature on portfolio diversification, see e.g. Goold and Luchs 1993, Robins and 
Wiersema 1995, Palich et al. 2000, Woerheide and Parsson 1993.
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concept have been particularly used: categorical and continuous measures (Palich et al. 
2000). While the former approach relies on a classification of a portfolio in terms of 
one of several characteristic types of diversification, the latter positions the portfolio on 
a  scale  that  indicate  its  relative  degree  of  diversification  (and/or  specialization)34. 
Continuous measure have overwhelmed categorical ones, since they offer a number of 
advantages  for  quantitative  research  (Robin  and  Wiersema  1995)  by  (1)  providing 
variables  at  a  high  level  of  measurement  subjected  to  a  wide  range  of  technical 
analyses; and (2) they employ data classified according to standard categories, allowing 
for research to be replicable and cumulative.
the two continuous measures of diversification that are most  commonly and 
widely used are the Complement of Herfindahl index and the Entropy index35. A part 
from the fact that these two indexes are calculated on the basis of SIC categories, they 
differ in several aspects.
The Complement of Herfindal index is a variation of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index (HHI), which have been developed by researchers in the industrial organization 
context (e.g. Caves et al. 1980) and then adapted in strategy research (i.e. Montgomery 
and Wernerfelt  1988)  in  order  to  calculate  a  measure of  market  concentration in  a 
particular sector for purposes of antitrust enforcement. Its complement then became 
very popular in finance, as a reliable measure of portfolio diversification (Woerheide 
and Persson 1993). In fact HHI is calculated by squaring the market shares of each firm 
34 According to  Robins  and Wiersema 1995,  the categorical  measures are based on the typology of 
Wrigley (1970) and Rumelt  (1974);  while the continuous measures  originated by the SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification) system. 
35 Critics of said indexes argue that SIC classifications can hardly account for the strategic interrelations 
between different industries (Robins and Wiersema, 1995), since their categories are based on physical 
aggregation criteria (materials, products/markets). According to Robins and Wiersema (1995), the index 
should  be  based  on  the  sharing  between  industries  of  technological  and  managerial  resources  and 
competences (Barney, 1986; Teece, 1986; Winter, 1987), to be measured by an estimate of the flows of 
technological knowledge between industries (Farjoun, 1994).
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competing  in  a  market  and  then  summing  the  resulting  number.  The  use  of  the 
complement of this index by altering the HHI index value has the advantage that it can 
range from 0 to 1. As such, 0 represents a portfolio with absolutely no diversification (a 










Wi = the proportion of portfolio market value invested in category i (in decimal form), 
And N = the number of asset (investment) in the portfolio.
Statistically derived from the thermodynamics,  the  Entropy  index is a  direct 
measure of diversification. This index has been used in corporate strategy in order to 
study the relation between the external growth of large corporation and their pattern of 
diversification from the core business (Jacquemin and Berry 1979) and to study the 
relatedness of portfolio assets (Hart 1970). Using the same diction for the specification 
of the HHI index, the Entropy measure is calculated as it follows:
36 The use of complement of HHI to distinguish diversification indexes from concentration indexes is 
common also in the industrial organization literature. See Robins and Wiersema (2003).
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By using the natural logarithm, the Entropy measure is not constrained by 0 and 1.
A number of studies have been carried in order to analyse which of the two 
indexes  is  the  most  reliable  for  measuring  diversification.  Studying  the  optimal 
diversification  strategy  for  portfolios  of  securities,  Woerheide  and  Persson  (1993) 
compared five indexes aiming at finding which among them is the best in providing 
meaningful  information about the degree of  diversification of  a  portfolio of stocks. 
They found that the complement of the HHI was superior to the Entropy measure in 
terms  of  closeness  of  fit  in  regression  terms  between  portfolio  risk  and  the  index 
number. In particular they found that the modified HHI is the best diversification index 
amongst  the  five  considered  and  recommended  its  use  also  for  its  simplicity  of 
calculation and interpretation.
Studying concentration and market power in several industries, Stigler (1968) 
and Scherer  and Ross  (1990)  found HHI to  be  an appropriate  measure of  industry 
concentration, because by squaring the market shares it lessens the influence of errors 
due to lack of data for small firms. In contrast, they also found that the Entropy index 
can be misleading, in that it shows a more competitive structure than the true level. 
Acar and Sankaran (1999) also prefer HHI for its simplicity and its widespread use – 
although the entropy measure have been used in several other scientific domains (i.e. 
Waterson  1984).  In  addition  they  argue  that  the  two  indexes  are  not  perfectly 
overlapping. In other words the two indexes are not perfectly comparable because (1) 
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while the modified HHI range between 0 and 1,  the Entropy index is not  bounded 
upwards;  (2)  the  two  indexes  seem  to  measure  slightly  different  aspects  of 
diversification, thus their validity ultimately depends upon the theoretical concerns that 
drive the research. This latter idea is developed further by Robin and Wiersema (2003) 
showing that the academic debate on the superiority of one index over the other can be 
solved by looking at the appropriateness of the indexes in the specific context of the 
research where they are supposed to be applied. The authors argue that although they 
have often been viewed as alternative approaches to the common problem of measuring 
diversification, the measures can produce contradictory results because they differ in 
their sensitivity to underlying dimension of portfolio strategy. In particular they suggest 
that entropy index should be preferred in situations where the focus of the research is 
on the relatedness of portfolio assets (investments, stocks, etc.), because the sensitivity 
of the index to the dominant business could affect substantially the interpretation of the 
research. Conversely the concentric index should be preferred if pure diversity of assets 
in portfolio is the objective of the research.
Since the purpose of my dissertation is that of studying the impact of portfolio 
diversification on VCs performance, I will use the HHI approach, as it follows:


















 where  Nij denotes  the  number  of  investments  (in  companies)  of  fund  i in 
industry j (j=1,…, J) and Ni the number of companies in the fund portfolio37. Hence, the 
37 Another approach to compute the diversification index could be that of using the fraction of the fund 
total capital (instead of the fraction of companies) invested in each industry. However, this approach 
requires the full availability of the data on the value invested in each single deal. Unfortunately, in the 
database Venture Expert this kind of information is missing for a large number of  deals, so that it is not 
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index takes the value 0 for a VC fund which is not diversified at all (i.e., all portfolio 
companies operate in a single industry) and increases for higher level of diversification, 
its upper limit being 1.
In a similar way, I computed the diversification by country and by stage-of-
development indexes as it follows:




































where Niy denotes the number of investments of fund i in country y (j=1,…, Y), 
Niz the number of investments of fund i in stage-of-development  z (z=1,…, Z) and Ni 
the number of companies in the fund portfolio.
4.2.4. Operationalizing control variables
A number of variables, for which previous literature found an impact on VCs 
performance, are used as controls. 
The first control variable is Fund Size, measured as the log transformation of the 
total  amount  of  money invested  in  the  VC fund,  in  order  to  control  for  scale  and 
reputation effects which might affect fund performance (e.g. Kaplan and Schoar 2005). 
possible to use it for analysis.
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A  dummy  variable  Follow-on,  taking  the  value  1  for  funds  representing  a 
follow-on of previous funds, was included in order to control for the expertise accrued 
by VCs (e.g. Hocberg et al 2005). 
VC firm experience  captures the experience cumulated over time by the fund 
manager, measured by the cumulated number of companies supported by the lead fund 
manager up to the fund’s vintage year (e.g. Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001). 
VC  inflows in  fund’s  vintage  year  captures  the  log  transformation  of  the 
aggregate amount of money raised by VC industry in the UK in the fund’s vintage year, 
controlling for the presence of a “money chasing deals” phenomenon, which might lead 
to  the  financing  of  low-quality  companies  in  periods  of  excess  availability  of  VC 
funding (Lerner and Gompers 2000). 
As illustrated in the previous part,  syndication allows VCs to share risks and 
have access to their partner’s information and skills in choosing and managing specific 
investments.  Hence,  the  resort  to  syndication  is  positively  associated  with  VCs’ 
performances.  This variable is operationalised for each VC as the shares of portfolio 
investment  co-invested  with  other  VCs,  expecting  a  positive  relationship  with 
performance (Lerner 1994, Lockett and Wright 2001, Brander et al. 2002, Manigart et 
al. 2002, Hege et al. 2003).
Lastly, in order to control for time effects and for the presence of a truncation 
bias, as a consequence of the way I measured fund performance in terms of successful 
exits, I included year dummies controlling for fund vintage year effects. 
124
                                                                                                                           Chapter IV
4.2.5. Statistical Approach.
In this section I will introduce the statistical approach used to analyse the impact 
of VCs diversification strategies on their performance.
In general terms, I modelled the said relationship as it follows:
VC Performance = A + B1(Div.byCountry) + B2(Div.byIndustry) + B3(Div.byStage)  + 
… + BkXk + e
With BkxXk representing a vector of control variables and “e” the error term.
Since the performance of a VC (the proportion of positive portfolio exits) is 
fractional, taking any real value between 0 and 1, with values that tend to cluster on the 
extremes;  the  explanatory  independent  variables  (the  three  measures  of  portfolio 
diversification) are also continuous, fractional and bounded between the values 0 and 1; 
and our control variables are both continuous and dichotomous, the OLS cannot be 
used. Instead I implement the method of Papke and Wooldridge  (1996) for fractional 
response variables. These authors developed a functional form for fractional dependent 
variables, based on the Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood methods.
Papke and Wooldridge  argue that multiple regression model is not applicable 
when fractional dependent variables arise since it assumes a linear relationship between 
the independent  variables and the dependent  variable.  However,  when the  outcome 
variable is dichotomous or fractional, this assumption is usually violated, because “the 
predicted values from an OLS regression cannot guarantee to lie in the unit interval” 
(Papke and Wooldridge  1996,  pp.  620).  One way to  overcome this  problem is  to 
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transform the data using the logarithmic transformation. This has the effect of making 
the form of the relationship linear whilst leaving the relationship itself non-linear. The 
logistic regression38 is based on this principle. It expresses the multiple linear regression 
equation  in  logarithmic  terms  and  thus  overcomes  the  problem  of  violating  the 
assumption of linearity (Field 2000). 
In the Logistic regression the dependent variable is the probability of having one 
outcome or another based on a non-linear function of the best linear combination of the 
independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidel 2001). In case of two outcomes categories 
– i.e. if the dependent variable can assume only the value 0 or 1, the logistic regression 
generates the logit or log of the odds: 
E(ln[Y/(1-Y)|x]=Xβ.
That is, the linear regression equation is the natural log of the probability of 
being in one group divided by the probability of being in the other group, conditioned 
on a set of independent variables.
Nevertheless Papke and Wooldridge  (1996) argue that, with fractional response 
variables, this approach entails some potential problems. For instance, since the log-
odds ratio represent the probability for the dependent variable to take value 0 or 1, for a 
given set of data where the observations take the value 0 or 1 (such as in the case of the 
VC  proportion  of  exited  portfolio  companies),  some  adjustment  are  needed39,  for 
example  assuming  a  particular  distribution  for  the  response  variable,  given  the 
independent variables, and then by estimating the parameters of conditional distribution 
38 Because the model produced by logistic regression is nonlinear, the equations used to describe the 
outcomes are slightly more complex than those for multiple regression.
39 See for example Maddala (1983).
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by maximum-likelihood. However, even when a suitable conditional distribution can be 
applied these adjustments can be difficult to implement or non-rosbust40, depending on 
whether a non parametric or a parametric approach is adopted.
Papke and Wooldridge  (1996) present an estimation method that circumvents 
the said difficulties and it easy to implement for independent, though not identically 
distributed, observations, even if the dependent variable takes the values 0 and 1. The 
authors demonstrate that the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QLME) method 
offer a viable alternative to linear models when the dependent variable is fractional, 
being fully  robust  and  efficient  under  GLM assumptions  and with no  need  of  any 
adjustment.
Maximum  likelihood  estimation  is  an  iterative  procedure  that  starts  with 
arbitrary values of coefficients and determines the direction and size of change in the 
coefficients that will maximise the likelihood of obtaining the observed frequencies. 
Then the residuals are tested and another determination of directions and size of change 
in coefficients is made, and so on, until the coefficients change very little, i.e. converge. 
So,  as  with  multiple  regression,  one  tries  to  fit  a  model  to  the  data  that  allows 
estimating values  of  the dependent  variable  from known values of  the independent 
variables.
Hence, I applied the QLME to the following linear function, in order to evaluate 
the  impact  of  dependent  variables  of  each  j-VC  on  its  performance  (dependent 
variable):
40 A possible distribution for fraction variables is the β-distribution, but Gourieroux et al. (1984) showed 
it is not robust, at least when a portion of the sample is at the extreme values of 0 and 1.
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VC  Performancej =  A  +  β1DivbyCountryj +  β2DivbyIndustryj +  β3DivbyStagej + 
β4ln(fundsize)j  +  β5ln2  (fundsize)j  +  β6Dummy(follow-on)j  + 
β7ln(capitalinflows)j + β8firmexpj + β9Syndj + β10εj 
STATA® provides  routines  for  QLME  method,  derived  from  a  particular 
application  of  the  GLM.  It  allows  for  heterosketasticity  control,  providing  robust 
standard  error  coefficients.  Furthermore,  dummies  for  each  fund vintage-year  were 
included in the regression models, in order to control for time effects. Also, controls for 
multicollinearity  problems  are  performed  for  correlation  amongst  independent 
variables. To address this problem, some preliminary analyses will be performed. First, 
classic bivariate correlation will be calculated. Logistic regression, like all varieties of 
multiple regression, is also sensitive to extremely high correlations. High correlation 
coefficients between two variables can cause multicollinearity, reducing the predictive 
power of analysis. Here, values higher than 0.5 are said to be critical. However, from 
this it is not possible to uncover multicollinearity. Therefore statistics such as variance 
inflation factors (VIFs), are calculated by simply running a linear regression analysis 
using  the  same  outcome  and  independent  variables  (Field,  2000;  Menard,  1995; 
Tabachnick & Fidel, 2001). 
Based on this  I  find highly correlated coefficients  between two of the main 
explanatory variables, namely the index of Diversification by Industry and the index of 
Diversification by Stage of Development. This leads me to run separate analyses, which 
comprise  the  same  baseline  models  (control  variables)  and  use  the  same  units  of 
analysis (VCs for which I have information on all examined variables) but include only 
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one  of  the  theoretical  variables  at  a  time. This  both  circumvents  the   problem of 
multicollinearity  and  allows  for  the  specification  of  a  model  which  allows  for  the 
examination of competing hypotheses. Hence I operationalized the two Diversification 
dimensions of Industry and Country, by calculating Diversification measures based on 
the complement of Herfindahl-Hirschmann Indexes (HHI). In order to take account of 
the stage-of-development portfolio characteristics of funds, I followed previous studied 
(i.e. Kaplan and Schoar 2005) and split the original sample in two sub-groups41: Early 
Stage Funds (ES) are those funds which invest (at least) 60% of their capital in early-
stage deals (i.e. Seed, first-stage, second-stage, development, etc.), while Later Stage 
Funds  (LS)  are  those  whose  60%  of  capital  is  invested  in  later  stage  deals  (i.e. 
Buyouts).
Analyses  will  be  carried  following  this  approach,  which  allows  for 
simultaneously analysing the impact of different levels of portfolio diversification on 
VCs performance, including only those variables that are not highly correlated. Last, a 
number of robustness checks are performed, especially in order to consider the possible 
truncation bias generated by the fact that more recent funds in our dataset can benefit of 
a shorter period to reach a successful exit for their investments, and in order to take 
account  of  the possibility that portfolio strategies can have different  impact  on VC 
performance, depending on the different type of exit.
41 This classification and definition is taken directly from Venture Expert.
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CHAPTER V
The diversification of VCs’ portfolios and the 
impact on performance: analyses and results
In  this  section  we  perform the  analyses  in  order  to  test  the  two  competing 
hypotheses  presented  in  paragraph  3.6..  In  particular  the  focus  is  on  the  question 
whether a diversification rather than a specialization strategy, relatively to the way VCs 
decide which companies should be included in their portfolio, has a positive impact on 
their  performance.  This  issue  is  of  particular  relevance  for  VCs  since  portfolio 
strategies are supposed to directly affect the risk/return profile of funds.
It has been shown that different bodies of literature tend to suggest competing 
hypotheses about the most profitable portfolio strategy. A stream of literature following 
the Financial intermediation perspective seems to support the idea that a diversified 
portfolio should be beneficial  to VCs performance, while applying a resource-based 
view to the venture capital context, VCs with highly specialized skills should perform 
better than less specialized peers.
In this section analyses on a sample of UK VCs are performed in order to shed 
light on the diversification versus specialization strategies and the linkages with VCs 
performance.
VC  performance  is  measured  as  the  percentage  of  successful  exits  a  VC 
experiences in its life. Portfolio diversification/specialization strategy is conceived as a 
130
                                                                                                                           Chapter V
multilevel construct, which entails at least three possible dimensions, characterized by 
the portfolio scope in terms of industries, countries and stage of development in which 
the VC invests. I operationalized the first two dimensions (i.e. Industry and Country), 
of Diversification by calculating modified Herfindahl-Hirschmann Indexes (HHI). In 
order to consider the stage-of-development portfolio characteristics of funds, I followed 
previous studied (i.e. Kaplan and Schoar 2005) by splitting the original sample in two 
sub-groups: Early Stage Funds (ES), investing (at least) 60% of capital in early-stage 
deals; and Later Stage Funds (LS), investing 60% of capital in later stage deals.
 First, I will analyse descriptive statistics for the full sample and the splits. I will 
also display the dynamics of VCs during the period of analyses. Then a quantitative 
approach will be implemented to measure the relationship between VCs diversification 
strategies  and  their  performance.  Finally  a  section  of  robustness  checks  will  be 
presented.
5.1.  The  Dynamics  of  Venture  Capital  Funds  in  the  UK 
between 1981 and 2000.
This paragraph will focus on the dynamics of VCs within the sample, looking 
for trends and heterogeneous characteristics of sample VCs along a relevant period of 
analysis. 
Table 5.1. summarize the characteristics of the full sample. In order to give a 
broad and detailed picture of the dynamics of the sample, I included a number of VCs 
characteristics  of  interest  more  than  only  the  variables  that  will  be  use  in  the 
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quantitative section of the analysis, such as the number of portfolio companies of each 
funds and the statistics on the different type of exits.
Each fund has an average number of 9.3 companies in its portfolio, while the 
median is 5. The average fund size is 68.7 millions of British Pounds, while the median 
is around 11.04 million. 
This suggest a relative small number of big funds with many companies in their 
portfolios and a relatively bigger number of small/medium funds with fewer companies 
in their portfolio.
On average, each found has performed 4.5 positive exits, with M&A that more 
then double the number of IPOs. In terms of percentage, each fund has experienced 
45% of success, meaning that the 45% of companies they have invested in has gone out 
their portfolio, of which 33.2% through third-sale (merger and acquisition) and 11.9% 
going public. This is consistent with the EVCA (2005) findings, which demonstrate a 
preference for the third-sale type of exit for UK VCs.
The table allows to compare funds levels of Diversification by Industry and by 
Country.  The  mean  of  Diversification  by  Industry  for  British  funds  is  49%,  with 
standard deviation levels of 0.29 and the median of 58%. The sample encompasses 
small funds, which have invested in only one company, as well as large funds which 
have invested in hundreds of companies. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  lower  level  for  Industry  Diversification  is  0.00%, 
representing  the  Industry  Diversification  of  a  fund  that  have  invested  in  only  1 
company, and hence having its portfolio focused on 1 Industry field. The maximum 
level  of  the  index is  0.89% representing  funds  that  broadly  spanned their  invested 
companies  through  almost  all  the  Industry  categories.  Considering  that  the  sample 
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contains 39% of funds (255 funds) that have 3 or less companies in their portfolios, 
these figures tell that on average British funds tend to invest in companies pertaining to 
a  number  of  different  technological  domains,  with  363 funds  upon 649 showing a 
degree of Industrial diversification higher then 50%.
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics for the full sample
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Div. by Country 649 0.232 0.000 0.273 0.000 0.903
Div. by Industry 649 0.490 0.581 0.289 0.000 0.891
No of Comps 649 9.279 5.000 12.415 1.000 116.000
No of M&A 649 3.382 1.000 6.174 0.000 72.000
No of IPO 649 1.114 0.000 2.152 0.000 27.000
No of Positive Exits 649 4.496 2.000 7.539 0.000 80.000
M&A/No of Comps 649 0.332 0.286 0.310 0.000 1.000
IPO/No of Comps 649 0.119 0.000 0.206 0.000 1.000
Performance
(No of Positive Exits/ No of Comps) 649 0.450 0.455 0.341 0.000 1.000
Fund Size (GBP Mil.) 649 68.686 11.040 187.575 0.047 1688.110
Ln(Fundsize) 649 2.004 2.402 2.519 -3.053 7.431
ln2(Fundsize) 649 10.353 7.070 10.849 0.000 55.225
Firmex 649 11.960 2.000 24.254 0.000 158.000
% Synd. 649 0.423 0.400 0.360 0.000 1.000
Ln(capitalinflows) 649 8.024 9.094 1.736 4.257 9.714
Diversification by Country for British funds shows lower average levels. The 
mean is 23.2% and standard deviation 0.27. The median is 0.00%, which means that 
half  of  the  funds  invest  only  in  1  country,  and  only  19%  (122  funds)  having  a 
Geographic Diversification level higher then 50%. This suggests that, Diversification 
by Country is less likely to be a preferred portfolio strategy for British VCs, whilst 
these funds appear to be more active in coping with the Diversification by Industry 
strategy.
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Looking at  the same characteristics for the sub-sample of early-stages funds 
(ES) and for later-stages funds (LS), there is evidence of a relevant difference amongst 
these two groups. Table 5.2 reports the mean values, median values, standard errors, 
min and max values for the two groups. I also compared the mean value of each group 
for the most relevant characteristics. The t-test are reported in Table 5.3, which shows 
the significance of these differences.
Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics for sub-samples





n Std. Dev. Min Max
Obs
. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Div. by Country 487 0.206 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.903 162 0.309 0.245 0.304 0.000 0.885
Div. by Industry 487 0.499 0.612 0.296 0.000 0.891 162 0.464 0.531 0.266 0.000 0.840
No of Companies 487 8.277 5.000 10.432 1.000 116.000 162 12.290 6.500 16.725 1.000 106.000
No of M&A 487 2.433 1.000 4.239 0.000 53.000 162 6.235 3.000 9.396 0.000 72.000
No of IPO 487 1.094 0.000 2.260 0.000 27.000 162 1.173 0.000 1.796 0.000 10.000
No of Positive Exits 487 3.528 1.000 6.059 0.000 80.000 162 7.407 4.000 10.323 0.000 74.000
M&A/No of Companies 487 0.280 0.222 0.299 0.000 1.000 162 0.487 0.500 0.292 0.000 1.000
IPO/No of Companies 487 0.121 0.000 0.207 0.000 1.000 162 0.111 0.000 0.202 0.000 1.000
Performance
(Positive Exits/ No of Companies) 487 0.401 0.364 0.342 0.000 1.000 162 0.598 0.606 0.295 0.000 1.000
Fund Size (GBP Mil.) 487 27.152 6.940 73.737 0.047 1136.600 162 193.542 62.675 322.947 0.124 1688.110
Ln(Fundsize) 487 1.347 1.937 2.346 - 3.053 7.036 162 3.979 4.138 1.923 -2.091 7.431
ln2(Fundsize) 487 7.307 5.207 7.458 0.000 49.502 162 19.513 17.122 13.904 0.001 55.225
Firmex 487 10.129 1.000 22.833 0.000 149.000 162 17.463 5.000 27.445 0.000 158.000
% Synd. 487 0.435 0.429 0.369 0.000 1.000 162 0.389 0.327 0.333 0.000 1.000
Ln(capitalinflows) 487 7.981 9.094 1.830 4.257 9.714 162 8.154 8.440 1.411 4.257 9.714
The two splits largely differ for the size of funds, LS being on average more 
than 7 times bigger than ES. While ES mean size is 27.2 Million of British Pounds with 
standard  deviation  73.7,  LS’  mean  size  value  is  over  193  Million,  with  standard 
134
                                                                                                                           Chapter V
deviation about 324, suggesting a great heterogeneity also within the groups. Those 
differences are statistically significant at 1%. The difference between the two splits is 
reflected in the number of companies held in portfolio, which for ES is 8.3 and for LS 
is 12.3. On average, LS count for 4 more companies in their portfolio than ES. This 
does not mean however that all the ES invest less in term of number of companies: 
difference between median vales are in fact lower (ES = 10.4 and LS = 12.3) and while 
the biggest LS invest in 106 companies, the biggest ES invest in 116 companies. Also 
this difference is significant at 1% level.
Table 5.2. Early-stages funds compared with Later-stages funds. Mean values by group.
Early-stages Later-stages T-test p-value(two tails)
Div. by Country 0.21 0.31 -3.26 <0.01
Div. by Industry 0.50 0.46 2.05 <0.05
No of Companies 8.28 12.29 -2.87 <0.01
No of M&A 2.43 6.23 -4.98 <0.001
No of IPO 1.09 1.17 -0.44 n.s.
No of Positive Exits 3.53 7.04 -4.53 <0.001
M&A/No of Companies 0.28 0.48 -7.79 <0.001
IPO/No of Companies 0.12 0.11 0.56 n.s.
Performance
(Positive Exits/ No of Companies) 0.40 0.60 -7.07 <0.001
Fund Size (GBP Mil.) 27.15 193.54 -6.50 <0.001
Firmex 10.13 17.46 -3.07 <0.001
% Synd. 0.43 0.39 1.46 n.s.
Looking at the difference relatively to Diversification indexes, LS have higher 
levels of Diversification by Country with an average index of 31%, while ES reach 
21%. This figure supports the finding of previous literature in that ES tend to prefer less 
degree of diversification than LS. At least at the level of Country. Indeed, when turning 
to the Diversification by Industry, mean values are very similar, with ES values (50%) 
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slightly higher than LS (46.4%). Hence ES and LS tend both to have on average a 
medium level of diversification by Industry. This conflicts with previous findings that 
ES might prefer lower level of industry scope for their portfolios than LS.
Relatively  to  company  exits  LS  outperform  ES  with  an  average  of  6.2 
companies exited via third sale (M&A) versus 2.4 for ES. However when looking at the 
number  of  IPOs  for  the  two  sub-sample,  the  figures  are  very  similar,  with  1.1 
companies  brought  to  public  markets  for  ES  and  1.2  for  LS.  These  findings  are 
consistent  with  previous  literature  which  shows  that  for  LS  third-sales  may  be  a 
preferred and/or easier type of exits than IPO, since LS’ portfolio include in general 
more stable and easy to evaluate (or in other words, less risky) companies, thus being 
more easy to find a third party who wishes to buy the company through MBO, MBI or 
other type of buyout. Also this figure support the view that ES are more keen on IPO 
than M&A as a way to exit portfolio companies. In fact IPO is the most promising way 
for ES to “cash-out” their investment (i.e. to make money from the capital invested), 
possibly benefiting for  the huge  increase  of  value that  generally  an offer  to  public 
markets entails42.
Looking  at  the  performance  of  two  splits,  measured  as  the  proportion  of 
portfolio positive exits, including both those exited via IPO and via M&A, LS shows 
statistically significant higher values, with an average of 60% of portfolio companies 
exited,  while  ES have an average of 40% of portfolio companies positively exited. 
Again, the difference reflects the number of M&A, which is higher for LS than for ES.
42 It has been calculated that in USA for each venture a VC is able to brought to public market, 10 are 
failures. In this case, for a VC is vital to perform a type of exit that pay not only the capital invested in 
the venture exited via IPO, but also for the capital invested in the failing ventures (Gompers and Lerner 
2000).
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In order to understand the dynamics of British VCs, figures showing the trends 
of sample VCs, relatively to their size, performance and level of Diversification were 
elaborated. For ease of interpretation trends are displayed by dividing the period of 
analysis in quarters, and by aggregating the funds incorporated in the each year of the 
quarter.
Figures 5.1. and 5.2a. and 5.2b. explain the distributions of the funds across 
years and their growth in number and size, this last indicator measured both in terms of 
Million of British Pounds as well as by the number of companies the funds invested 
in43.
Figure 5.1. shows the five-years mean of the number of new funds that were 
raised between 1985 and 2000. The data show an impressive increase between the years 
1996 and 2000 with a  number  of  new funds that  is  about  3  times higher  than the 
previous  five-year  period.  This  means  that  each  year  the  number  of  new  funds 
increased of  45.6%, on average.  This  trend reflects  a  steady growth process  which 
started in 1994, with a robust boost on the final year of our sample, consistently with 
the euphoria that characterized financial markets relatively to new ventures. These are 
also the consequences of policy measures implemented during the 1990s with the aim 
of enhancing investments in new ventures. As it has been shown in Chapter II,  the 
consolidation of public market for small ventures; incentive schemes set up in order to 
foster investments in new technology venture; and the progressive inflows of capital 
also from foreign investors (i.e. Especially from US investors); created the setting and 
provided the factors which enhanced this growth (Mason and Harrison 2002).
43 These figures refer to the full sample. Although not reported, same figures were elaborated for the two 
splits. The evidence confirms the descriptives statitics, in that on LS tend to be bigger and tend to have 
more companies than ES; and this trend is consistent over time.
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Figure 5.2a. shows the average size of new funds raised during each five-years 
period of analysis. Consistently with Figure 5.1., the average size of funds shows a 
strong growing trend. As the figure displays, while during the first five-years period the 
average fund size was 7.46 GBP Mil., in the next period the average size was 27.74 
GBP Mil., growing to 56.77 GBP Mil in the period 1991-1995, up to 111.84 in the final 
quarter. Accordingly, as Figure 5.2b. shows, the number of companies in which the 
sample funds invested is growing for funds incorporated in more recent years, with a 
strong increase for funds raised during the last period of analysis, as it is displayed by 
an increase of 54% of the number of companies in the portfolio of later funds.
Consistently with the general VC market trend in the UK, the growth of sample 
funds in number and size was steady and robust, characterised by a real boost in the 
final five-years period of analysis. These trend are also consistent with the findings 
reported  by  BVCA  and  EVCA,  and  also  reflect  interventions  of  public  policy 
organizations in promoting venture capital during the 1990s (Painter 2000), by creating 
the conditions and setting for the increase of venture capital investments.
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Now turning to the performance trends, Figure 5.3. displays the average number 
of positive exits for funds incorporated in each five-years period, in absolute terms. 
Each column of  the graph is  referred to  the average total  number of  positive exits 
experienced by the funds that were incorporated in each of the five-year periods. The 
figure shows the number of positive exits and also the portion of exit via merger and 
acquisition (M&A) and via public offer (IPO) for the full sample. 
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As a general trend it seems that the number of positive exits is higher for more 
recent funds, although for a small drop for funds raised between 1991 and 1995.  Not 
surprisingly IPOs are always lower than M&As, confirming the general finding that 
getting a company to public markets is more difficult that exiting it through third sale, 
especially for British VCs which seems to prefer M&A as type of exits,  as it  also 
pointed out by research and reports on the huge wave of buyouts (MBO, MBI, LBO, 
etc.) experienced by British VCs during the final years of the 1990s.
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 Nipo
 Nmerger
More interesting is Figure 5.4. which displays funds’ positive exits scaled for 
the number of companies they invested in, which is the our measure of performance, 
explaining the success rate of funds in our sample. The figure show a slightly declining 
trend in the first three of the five-years periods of analysis, going from an average 61% 
of success rate for funds raised during the period 1981-1985, to an average of 59% 
success rate for funds raised during the next period, and 55% during the quarter 1991-
1995. The success rate in the final period declines from 55% to 39%. Considering that 
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the number of companies on which VCS invested in has strongly increased in the last 
period, this can be taken as a real fall in success rate for funds raised in the last quarter. 
Yet this is more likely to reflect a truncation bias, due to the shorter period of time for 
the latest funds have in order to exit their investments. As Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
and Hocberg et al. (2006) showed, funds are likely to exit their investment in the last 5 
of their 10 years life-span. In other words, while funds raised in previous years had at 
least 10 years to exit their companies, more recently raised funds are still active on their 
investment and still have some years left to perform a positive exit.
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 Merger/Ncomp
 IPO/Ncomp
Similar figures are elaborated relatively to the exits and performance measures 
of sub-samples (ES and LS). Figure 5.5. displays the proportions of portfolio exits. 
Figure 5.5a. Reports the percentage of IPO, figure 5.5b. represents the percentage of 
M&A, and figure 5.5c. reports the sum of the two previous ones, which is the measure 
of performance used for VCs. Except for the first quarter, LS have higher performance 
levels and this trend is kept over time. This superiority of LS is sustained by the level of 
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M&A (figure 5.5b.) where LS show higher values. When looking at the level of IPOs 
instead (figure 5.5a) ES show higher levels (but in the second quarter), suggesting ES 
have preferences for IPO, while LS prefer M&A as exit way.
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a) % IPO
b) % M&A
c) Performance (% IPO + %M&A)
Finally,  Figures  5.6.  to  5.7b.  display  the  variation  in  the  indicators  of 
Diversification by Industry and of Diversification by Country, for the full sample and 
for the two splits. Figure 5.6. supports the finding we described relatively to Table 1. 
Diversification  by  Industry  shows  higher  level  than  Diversification  by  Country.  It 
confirms that UK funds tend to invest in companies pertaining to different domains. 
The trend is quite flat, with a small decrease after the first quarter, which is recovered 
in the other three. This is particularly evident for LS than for ES (Figure 5.7a). 
ES LS
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Figure 5.7. Diversification by Industry and by Country for Early Stage (ES) and Later Stage (LS) 
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The general trend shown for the Diversification by Country is also flat (Figure 
5.6.),  with a remarkable increase for funds raised in the last  quarters,  supported by 
higher levels of diversification reached by LS compared to LS (Figure 5.7a.). This is 
consistent  with  the  data  showed  by  EVCA  and  BVCA  reports  and  indicating  a 
progressive internationalisation of UK VCs (Chapter IV) in the late 1990s-early 2000s 
showing the tendency to increase investments abroad.
5.2. Interpretations of descriptive statistics and dynamics.
The  analyses  evidenced  that  in  VCs  in  the  UK  are  heterogeneous  in  their 
characteristics and apply to portfolio strategy in different ways. The distinction between 
ES and LS proved to be significant since the two sub-sample statistically differ in many 
important  factors,  including  funds  characteristics,  level  of  performance,  and 
diversification  strategies.  Overall  it  seems  that  VCs  tend  to  have  higher  level  of 
Diversification by Industry than Diversification by Country. This is consistent with the 
studies which analyse the allocation of efforts and attention of VCs to backed ventures 
and found that there is a trade off  between the possibility to invest  abroad and the 
involvement of fund managers in the activities  of funded companies (Gompers and 
Lerner 2000, Manigart et al. 2002). In other words, the geographical distance imposes 
some boundaries  on  the  possibility  to  oversee  and  control  funded  companies,  thus 
suggesting  that  it  might  be  easier  and  more  convenient  for  VCs  to  follow  a 
diversification strategy by industry than a diversification strategy by country. The latter 
may be more time- and resource-consuming since it requires the deployment of various 
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type of resources in different locations (Gompers 1995). This in particular is supported 
by the fact  that  LS have higher levels  of Diversification by Country than ES. The 
former  indeed  have  portfolio  of  companies  which  are  by  definition  more  easy  to 
evaluate (Kortum and Lerner 1998) because they represent more developed business, 
operating in more mature stages where key success factors, such as product, markets 
and clients (Hellmann and Puri 2002) are better defined. The latter have to deal instead 
with early stage businesses, where even the product idea might be only roughly definite 
(Amit et al. 1998), often entailing only the potential of a future profit at the date of 
investment (Murray 1999, Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). These investments are those 
requiring the greatest involvement and support of the VC in their management, thus 
imposing constraints on the possibility to invest abroad or in a large number of different 
countries.
Surprisingly  this  seems  not  to  be  true  relatively  to  the  dimension  of 
Diversification by Industry , where ES have the same average rate of diversification, if 
not higher, than LS. This evidence clashes with previous literature (Gupta and Sapienza 
1992, Norton and Tenenbaum 1993, Carter and Van Auken 1994, Elango et al. 1995) 
which found for VCs involved in early stages a preference for less industry scope than 
VCs involved in later stage deals. On the other hands this is consistent with those who 
support the view of VCs as financial intermediaries, seeking to diversify their portfolio 
by investing in unrelated businesses.
An alternative explanation of this could be linked to the existence (or absence) 
of investment opportunities available to VCs in their geographical area. In particular, 
the need to maintain a fluid and robust deal-flow (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984), i.e. the 
need to constantly find profitable investment to be approached by VCs, clashes with the 
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possibility to find a suitable investment in the domain the VC is familiar with (Black 
and Gilson 1998, Jeng and Wells 2000) Indeed European venture capital is considered 
to be still a young market, at least compared to the more mature USA, lacking (among 
other things) of the investment opportunities which arise oversees. This has been used 
as an argument to justify the poor return European VCs gain compared to US-based 
peers (Bottazzi et al. 2004). Assuming this is true also for UK venture capital, VCs 
might have to chase profitable investment opportunities by looking at other domains 
than  those  they  are  familiar  with.  This  can  be  especially  true  for  VCs  which  are 
involved  with  new  markets  and/or  businesses,  and  is  typical  for  “State-of-the-art” 
technologies, where the number of investment opportunity is lower than those in more 
consolidate  environment,  explaining  why  also  ES  have  to  face  higher  levels  of 
Diversification by Industry.
5.3.  The  impact  of  portfolio  Diversification  on  fund 
Performance: regressions and analyses.
In  this  section  I  analyse  whether  portfolio  Diversification  leads  to  better 
performance for VCs than portfolio specialization in a regression framework. In order 
to  do  so,  VCs  performance are  measured  as  the  proportion of  portfolio  companies 
exited  via  IPO and  M&A.  VCs  diversification  is  operationalized  at  three  different 
levels: Diversification by Industry, by Country and the scope of stage of development 
of  investee  ventures.  I  operationalized  these  measures  using  the  complement  to 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann indexes, taking any value between 0 and 1, so that a fund with 
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diversification index taking value 1 is perfectly diversified, while a fund taking value 0 
is extremely focused (i.e. specialized).
Table 5.3. Sample Correlation for VCs
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10)
1) Performance 1.00
2) Div. by country 0.06 1.00
3) Div. by Industry 0.04 0.32 1.00
4) Div. by Stage -0.10 0.30 0.60 1.000
5) Ln(fundsize) 0.14 0.30 0.25 0.13 1.00
6) Ln2(fundsize) 0.15 0.37 0.17 0.07 0.79 1.00
7) Dummy(Followon) -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.21 0.19 1.00
8) Ln(Capitalinflows) -0.31 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.28 0.28 0.19 1.00
9) Firmexp. 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.11 1.00
10) Synd 0.07 -0.10 0.09 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.1 0.03 1.00
Table 5.3. reports the correlation for sample variables. Values higher than 0.5 
are  reported  for  correlation  between  Ln2(fundsize) and  Ln(fundsize) (0.79)  and  also 
between  Div.  By Industry  and  Div.  by Stage  (0.60).  In  order  to  avoid problems of 
multicollinearity I dropped the squared term of the natural logarithm of fund size and 
followed Kaplan and Schoar (2005) approach, splitting the sample between ES and 
LS44 (see paragraph 4.2.5.). I perform Papke and Wooldridge (1996) QLME method, 
described in section 4.2.5., in order to assess the following linear function:
VC Performancej = A + β1DivbyCountryj + β2DivbyIndustryj + β3ln(fundsize)j + 
44 ES = VCs with 60% of portfolio involved in early stages; LS = VCs with 60% of portfolio involved in 
later stages.
147
                                                                                                                           Chapter V
β4Dummy(follow-on)j + β5ln(Capitalinflows)j + β6Firmexpj + 
β7Syndj + β8εj
I  tested  for  multicollinearity  by  calculating  variance  inflation  factors  (VIF). 
None of the VIF scores approached the commonly accepted threshold of 10 to indicate 
potential multicollinearity problems, the mean VIF being 1.40 with a maximum value 
of 3.67. These results suggest that multicollinearity is not a problem.
Table  5.4.  reports  the  results  of  QLME  analyses.  Robust  standard  errors  are  in 
parentheses, in order to control for heterosckedasticity. I controlled for year-fixed effect 
by including year-dummies relatively to fund vintage year. The table reports the QLME 
for the full sample and for sub-samples of ES and LS.
In the first column the table reports the impacts of diversification strategies and 
control variables for the full sample. Both impacts of Diversification by Country and 
Diversification by Industry are statistically significant (p < 0.05 for Diversification by 
Country and p < 0.001 for Diversification by Industry). Diversification by Country is 
positively  related  to  the  performance  of  a  fund,  while  Industry  Diversification  is 
negatively related to funds’ performance.
            Table 5.4. Regression (Dependent Variable: Fund Performance) a, b
Dependent Variable: VC Performance
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Year Dummies YES YES YES
Log pseudolikelihood -328.66 -246.75 -78.19
McFadden's Adj R2 0.10 0.32 0.79
N. obs. 649 487 162
   a Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
      b *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1
. 
This suggest that for UK funds following a diversification strategy by investing 
in companies differently located pays more, in terms of percentage of companies exited 
through IPO or acquisition, then a country-focused approach.
On  the  other  hand,  Industry  diversification  is  negatively  related  to  fund 
performance. In other words, the more the funds diversify by industry, the less they are 
likely to perform positive exits.
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In columns 2 and 3 results  for  ES and LS are  considered.  The  direction of 
relationships between portfolio diversification and performance are kept both for ES45 
and LS, VCs performance being positively affected by country scope of portfolio and 
negatively affected by industry scope of investments.
For the full sample Hypothesis 1,a is confirmed on the Country Dimension. This 
results seem to support  the Financial  Intermediation perspective,  in that VCs which 
diversify  across  countries  seeking  portfolio  risk  reduction  are  more  likely  to  show 
higher performance. Conversely, on the geographic dimension, these results disconfirm 
a  resource-based  view applied  to  the  venture  capital  context.  In  other  words  VCs 
pursuing diversification by country as an investment strategy show higher performance 
than VCs following a geographic-focused approach to investments. By broadening their 
geographic  scope  of  investment  portfolio  VCs  can  enlarge  their  investment 
opportunities. This will provide higher chances to identify higher-return investments. 
Moreover, by spreading their portfolio in different geographic areas, they can minimize 
country-specific  risk  and  mitigate  the  impact  on  performance  of  factors  negatively 
affecting the economic outcomes for a specific geographic region.
However, this perspective changes when looking at diversification strategy at 
the level of Industry. Here Hypothesis 1,b is confirmed. VCs pursuing specialization 
investment  strategy on the Industry dimension show higher  performance than those 
investing  in  several  different  technological  fields  or  industries.  On  this  dimension 
Financial Intermediation and agency perspectives are no more supported. The results 
suggest, instead, that moving along the Industry dimension, a more focused approach 
pays  more  than  diversification,  thus  confirming  the  resource/knowledge-based 
perspective.  Specialized  VCs  can  control  for  business  risk  by  providing  more 
45 Although ES coefficient are not statistically significant.
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competent strategic and operational support to deals they funded (Barney et al. 1989), 
by leveraging on knowledge and competences developed in a particular field and by 
spreading  and  redeploying  these  assets  over  a  number  of  technologically  similar 
ventures.  Specialization  may  help  VCs  to  protect  themselves  from  information 
asymmetry (Eisenhardt 1989), thanks to their in-depth understanding of the industry. 
Also VCs’ specialized industry knowledge can help VCs in more accurately evaluating 
and  selecting  ventures,  thus  having  more  potentially  profitable  companies  in  their 
portfolios.
Overall  it  appears that VCs which diversify by Country tend to have higher 
performance, while those who diversify by Industry tend to find more difficulties in 
exiting portfolio companies.
When looking at columns 2 (ES) and 3 (LS) of the table direction of effects for 
Diversification  by  Country  and  by  Industry  are  steady  with  LS  shower  higher 
magnitude than ES in both cases, and ES coefficients being not significant. In other 
words, the positive impact of Diversification by Country is stronger for VCs involved 
in later stage investments than for those dealing with earlier ones, the coefficient for the 
latter being not statistically significant. On the Country dimension, this is consistent 
with the studies which found that LS prefer higher level of geographic scope while ES 
are  keen  to  a  narrower  geographic  scope  (Gupta  and  Sapienza  1992,  Norton  and 
Tenenbaum 1993). 
Relatively to the Industry dimension, LS show higher impact of diversification 
on performance. For this type of VCs industry diversification is more likely to lead to 
lower performance, supporting the findings of scholars which state that, by limiting the 
number  of  industries  in  which  to  invest,  VCs  can  develop  a  more  specialized 
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knowledge  of  the  complexities  inherent  in  these  particular  fields,  the  homogeneity 
among the portfolio  ventures  allowing for  an effective sharing and re-deploying of 
specialized resources across them. This in turns enhance the possibility for the VC to 
effectively  support  the  funded  companies  and,  as  a  consequence,  it  enhance  the 
probability to exit ventures via IPO and M&A.
Turning now to the other variables, the first one controls for the size of the fund 
measured by the logarithmic transformation of fund size in Millions of British Pounds. 
This measure is positively related to funds performance and significant at 1% level. 
Furthermore this relationships is confirmed and significant both for ES and LS sub-
samples. Other authors (Hocberg et al. 2005, Kaplan and Schoar 2005, Lerner et al. 
2005)  found  a  concave  relationship  between  funds  performance  and  their  size, 
highlighted  by  the  negative  impact  of  the  squared  value  of  the  logarithmic 
transformation of size. I did not included the squared log term in the analysis, since it is 
positively correlated with the log term. Yet in an unreported regression I controlled for 
the squared effect finding no concave relationship between fund size and performance 
in the sample. 
Results also suggest that when more money was raised by venture funds in the 
industry, performance of same-year funds declines. Controlling for the inflow of funds 
in Million of British Pounds in the market, I found that the fund-raising (i.e. the Capital 
Inflows in the venture capital industry) is negative and significantly related to funds 
performance.  This  result  is  not  surprising;  it  is  likely  that  fund  inflows  proxy  for 
competition for deals. As competition increases the harder it is for new entrants to win 
good deals. Hence this findings are consistent with Gompers and Lerner (2000), who 
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were the first to capture the “money chasing for deals” phenomenon. This evidence is 
also supported by more recent papers (Hocberg et al. 2005, Kaplan and Schoar 2005) 
which show that prices VCs pay when investing in portfolio companies increase as 
more money flows into the venture capital industry, holding investment opportunities 
constant. This pattern is an evidence that increases in capital inflow produce an increase 
in  the  competition  for  a  limited  number  of  investment  opportunities,  negatively 
affecting the quality of investments and, as a consequence, funds performance. 
The  variable  Follow-on  is  a  dummy  which  aims  to  capture  the  effect  of 
experienced  funds  on  performance.  Gompers  (1996)  shows,  the  possibility  to  raise 
follow-on funds is affect the chances for VCs to attract capital from investors. Thus 
raising follow-on funds is very important for VCs who want to show track records of 
performance.  Results  show  that  follow-on  funds  do  not  seem  to  add  to  positive 
performance,  never  being  significant  in  all  three  studies  (and  showing  negative 
coefficients). Amit et al. (1998) report that, some VCs raise follow-on funds when at 
the end of previous fund life, transferring old-fund companies in the new fund portfolio. 
Hence, if a fund at the end of its life has a portfolio of active investments it is more 
likely the VC raises a new fund in order to pursue the investments in the old portfolio, 
trying to gain more time to perform positive exits with those investments still active. In 
this  case  raising  follow-on  funds  does  not  necessarily  imply  better  performance, 
reflecting instead the aim of the VC to simply pursue the investments.
As  expected  the  experience  of  fund managers  (i.e.  the  variable  Firmexp)  is 
positively related  to funds performance. This finding shows that managing experience 
matter far more than the ability to raise up subsequent funds. Furthermore, this finding 
is also significant for ES, supporting the view that managing experience can add more 
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value to early-stage ventures, because the greater uncertainty relatively to the definition 
of products, markets and businesses, imply a greater involvement and support from the 
VC (Murray 1999, Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). 
Finally, I do not find statistical support for the positive relationship between the 
syndication  of  investments  and  VCs  performance,  since  the  coefficients  are  not 
significant in all the three studies, although reporting positive values for the full sample 
and for the ES sub-sample. 
5.4. Robustness Checks
Two potential biases can affect previous results.  In this section I display the 
robustness checks relatively to: sample selection and performance measurement.
5.4.1. Sample Selection bias
The sample include British VCs raised between 1981 and 2000. For each fund I 
gathered information of investment activities and performance until the end of 2006. 
Since funds have a predetermined life of 10 years, more recent funds have less years of 
observation.  For  instance funds  raised on 2000 have (only) 6  years  of observation, 
while funds raised in early 1990s have more than 10. 
In  paragraph  5.2.  it  has  been  displayed  a  decreasing  trend  relatively  to 
performance of funds raised in the last quarter period of analysis. Since funds tend to 
exit their companies mostly in the second half of their life (Kaplan and Schoar 2005, 
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Hocberg  et  al.  2004)  it  might  be  that  poorer  performance  trend  for  these  younger 
funds46 is not true, but instead is the effect of a truncation bias.
In order to control for this, I repeat the analyses considering only the VCs raised 
until 1996, each fund having at least 10 years of observation to exit its companies.
Table 5.5.  reports  the results  of  the analyses  for the sample of  funds raised 
between 1981 and 1996. The full sample counts about 52% of the old sample (335 
observations were dropped) as expected, since in section 5.2. it has been shown that the 
number of funds experienced a strong increasing trend over time, especially in the two 
last quarter periods of analysis. However directions and significance of main effects 
keep  steady.  Diversification  by  Industry  is  negatively  related  to  VCs  performance, 
while Diversification by Country is positively related. 
Also while looking at the two sub-samples, minor changes occur compared with 
previous regressions. For LS the size of funds is no more significant. Trends shown in 
previous paragraphs told that funds tend to increase their size during the last quarter 
period (i.e. between 1995-2000). Hence a possible explanation may be linked to the fact 
that the new LS sub-sample does not include bigger funds.
Moreover,  the variable  follow-on becomes significant (1% level) for the full 
sample and for the ES split, having a negative relationship with VCs performance. This 
contrasts with the findings of Gompers (1996). The explanation that follow-on funds 
are raised with the purpose to continue pursuing investments which are still active at 
the end of the fund life, is thus more reasonable.
Table 5.5. Regression for funds raised between 1981 and 1996
          (Dependent Variable: Fund Performance) a, b
46 In previous paragraph it has been noted that I considered year-effects by including in the QMLE 
regression years dummies. 
155
                                                                                                                           Chapter V
Dependent Variable: VC Performance

















































Year Dummies YES YES YES
Log pseudolikelihood -176.19 -120.49 -40.90
McFadden's Adj R2 0.06 0.32 0.77
N. obs. 314 228 86
                     a Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
                  b *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1
Overall the robustness check on sample bias confirms previous findings on our 
main  theoretical  variable  regarding  the  effect  of  portfolio  strategies  on  VCs 
performance. Now I will  turn to the second robustness check, which deals with the 
measurement of performance.
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5.4.2. The percentage of IPOs as an alternative measure of VCs 
performance.
I measured the dependent variable (VC performance) as the proportion of 
companies exited via IPO and M&A. In paragraph 3.4. it has been shown why this 
measure should be considered a reliable proxy for VCs return. Indeed by including only 
the portion of M&As or only the portion of IPOs one is putting aside the other portion 
of exits which generate returns (Hochberg et al. 2004). Furthermore, previous research 
on UK and analysis on sample trend reveals that exit via third sale is a fundamental 
driver for VC returns (Wright and Lockett 1999).
However some authors pointed out that IPO should be the most important exit 
route, since it is by bringing ventures to public markets that VCs receive the highest 
capital gains (Black and Gilson 1998). Hence IPO might be considered by VCs as the 
strongest driver to invest (Jeng and Wells 2000), especially for early stage investors, for 
which a successful IPO can cover the costs and risks of several failures (Gompers and 
Lerner 1999).
As a robustness check I proxy VCs performance aa the proportion of IPOs, i.e. 
the number of portfolio companies brought to public market scaled for the total number 
of portfolio ventures, and repeat the regressions on the full sample and split samples.
Table 5.2. shows the results of this check. Looking at the first column for the 
regression on the full sample, results of the analysis confirm the findings displayed in 
Table 5.4. Higher levels of Diversification by Country seem to enhance the probability 
for a VC to bring backed ventures to public markets. On the contrary, and still 
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consistent with previous results, higher levels of Diversification by Industry have a 
negative impact on the ability of VCs to perform IPOs.
Table 5.6. Regression for funds raised between 1981 and 2000
          (Dependent Variable: % of IPOs) a, b
Dependent Variable: % of IPOs

















































Year Dummies YES YES YES
Log pseudolikelihood -178.83 -137.666 -37.284
McFadden's Adj R2 0.09 0.30 0.81
N. obs. 649 487 162
                                       a Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
                  b *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1
Also, Diversification by Country is significant for both ES and LS. Geographic 
scope increases the range of investment opportunities providing more chances for VCs 
to identify and select higher-return investments. Agency and business risks could be 
reduced by decreasing industry-specific risk through the spreading of investments 
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across different countries. Although data show this should be true for both the sub-
samples, the positive effect of geographic diversification is bigger for LS than ES, as 
the magnitude of relative coefficients says. A possible explanation for this might lay on 
the fact that, by dealing with more mature companies, LS may find easier to bring a 
venture to public market. These ventures concern businesses better defined so that it 
may be easier for VCs to evaluate the profit potential of companies and to select the 
most promising ones. On the other hands, also for public markets it is easier to float 
more established companies because it may offer more guaranties of returns to 
shareholders. In other words, the higher stability and solidity of companies in later 
stages might induce LS to look for the advantages of portfolio diversification on the 
geographic dimension
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Conclusions and limitations of the research
Contribution of the research
This  research  analysed  the  impacts  of  VCs’  portfolio  strategies  on  their 
performance. In particular it addressed the question whether a diversified approach to 
investment portfolio leads to better performance than a specialized strategy. Hence the 
main contributions of this research are that it  adds on the literature that studies the 
strategic  behaviour of VCs, analysing for the first  time the VCs strategic  decisions 
relatively to portfolio composition, and their impacts on performances. 
VCs invest in highly risky ventures with the hope of obtaining a profit in return. 
While, on the one hand, the traditional financial approach suggests that diversification 
eliminates non-systematic risks (Scharpe 1964, Brealey and Myers 1996), on the other, 
the  competence-based  approach  seems  to  support  greater  specialization  of  VCs 
portfolio  as  a  means  of  reducing  uncertainty  (Bygrave  1987,  Lubatkin  and Rogers 
1989, Manigart et al. 2002). The very nature of VCs is the investment in highly risk and 
(potentially)  highly  reward,  privately  held  companies  with  the  goal  of  providing 
expected returns to investors, by supporting and developing backed ventures and then 
by realizing capital gains through the exit of portfolio companies via third sale or public 
offer. Hence analyses of portfolio strategies is a relevant question since it represents a 
powerful  means  VCs  have  to  manage  their   risk/return  profile.  It  is  important  to 
examine factors influencing these decisions and the consequences on VCs performance. 
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This research suggests that VCs’ performances are contingent on their choices 
as to the composition of their investment portfolios. Also, the decision determining the 
composition of a VC’s portfolio of investments and thus the level of diversification, 
plays a crucial role in the creation of a fund. First these are long term strategic decisions 
that are difficult  to change.  Second the maximum amount a VC fund is allowed to 
invest in a single company as well as in certain financing stages, industries, or countries 
is fixed in the partnership agreement with the limited partners, i.e., the investors. A 
deviation from this agreement is only possible if all limited partners approve.
Previous  research  on  this  topic  showed  that  VCs  can  choose  between  two 
alternative  approaches  to  portfolio  management:  diversification  or  specialization  of 
investment portfolio. These approaches apply to different theoretical perspective: the 
literature that takes a financial  intermediation perspective on the VCs insists on the 
financial  advantages  resulting  from  the  reduction  of  risk  exposure  through  the 
combination of ventures whose financial flows are not correlated. The resource-based 
perspective  applied  to  venture  capital,  instead,  advances  the  superiority  of  a 
specialization  strategy.  The  specialization  of  VCs’  portfolio  in  those  particular 
industries, stage of development and geographic markets, make them more capable of 
dealing  adequately  with  the  risks,  uncertainties,  and  information  asymmetries 
associated with investment opportunities. 
Both these approaches some limitation in explaining the behaviour of venture 
capital  and  they  do  not  address  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  portfolio 
strategies and VCs performance. Hence this thesis is an attempt to go directly at the 
core issue of this relationship, by modelling two conflicting hypotheses, one supporting 
the view that diversification should lead to better performance than specialization (as 
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predicted by Financial intermediation theory), the other one stating that specialization 
should lead to better performance than diversification (as predicted by the Resource 
based approach to venture capital investment). I modelled portfolio strategy considering 
different dimensions along which a VC can diversify or specialize, namely the industry 
and geographic scope of portfolio investments. In this sense indexes of diversification 
have been calculated so that higher values in the indexes indicate diversification, while 
lower values mean specialization. Then I analyse the impact of these factors on the 
performance of VCs in the UK, taking in consideration also the particular involvement 
of each VC in early stage deals or in later stage deals. 
The analyses evidenced, first, that in VCs in the UK are heterogeneous in their 
characteristics  and  apply  to  portfolio  strategy  in  different  ways.  Overall  VCs  have 
higher  level  of  Diversification  by  Industry  than  Diversification  by  Country.  This 
research  suggests  that  the  geographical  distance  imposes  some  boundaries  on  the 
possibility to oversee and control funded companies, implying that it might be easier or 
more  convenient  for  VCs  to  follow  a  diversification  strategy  by  industry  than  a 
diversification  strategy  by  country.  The  latter  may  be  more  time-  and  resource-
consuming since it requires the deployment of various type of resources in different 
locations (Gompers 1995). This in particular is supported by the fact that later-stages 
VCs (LS) have higher levels of Diversification by Country than early-stages peers (ES). 
The former indeed have portfolio of companies which are by definition more easy to 
evaluate because they represent more developed business, while the latter have to deal 
with  businesses  often  entailing  only  the  potential  of  a  future  profit  at  the  date  of 
investment. Since these investments are those requiring the greatest involvement and 
support of the VC in their management, thus imposing constraints on the possibility to 
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invest abroad or in a large number of different countries. This is not true relatively to 
Diversification by Industry, where ES have the same average rate of diversification, if 
not higher, than LS. This lead to the conclusion which contradict previous literature 
(Gupta and Sapienza 1992, Norton and Tenenbaum 1993, Carter and Van Auken 1994, 
Elango et al. 1995) which found for ES a preference for less industry scope than LS. As 
a  possible  explanation  it  is  argued  that  the  existence  (or  absence)  of  investment 
opportunities available to VCs affects the composition of their portfolio of investments. 
In  particular,  the  need  to  constantly  find  profitable  companies  to  invest  in, 
clashes with the actual existence (or absence) of suitable investment in the domain the 
VC is familiar with. This calls into question the maturity of venture capital markets 
(Black and Gilson 1998, Jeng and Wells 2000). Indeed European venture capital  is 
considered to be still  a young market,  at  least  compared to the more mature USA, 
lacking (among other things) of the investment opportunities which arise overseas. This 
has been used as an argument to justify the poor return European VCs gain compared to 
US-based  peers  (Bottazzi  et  al.  2004).  Assuming  this  is  true  also  for  UK venture 
capital,  VCs might  have to  chase profitable  investment  opportunities  by looking at 
other domains than those they are familiar with. This can be especially true for VCs 
which are involved with new markets and/or businesses, and is typical for “State-of-
the-art” technologies, where the number of investment opportunity is lower than those 
in more consolidate environment, explaining why also ES have to face higher levels of 
Diversification by Industry.
On  the  relationship  between  diversification  and  performance,  the  analyses 
results  show that  different  level  of  diversification  have  divergent  impacts  on  VCs 
performance. In particular, while Diversification by Country have a positive impact on 
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performance, Diversification by Industry negatively affects performance of VCs. Hence 
on  the  geographic  dimension,  results  confirm  the  prediction  of  the  Financial 
Intermediation  perspective,  while  on  the  industry  dimension,  results  confirm  the 
prediction of the Resource-based approach. As a possible explanation of this findings, it 
is  advanced  that  there  is  a  higher  degree  of  geography  homogeneity  than  industry 
homogeneity. In other words, the different country a VCs can chose to invest in are 
more similar each other in terms of venture capital investments, than on the industry 
domain. Indeed in Western economies processes of homologation are implemented in 
latest years relatively to market infrastructures and economic regulation. For instance in 
European countries small number of investment opportunities and poorer return during 
the 1990s have been associating to the differences between regional venture capital 
markets  relatively  to  financial  markets,  business  and  sector  regulation  and  policy 
interventions (La Porta et al. 1997, Jeng and Wells 2000). Furthermore Bottazzi et al. 
(2004) pointed out that a major issue explaining the gap between European VCs and 
US-based VCs has been the fragmentation of regional venture capital markets and the 
lack  of  critic  mass  in  terms  of  investment  opportunities  to  VC investment.  Indeed 
several  official  documents  of  the  European  Commission  and  other  European 
Organization policies urge for the integration of European Union’s financial markets 
and the development of venture capital (European Commission 1998, EVCA 2000). 
Sample data show increasing trend in level of diversification for younger funds. Hence, 
is  possible  that  in  the  context  of  integration  of  market  infrastructures;  converging 
business, sector regulation and policy interventions (Levin 2004); and aligning financial 
markets  (Black  and  Gilson  1998),  VCs  may  find  easier  to  invest  abroad  and  find 
profitable opportunities which were not available in countries where they were used to 
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invest in before. As a consequence, higher levels of Diversification by Country might 
be beneficial in terms of VCs performance. 
Limitations of the thesis and future directions of research on Venture 
Capital strategy
In studying the patterns of VCs’ portfolio strategies and its impacts on 
performance, this research shows several limitations.
A first limitation concerns the measure of performance implemented for 
VCs. The calculation of performance through internal rates of return (IRR) is tricky in 
terms of both data availability and measurement problems. First fund cash-flows are 
difficult to observe, but when a company exits the VC portfolio. Furthermore, a big 
fraction  of  deals  is  syndicated  so  that  it  is  necessary  to  evaluate  the  syndication 
agreements on the sharing of returns for venture exits. Moreover, in IPO exits, venture 
capitalists typically keep a large stake for a certain period after the IPO and exit piece 
by piece (Cumming and Macintosh 2003). The difficult part for an outside observer 
would be to track all the actual cash flows the venture capitalist receives from selling 
portions of its ownership after the IPO. I used the fraction of portfolio companies exited 
via IPO and M&A as a proxy of fund returns. The question is: Can we then use exit 
rates as a proxy for investment success? We should certainly be careful  in making 
inferences based on, say, the exit rate. Although IPOs and M&As are the highest profit 
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exit routes, exits differ widely in their terms and the price obtained. For instance, a 
success  rate  of  50% which  gives  a  total  capital  gain  of  20% on  the  total  amount 
invested by the fund, is performing worse than a success rate which earns a capital gain 
of  50%.  Future  research  should  address  the  performance  measurement  issue,  for 
instance by weighting each exits with the amount of capital invested in, or using the 
data of funds value when companies are exited. The problem of lack of available data it 
is not only due to the private nature of venture capital  investments, but also to the 
difficulties in finding appropriate performance measures. 
Another  important  limitation  of  this  research  concerns  the  modified 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann  measures  originally  used  to  measure  the  Diversification  by 
Stage of development (see paragraph 4.2.3.). In order to do so I assigned each portfolio 
company to a stage class, according to the 2-digit classification of Venture Expert. This 
classification counts four 1-digit classes relatively to the so-called early-stages (venture 
capital  in strict  sense) and two 1-digit  classes for the so-called later-stages (private 
equity). Furthermore when looking at the two-digit subclasses, for early-stages each 
sub-class  is  defined  in  terms  of  development  of  the  venture  (see  in  Appendix  1 
definition for e.g.  seed stage and  expansion), that is in terms of development of the 
business. On the contrary  the sub-classed for later stage investments are assigned in 
terms of difference in the type of financing and/or acquisition than on the base of the 
venture  development  (see  in  Appendix  1  definition  for  e.g.  MBO and  MBI).  As  a 
consequence I doubt the reliability of said classification relatively to the measure an 
index of Diversification by Stage of development, since it is likely to induce distortion, 
which may affect analyses, as in my case. 
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More broadly, future research should deepen the understanding of these 
diversification  dimensions.  Indeed results  showed that  funds  specialize  or  diversify 
along these dimensions (at least by Country and by Industry), but further investigation 
is needed to understand the motives underlying a particular choice relatively to these 
variables.  For  instance,  which  factors  influence  the  decision  of  VCs  to 
diversify/specialize along the industry dimension and/or the geographic dimension? Is 
the  industry  and/or  geographic  diversification/specialization  strategy  by  the  same 
factors affecting performance? are these patterns steady over time? What types of VC 
are more sensitive to the different dimension of diversification/specialization? Are there 
other variables along which a VC can diversify/specialise? Since this research showed 
that different dimension have divergent impact on performance, analysing these issues 
seems relevant for the understanding of VCs strategic behaviour and performance.
Finally,  this  research  pointed  the  existence  of  different  patterns  of 
diversification. For instance it has been shown for Diversification by Country, which 
has a positive impact on performance, while for Diversification by Industry values are 
higher but the relationship with performance is negative. This results, seem to suggest 
that  the  question  whether  diversification  or  specialization  lead  to  better  VCs 
performance cannot be solved straightforward. Instead the question should be put in 
terms of different levels or type of diversification for different variables. In other words 
this  research  suggests  that  a  certain  degree  of  diversification  may  benefit  funds 
performance, but a stronger level of diversification might be detrimental. Put in other 
terms there may exist threshold-levels of diversification positively related with VCs 
performance. Over a certain amount of diversification, the relationship may become 
negative. Yet the literature on strategic management dealing with diversification has 
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recently convened that multi-business firms benefit from a  correlated-diversification, 
only as far as such benefits derive from the creation of synergies between correlated 
ventures through the sharing of resource and competence (Grant 1988, 1991, Kanter 
1989, Trautwein 1990, Goold and Luchs 1993), by means of which the performance of 
a given portfolio is better than the sum of each single venture (Panzer and Willig 1981, 
Prahalad  e  Hamel  1989,  1990).  Attention  is  thus  paid  not  only  to  the  portfolio  of 
ventures  that  can  be  managed  contemporaneously,  but  also  to  the  portfolio  of 
competences developed by the VC. 
Therefore  future  research  on  venture  capital  should  address  the  issue  of 
correlated diversification.  The  more VCs skills  and resources can be redeployed to 
portfolio  companies,  the  more  it  is  convenient  to  keep  said  ventures  in  the  VC’s 
portfolio and to invest in the development and sharing of competences crucial thereto 
(Campbell 1992, Stalk et al. 1992, Barney 1997). VCs might reach a maximum level of 
efficient diversification, which is determined by the strategic correlation between its 
ventures; beyond said level, further diversification implies reduced benefits and worse 
performances (Palich et al. 2000). 
In other words, diversification might entail benefits so long as the integration of 
a new venture in the portfolio does not imply costs (due to increased difficulties related 
to coordinating and controlling different ventures or inefficiencies due to conflicts and 
agency problems, which counterbalance the positive effects of such an inclusion.
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